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Abstract 
This thesis explores Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFI) as an 
alternative vehicle for the supply of debt finance to financially excluded enterprises. 
CDFIs are part of a broader approach to addressing financial exclusion that is 
experienced by commercial and social enterprises in the US and UK.  The thesis explores 
US and UK CDFI lending processes to develop an understanding of how financial and 
social objectives are balanced in the lending process and the ways in which CDFIs 
become embedded in local financial and business support networks.  The analysis is 
based upon detailed comparative research of CDFIs located in the US and the UK; 
interviews were undertaken with CDFIs, their clients and a quantitative analysis of a 
CDFIs loan portfolio was undertaken.  The research concludes that CDFIs are complex 
dynamic organizations as they have to balance a double or triple bottom line which has 
the potential to undermine the firm’s long term survival or mission.  The danger is that 
over time a CDFI will reduce its exposure to risk and become more like a mainstream 
bank.  The tensions with the CDFI business model implies that they will only ever 
provide a partial solution to the enterprise finance gap. 
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CHAPTER 1  FINANCIAL EXCLUSION: SMALL FIRMS 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the supply of funds available to support the 
activities of entrepreneurs1, as well as commercial and social enterprises that are deemed 
by mainstream lenders to be unbankable.  Enterprises that are unable to access finance 
are considered financially excluded2, defined simply as ‘those who lack financial 
products’ (Marshall, 2004:241) or more correctly, those who are unable to access 
financial products including loan finance.  Conversely, financial inclusion is where 
individuals and businesses can open a bank account and have access to credit facilities 
such as a an overdraft or credit card.  Start-up enterprises may be unable to access finance 
as their founders may not have a track record, lack experience, have a poor credit history 
and limited wealth.  The same also applies if enterprises seek finance to grow who 
cannot, for example, provide security to guarantee a loan that operate in high risk markets 
and declining markets.   
 
This chapter first considers why enterprise, entrepreneurship and social enterprises are 
important in today’s economy.  The second part explores why enterprises require access 
to finance and the types of funding available and the sources of funding.  The third part 
explores the enterprise finance gap and one solution, CDFIs.  The final part outlines the 
structure of the thesis. 
                                                 
1 Entrepreneurs are individuals who have established and currently manage a business.   
2 Social inclusion, on the other hand ‘is about having the personal capacity, self confidence and aspiration 
to make the most of the opportunities, choices and options in life that the majority of people take for 
granted’ (SETF, 2007:4).     
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Consequences of Financial Exclusion 
The neoliberal strategies of successive US and UK governments have aimed to create 
jobs and to reduce the reliance on welfare support.  One of these strategies aimed to 
stimulate and support enterprises in disadvantaged areas3 through providing loans and 
business support as deprived areas have least access to finance.  This thesis explores the 
role and relations of Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) as an 
alternative vehicle for the supply of debt finance to enterprise.  CDFIs serve the 
financially excluded by providing access to credit and in doing so, contribute to 
overcoming financial exclusion in which individuals and firms are denied access to 
various forms of financial products and loans for business start-ups and firms wanting to 
invest in developing their business activities.  CDFIs work to a double bottom line by 
realizing social as well as financial objectives and can be defined as independent finance 
institutions that provide capital and support to empower individuals or organizations at 
the edge of commercial margins to develop opportunity and wealth in disadvantaged 
areas.  
 
The UK New Labour Government’s promotion of the Third Way’s social and financial 
inclusion agenda, implies that it is advocating a retreat of the state as the UK system is 
shifting towards alternative forms of loan finance for both individuals and businesses 
rather then the provision of grants (Giddens, 1998).  The UK is following the US model 
of making citizens responsible for their own welfare using public finance to support 
businesses that create jobs rather than directly supporting the unemployed.  In spite of 
                                                 
3 Deprived or disadvantaged areas are characterised by multiple indices such as poverty, high 
unemployment, low skills, poor health and housing, and a lack of geographical access to goods and services 
(Troni & Kornblatt, 2006). 
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dramatic economic change over the 20th Century, community finance has become 
instrumental in providing financial products and services to individuals and firms.  For 
community finance institutions to remain viable in the long term they have to be 
innovative and diversify to adapt to changing policy market and economic conditions.       
  
One solution to the enterprise finance gap in the US and UK has been developed and 
provided by Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs).  CDFIs are an 
alternative vehicle for the supply of debt finance to financially excluded enterprises in 
deprived areas (Bryson and Buttle, 2005; Leyshon & Thrift, 1994; Mayo et al. 1998; 
Marshall, 2004; NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  These institutions are involved in relatively 
high risk lending and consequently have to manage relatively high default rates.  In many 
respects, CDFIs are an alternative to providing firms with grants.  They use criteria 
developed in the mainstream financial institutions but modify them to target financially 
excluded enterprises and to include social criteria.  Loans sanctioned by CDFIs are re-lent 
on repayment which multiplies economic wealth in the local community.  In this way, 
CDFIs minimize risk and maximize social impact by operating revolving loan funds.  
This means that grant finance can be targeted at CDFIs as they will try to ensure that the 
funding they receive is re-circulated around the local economy.  In this way, CDFIs could 
be largely responding to a set of policy objectives regarding financial exclusion and 
enterprise.  This research aims to explore the different ways in which CDFIs operate to 
understand how effective they are in addressing financially excluded enterprises.  
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There is an unequal geography of CDFI provision as many CDFIs have been established 
by local volunteers rather than being the product of an organized movement to ensure 
equal access to CDFI services throughout the US and UK.  High default rates and a gap 
in the provision of financial resources implies that CDFIs only contribute to overcoming 
financial exclusion in some parts of the US and UK.  Due to their double bottom line, 
CDFIs are highly complex and so tensions within their operations will always exist.  
CDFIs must be financially viable and as such they do not finance extremely high risk 
business propositions.  This means that financially excluded firms that operate below the 
lending threshold set by CDFIs will remain financially excluded.  As such, one does not 
know the true size and scale of the finance gap. There is also self exclusion due to 
cultural norms such as firms that follow Islam and comply with Sharia law and the 
restrictions it places on interest payment. 
 
The aims of the research are to: 
1. Understand how ART provides access to finance and how it bridges the gap 
between fulfilling social objectives and economic purposes.  
2. Define how CDFIs in the UK and US identify and measure effectiveness of 
socio-economic criteria that drive the business. 
3. To compare ART with other UK and US CDFIs through benchmarking. 
4. Consider the processes in which CDFIs become embedded in local financial 
and business support networks. 
? How effective are CDFI networks? 
? How do the networks operate and under what conditions? 
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5. To identify best practice to develop and inform other UK CDFIs.  
 
Enterprise plays a significant role in the US and UK economies, particularly in terms of 
creating jobs and start-ups, as these economies are becoming increasingly fragmented.  
Yet lack of access to finance can restrict new enterprise formation and firm growth and 
can constrain the creation of jobs in deprived areas.   Nevertheless, ‘boosting 
enterprise…has been a recurring goal of [US and UK] Government policy’ to generate 
local wealth, particularly in deprived areas (Troni and Kornblatt, 2006:v).  Financial 
exclusion is linked to space and place which combine to intensify the severity of the 
situation.  The impact of financial exclusion has intensified, especially in deprived areas 
of the US (Dymski and Veitch, 1996) and UK, through alterations in the way in which 
the mainstream financial sector assess loan applications from small firms (Buttle, 2005; 
Leyshon and Thrift, 1999; Martin, 1999).  Here it is important to distinguish between 
financially included firms that can access loan finance and a group of sub-prime 
borrowers.  This thesis explores one aspect of the sub-prime loan market in the US and 
UK.  Sub-prime borrowers are conventionally ignored by mainstream lenders given risk 
levels.  Sub-prime lending is usually ignored but has recently become extremely 
important given the relationship between sub-prime loans in the US and the impact on 
access and cost of finance in the mainstream financial markets.  The US sub-prime 
financial crisis was driven by mainstream lenders providing high risk loans to sub-prime 
lenders.  CDFIs are sub-prime lenders, but the limited extent of their activities and their 
distance from the mainstream financial system means that they have a limited impact 
both in terms of financial inclusion and on the wider financial system.    
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There are two types of enterprises; commercial enterprises and social enterprises.  
Commercial and social enterprises have different goals, for example, commercial 
enterprises may be managed to maximize growth, whilst social enterprises tend to be 
more concerned with their status quo.  Small commercial enterprises fall into three 
categories: 
1. Micro-enterprises: companies with 10 employees or less 
2. Small enterprises: companies with 50 employees or less 
3. Medium enterprises: companies with 250 employees or less (EC, 2007:1). 
Collectively they are referred to as small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  Start-up 
businesses, regardless of whether they are social or commercial enterprises, are those that 
are less than three years old and established businesses are over three years old. Both 
start-up and established SMEs can be affected by issues of financial exclusion.   
 
Social enterprises are organizations that have a social mission as well as a financial 
mission.  They can be for-profit or not-for-profit but are driven by reinvesting surplus 
into the business, community, or to support their mission instead of being motivated by 
maximizing profit for their own benefit (BOE, 2003).  It is worth noting that some social 
enterprises are driven by profit maximization, but only to ensure that they are able to 
maximize their social mission.  Social enterprises often provide facilities not delivered by 
the state, such as forms of extra care provided for the elderly, which are embedded in the 
local economy.  In this way, social enterprises allow ideas and innovations to occur that 
could not be developed in the public sector.  However, the public sector can reintegrate 
the services of social enterprises back into the public realm.  Social enterprises have to 
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demonstrate their financial sustainability to their stakeholders so that they can access 
grant or loan finance from mainstream financial institutions.  As social enterprises are 
driven by social and financial objectives, they must be sustainable organizations with 
viable business plans and balance sheets but they must also deliver a range of social, 
economic or environmental objectives.  Social enterprises may have ‘a higher cost base’ 
than purely commercial firms as a result of their social mission (BOE, 2003:3).  Given 
the higher cost of social enterprises, they may subsidize their social activities with other 
business activities.  External interested parties (Government and charities), may subsidize 
the cost of balancing these organization’s social and financial objectives.    
 
The Significance of Enterprise 
Since the 1980s successive US and UK Governments have asserted that small business 
enterprises are the backbone of these economies as they stimulate employment, increase 
productivity and innovation in a globally competitive dynamic marketplace (NEF and 
Nicholson, 2003).  Access to finance for SMEs is key to encouraging competition and 
economic growth in the UK.  SMEs provide 58% of private sector employment and 52% 
of private-sector turnover (SBS, 2003).  As such, SMEs play a significant role in the 
UK’s economy.  Government policy has adopted a neoliberal approach which involves a 
shift away from welfarism to a policy framework that attempts to make their citizens 
responsible for their own wellbeing.  The current UK Labour Government, for example, 
encourages women to go back to work when their children are at school (Wintour, 2007); 
this is one way of getting people off welfare benefits and into employment and even self-
employment.  It also promotes new opportunities for people to start their own businesses.   
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The economy has become increasingly fragmented largely through the corporate shift 
towards outsourcing and the ongoing division of labour associated with the development 
of the service sector (Bryson et al. 2004).  Both processes provide opportunities for the 
development of new businesses.  In addition, constant social change has provided new 
opportunities for people to do business.  For example, the increasing interest in organic 
food has opened up new markets and business opportunities.  The ongoing fragmentation 
of economic activity is dependent on the activities of educated people and their ability to 
access finance both for their start-up, development and growth.  Many new revenue-
based business opportunities have reduced entry barriers compared to manufacturing.  
Such firms have limited requirement for capital and equipment as they are based upon 
expertise and reputation. 
 
Funding Enterprise 
SMEs require both capital and revenue funding or cash-flow.  Capital funding is required 
for the business to operate such as to acquire stock, computers, and furniture, while 
revenue funding is required for day-to-day activities such as salaries, rent, and insurance.  
Start-up costs also need to be covered as initially a business may not create enough 
revenue to support the owner and any employees.   
 
Demand: How Small Firms are Funded 
The first in-depth study of UK SME mainstream finance was undertaken in 2004 (Fraser, 
2004).  The study led by the Bank of England collated data on the availability and types 
of finance used by SMEs.  The sources of finance used in the survey were all mainstream 
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sources and ignored alternative sources of finance, for example, CDFIs.  The study found 
that the most popular types of finance used by UK SMEs were overdrafts (52.9%) and 
credit cards (55.3%) (Table 1.1).  Personal finance is used by enterprises to fund an 
SME’s activities, which is a prime source of capital for entrepreneurs.  UK SMEs were 
least likely to use equity based transactions, such as informal finance from friends or 
family, or formal investment from venture capitalists or business angels4 (Table 1.1).  In 
2004, the average amount of loan finance sought by UK SMEs was £81,826 (Table 1.2).  
In comparison, UK ethnic-minority owners of SMEs only sought an average of £28,231 
(Table 1.2).  Of those businesses that sought external finance, 11.4% of UK SMEs were 
rejected outright from accessing bank loans, overdraft facilities, asset finance, or equity 
finance (Table 1.3).  19% of UK SMEs were awarded less capital than was requested and 
8% (130,000) of SMEs were discouraged from applying for finance as they considered 
that their application would be declined (Fraser, 2004:12).  However, in the majority of 
cases, no reason was given for the decline (Fraser, 2004:68).  Some firms also self-define 
themselves as being financially excluded as they do not approach banks.  These figures 
provide some indication of the extent of the enterprise finance gap in the UK.  
 
 Table 1.1: Type of Finance used by UK SMEs (%) 
 Overdrafts Grants Term Loan Asset Finance Asset-based 
Credit 
Cards Equity 
All businesses 52.9 6.4 24.3 26.9 3.0 55.3 2.9 
 
(Source: Fraser, 2004: 156) 
 
                                                 
4Business angels are largely individual investors who are prepared to invest equity (less than £50,000) and 
experience based on their own successful business ventures on an informal basis (Mason & Harrison, 1999; 
Storey, 1994; Van Osnabrugge, 2000). 
 
 9
 
Table 1.2: Amounts of new finance sought in last 3 years by UK SMEs 
 Amount Sought (£) 
All businesses £81,826 
Non-white ethicity businesses £28,231 
White ethnicity businesses £85,366 
 
(Source: Fraser, 2004:169-170) 
 
 
 
Table 1.3: Percentage of UK SMEs needing new finance which were rejected outright 
from applying for finance (bank loan, overdraft facility, asset finance, asset based, 
business angel or venture capital) in last 3 years (%) 
 
 
Rejected 
Outright  
Partial 
Rejection Discouraged      
All businesses 11.4 19.0 8.2     
(Source: Fraser, 2004: 172) 
 
Supply: The Business of Providing Funds 
Mainstream finance is provided by banks, venture capitalists and business angels, who all 
work to achieve a single bottom line of maximized profits.  Mainstream finance is 
defined in terms of the availability of conventional products such as deposits and credit.  
Mainstream banking is provided by private business and their focus is on making a profit. 
For instance, in the financial year 2006 to 2007 Barclays, a mainstream UK bank, saw 
their profits increase by 35% on the previous year’s trading, earning £7.136 billion before 
tax.  Banks make short-term loans if clients have sufficient collateral to guarantee 
repayment and have the right risk profile (Taylor and Thrift, 1983).  Thus, mainstream 
financial services exclude particular people and businesses that do not have the right 
credentials from accessing their services.  By excluding certain groups, mainstream banks 
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minimize the risk of losing money by borrowers defaulting on loans.  Risk is minimized 
through securing the loan against property to guarantee that the loan can and will be 
repaid in full.   
 
Recommendations made in the Macmillan report (1931) led to improved access to 
finance for SMEs but financial exclusion experienced by enterprise never disappeared.  
The Bank of England’s (BOE, 2000:v) report on ‘Finance for Small Businesses in 
Deprived Communities’ asserted that a number of elements contribute to increased risk 
and the reluctance of US and UK banks to sanction loans to ‘marginal and near bankable 
businesses’ in disadvantaged areas.  The factors which make banks less likely to lend to 
enterprises in deprived areas include information asymmetries including: 
‘Lack of business experience; lack of collateral and personal equity; 
concentration in business sectors subject to higher failure rates; 
remoteness; small and localised markets; and high crime rates.’ (BOE, 
2000:v)  
Information asymmetry is where information is missing or cannot be produced.  The 
reluctance of mainstream financial institutions to lend to small businesses can be 
regarded as market failure and/or credit rationing.  Mainstream banks lend on the loans of 
a system of credit scoring and risk assessment in order to increase profit and reduce the 
risk of borrowers defaulting on their loans (Barr, 2005; BOE, 2000; Leyshon and Thrift, 
1999).  The greatest impact of credit rationing is experienced by the most economically 
vulnerable who are asset and income poor and living in the most deprived areas.  Of 
those self-employed people in disadvantaged areas with a personal current account, many 
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do not have a separate business account.  Individuals, micro enterprises, SMEs, and 
social enterprises in deprived areas have the least access to finance due to the risks 
involved in lending to them (Mayo et al. 1998; NFSNR, 1999).  This means that the 
provision of finance for enterprise is geographically uneven and needs to be explored by 
economic geographers.  National and local strategies to overcome financial exclusion, 
such as CDFIs, also have distinctive geographies that should be the subject of detailed 
research and form one element of analysis. 
 
The Finance Gap 
Market failure occurs where there is a demand for business finance but the supply is 
restricted by lack of deal flow and an unwillingness by lending institutions to lend to 
viable propositions.  A finance gap exists where there is demand for finance but no 
supply.  This implies that viable business propositions may exist which are never 
developed because they are considered to be unbankable business propositions.  This 
leaves a finance gap in the market that can be filled by the activities of the state, by 
charities or by the development of various forms of micro-finance or community finance.  
The latter includes CDFIs.  CDFIs can be considered to be an alternative financial vehicle 
as they help individuals and firms that have been financially excluded by mainstream 
financial providers.  This thesis explores the role and actions of CDFIs as an alternative 
vehicle for the supply of debt finance to enterprise.   
 
The existence of finance gaps for SMEs in advanced capitalist economies has been well 
documented (Barr, 2005; BOE, 2000, 2004; Bolton, 1971; Cole et al. 2004; Gertler, 
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1988; Graham, 2004; Macmillan, 1931; Martin, 1999; Mayo et al. 1998; Radcliffe; 1959; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Storey, 1994; Taylor and Thrift, 1982, 1983; Wilson, 1979).  A 
finance gap is defined as: 
‘an unwillingness on the part of suppliers of finance to supply it on the 
terms and conditions required by small businesses’ (Storey, 1994:239). 
The issue is one of access to a product and the attached conditions and cost.  Small firms 
that have problems accessing capital are experiencing market failure and/or credit 
rationing (Storey, 1994).  If SMEs cannot access business finance, then personal finance 
may be used in the form of credit cards, mortgages and/or personal loans.  The existence 
of a finance gap suggests that mainstream financial institutions are reluctant to lend to 
small businesses that do not have the right business track record, lack collateral or are 
considered high risk from the perspective of lenders trying to minimize risk and 
maximize profit.   
 
The supply of funds for enterprise was uneven resulting in forms of financial exclusion.  
Taylor and Thrift (1983:31) suggested that there were three finance gaps for enterprise: 
the first gap is access to banking capital; the second gap is the venture capital5 gap; and 
the third gap is the international finance gap.  But, there is also a fourth finance gap, a 
start-up gap that overlaps with personal financial exclusion as many start-up small firms 
are financed by personal financial products.   
 
                                                 
5 Venture capitalists provide equity finance to businesses.  Venture capital is defined as finance provided by 
professional investors of more than £50,000. 
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Many viable firms experience problems in accessing finance from mainstream financial 
institutions as potential lenders may not expect them to produce the expected return on 
investment associated with the level of risk involved.  Viability is ‘where the expected 
return to the project exceeds the real costs of resources used’ by the financial institution 
(Storey, 1994).  Vitality is the financial institution’s probability of securing a profit on a 
lending transaction.  SMEs are perceived to be high-risk, expensive ventures for the size 
of loan that they require and part of the expense is linked to the management and 
administrative costs associated with smaller transactions.  Barriers to accessing finance 
for enterprise are highlighted in Table 1.4. 
 
Table 1.4: Reasons for the Financial Exclusion of Enterprise from Accessing 
Mainstream Finance 
Reasons for the Financial Exclusion of Enterprise 
• Start-up businesses 
• High technology businesses 
• Diversifying businesses 
• In need of working capital, research and development, and/or marketing finance 
• Lacking security 
• Lacking a business track record 
• Lacking management experience/skills 
• High transaction costs 
• Poor credit history and/or County Court Judgements (CCJs)  
 
(Source: Nicholson, 2004:8) 
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Businesses can experience problems in accessing finance due to a lack of business 
experience, lack of collateral, if there is a high failure rate of businesses in that market, 
small, weak or localized markets, isolation and or high crime rates (Nicholson, 2004).  
Barriers to accessing personal finance include: receiving welfare benefits; being on a low 
income; unemployment; not owning property; being a single parent; age; having a 
criminal record; being from an ethnic minority background and/or living in a deprived 
area (Nicholson, 2004:9).  As such, many businesses and individuals require business 
advice combined with financial support. 
 
Many charities and voluntary groups face barriers in accessing mainstream finance.  The 
supply of finance for social enterprises is problematic as many are at the margins of 
commercial viability as defined by the banks and many are not investment ready6.  Social 
enterprises have a cultural aversion to debt finance, as they may have developed within 
the context of a grant rather than loan environment and culture.  Grants often carry 
restrictions on the use of funds which constrains an organization’s activities (BOE, 2003).  
Project based loans and grants may be problematic as they create short-term funds and 
instability especially when projects are paid in arrears.  Grant funding does not motivate 
social enterprises to look beyond the short-term or to improve the operational efficiency 
of their business.   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Investment readiness is when firms searching for finance have viable business plans and business 
knowledge (Mayo et al. 1998).   
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Solutions to the Finance Gap 
In recognition of the significance of SMEs, academic and policy makers have called for 
improvements in the supply of finance for many decades (Deloitte and Touche, 2002).  
So, why should the finance gaps that exist be removed and how could those gaps be 
filled?  Access to finance is fundamental to enterprise development and growth (BOE, 
2003) and internationally as well as locally competitive businesses need finance.  Since 
Macmillan (1931) identified the first finance gap, the state has sought to resolve access to 
finance for enterprise.  Yet the state has had an unhappy history of providing solutions to 
this problem. 
 
Alternative sources of finance have emerged in response to the unwillingness of 
mainstream financial institutions to serve certain groups.  Fraser (2004) identified that 
some businesses (8%) could not access finance but he ignored the financially excluded as 
well as the role of alternative sources of finance in the provision of finance for enterprise 
through organizations such as CDFIs.  There is a gap in the existing literature on finance 
in regard to the provision of alternative finance for enterprise and the role of CDFIs.  One 
of the most important contributions to this literature is Buttle’s thesis on CDFIs, but the 
focus is primarily on the provision of finance for social enterprises.  Marshall (2004) 
provided a literature based account of US and UK CDFIs.  Buttle (2005) explored UK 
CDFIs as a form of social investment rather than as a source of finance for commercial 
enterprise.  Benjamin et al. (2004), Rubin with Zielenbach (2006) and Rubin and 
Stankiewicz (2001) have worked on US CDFIs.  One type of alternative to mainstream 
banks is a group of lenders that often incorporate a double or even triple bottom line in 
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that they seek to fulfil social, environmental as well as financial objectives.  These 
alternative lenders experience a tension that must be reconciled as they operate in line 
with mainstream lending practices yet also incorporate socially inclusive policies 
intended to serve the needs of the financially excluded.  The aim of these alternatives is, 
however, for those who are financially excluded to eventually become part of the 
mainstream once that they have proved that they are bankable. 
 
Alternative finance is also known as community finance, which includes co-operatives, 
friendly societies and credit unions, as well as pawnbrokers, licensed doorstep credit 
companies and illegal loan sharks (Palmer with Conaty, 2002).  With the rationalization 
of banks in the UK, credit unions, a form of community finance institution, ‘potentially 
offer a more stable financial and institutional presence for people in those localities, 
especially those on low incomes’ (Fuller and Jonas, 2002:87; Fuller and Jonas, 2003; 
Palmer with Conaty, 2002).  As such, Fuller and Jonas (2002) believe that the longevity 
and significance of credit unions is due to the fact that they are culturally and 
geographically embedded in local environments. The current UK Labour Government 
views credit unions as independent, alternative forms of finance which are thought to be a 
key to addressing social and financial inclusion (HMT, 2004).   This thesis, however, 
does not consider Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS) (Amin et al. 1999, 2003; 
Burns et al. 2004; Lee, 1999; Leyshon et al. 2003; Williams, 1996; Williams et al. 2004), 
credit unions (Fuller and Jonas, 2002, 2003; Purcell and Cobb, 2004), co-operatives, 
friendly societies, pawnbrokers, licensed, or unlicensed credit services, as they focus on 
overcoming personal financial exclusion rather than financially excluded enterprises.  
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This is an important distinction; credit unions enable people to borrow to fund personal 
consumption whilst providers of finance for enterprise directly contribute to local 
economic development and wealth creation.  
 
Geographers have predominantly been concerned with the use of finance and have also 
focused on understanding personal finance and alternative finance (for example Amin et 
al. 1999, 2003; Fuller and Jonas, 2002; Lee, 1999; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Leyshon et 
al. 2003; Williams, 1996; Williams and Windebank, 2001; Williams et al. 2003).  The 
alternative finance literature focuses on exploring local demand for personal finance and 
financial exclusion.  There has, therefore, been minimal effort to explore the supply of 
finance, particularly for enterprise.  The absence of a significant body of literature in 
geography on finance for enterprise is perhaps explained by the difficulty of working 
within firms as well as financial institutions, and the cultural turn which highlighted the 
importance of exploring diversity and alternatives other than the mainstream (Burns et al. 
2004, Leyshon et al. 2003; Williams and Windebank, 2001).  Similarly, the recent 
‘relational turn’ in economic geography encourages academics to develop a people-
centred rather than enterprise-based approach to the firm (Hess, 2004).  This means that 
banks or lenders to enterprise have been neglected.   
 
Financial exclusion for enterprise is not necessarily visible, whereas personal financial 
exclusion can be highly visible due to the retreat of banks from the high street and the 
multitude of pawnbrokers, cheque cashing, and credit unions.  The visibility of personal 
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financial exclusion is perhaps the UK version of US redlining7, where banks do not serve 
deprived communities.  In the late 1980s, mainstream banks retreated from inner city 
areas to more wealthy and profitable areas, thus excluding the poorest in society from 
accessing financial products and services (Buttle, 2005; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994, 1997, 
1999; Williams, 1996).   This suggests that there is an obvious spatiality of personal 
financial exclusion which has promoted the development of a geographical literature on 
personal financial exclusion. 
 
US and UK CDFI Comparison  
In this thesis a comparative approach developed through the analysis of US and UK 
CDFIs.  This approach was taken to understanding the emergence and development of 
CDFIs in the US and UK rather than making a straight comparison.  No empirical 
comparison between US and UK CDFIs has been undertaken.  The intention of this thesis 
is to provide the evidence base for US and UK CDFIs, and explore how and why CDFIs, 
located in different places, work to foster enterprise in different ways.  This analysis 
explores the ways in which marginalized enterprises can access finance through CDFIs to 
maximize enterprise activity in the US and UK.  US CDFIs emerged in the 1960s as a 
result of local banks shifting their interests to global markets through the deregulation of 
the banking sector.  US CDFIs are perhaps better developed than those in the UK.  UK 
CDFIs have taken a more balanced approach to their activities seeking to balance social 
and financial objectives.  In this way, this thesis explores different solutions that have 
been developed to overcome the problem of financial exclusion.  US CDFIs are radically 
                                                 
7 Redlining is the term used to describe the process by which a red line is drawn on a map to highlight low-
income areas to deny access to credit and mortgages to the communities within that location (Pinsky, 
2005).   
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different to those in the UK and this analysis identifies and explores those differences.  
Against this background, the analysis addresses US and UK CDFIs by exploring the 
following issues: 
• In what ways, if any, is financial exclusion being tackled by CDFIs and how are 
CDFIs becoming embedded in the local environment to ensure that they reach 
their target market through the articulation of a double bottom line? 
• How do CDFIs define and measure their double bottom line? 
• How do CDFIs become sustainable? 
This section has explored how SMEs are funded, if at all and the issue of the finance gap 
which has led to alternative forms of finance emerging to aid enterprises that cannot 
access mainstream finance.  The next chapter will highlight the gaps that exist within the 
literature that deal with the geographies of finance.  These questions are placed in the 
context of the literature that has developed on the geographies of finance and it is a 
consideration of the gaps in this literature that we now turn our attention. 
 
Thesis Outline 
This chapter has outlined the key theme of this thesis, the financial exclusion of 
enterprises in the US and UK as a result of a finance gap that is created by the action of 
mainstream financial institutions.  ‘Access to Finance: Small Firms’ provides the 
theoretical foundation for this research and explores the literature on the geographies of 
finance surrounding small firm operations and the supply of finance from mainstream 
financial institutions and alternative economic spaces to explore where, how and why 
CDFIs can be situated within these debates.   
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The methodology for the thesis is outlined in Chapter 3, which explores in detail how and 
why particular qualitative and quantitative techniques were selected in order to access 
and analyze the interview and CDFI loan portfolio data.  Interviews with banks, CDFIs, 
CDFI clients and CDFI trade associations were undertaken to consider a broad spectrum 
of key actors and stakeholders within the sector.   
 
Chapter 4 ‘The state of the CDFI sector in the US and UK’ explores the historical context 
of US and UK CDFIs and the current debates surrounding CDFIs and their activities.  
The chapter explores both how US and UK CDFIs emerged in a series of three, albeit 
different phases reflecting different policy contexts and the roles that CDFIs play in these 
countries.  Chapter 4 provides the context for Chapter 5, the first empirical chapter.  
 
The nature of the operations of US and UK CDFIs is considered in Chapter 5 ‘The nature 
and operations of US and UK CDFI case studies’.  The operations of CDFIs within and 
between the US and UK differ markedly as they emerged in different ways, in response 
to a different set of drivers, have various different roles (and missions), serve different 
markets and as a result, their performance measurement reflects the difference, diversity 
and complexity within the US and UK CDFI sectors. 
 
In Chapter 6, the embeddedness of US and UK CDFI operations and the tensions within 
balancing their financial and social objectives is explored.  Chapter 6 also explores the 
flow of funds into, within and out of CDFIs to reveal how CDFIs try to balance their 
social and financial objectives, if at all.      
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In Chapter 7 the dynamic complexity involved in balancing CDFI operations within a 
regional context is explored through a detailed case study, the Aston Reinvestment Trust 
(ART), a CDFI based in Aston, Birmingham, UK.  The chapter shows that US and UK 
CDFIs operate using a triple bottom line of social, financial and environmental objectives 
given the geographical nature of their operations, rather than balancing the usual double 
bottom line.   
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.  At present US and UK CDFIs are geographically uneven, 
use different business models and organizational structures, serve small, local, niche 
markets and are dynamically complex.  US and UK CDFIs may never achieve the scale 
to have a significant impact on financial exclusion as they are not a coherent sector.    
Without a consistent approach to providing access to finance, it is unlikely that UK 
CDFIs will create the impact desired to reduce the financial exclusion of enterprises. 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing literatures by exploring access to finance for 
enterprises that are at the margins of commercial viability.  The research undertakes a 
comparative study of US and UK CDFIs to explore the differences within and between 
CDFIs operations. 
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CHAPTER 2  ACCESS TO FINANCE: SMALL FIRMS 
 
Since the 1970s, geographers interested in finance have concentrated their activities on 
exploring access to mainstream finance for personal consumption, financial restructuring 
and bank branch withdrawal in the US and UK (Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1994, 1996, 1995, 1997, 1999; Martin, 1999).  One emphasis has been on bank 
retreat, for example: 
‘In the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to a financial recession the 
high-street banks re-orientat[ed] themselves up-market and…[closed] 
many of their inner city branches’ (Buttle, 2005: 144). 
Mainstream banks in the US and UK have focused on their bottom line8 and restructured 
their operations away from disadvantaged areas (Williams, 1996).  The literature on 
personal banking is paralleled by alterations in the way that banks process applications 
for enterprise loans.   Retail banks have shifted their business lending procedures away 
from face-to-face relationship banking to credit scoring to determine the lending risk and 
the profitability of each loan (Leyshon and Thrift, 1999).  The rationale for using credit 
scoring is to overcome information asymmetries9 and identify customers that will be 
more likely to repay loans from those that will not (Leyshon and Thrift, 1999; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981).  In this way, mainstream financial institutions seek to reduce the risk of 
loans defaulting and to increase their profitability.  The use of credit scoring arguably 
exacerbated financial exclusion as banks have become increasingly risk averse (Leyshon 
and Thrift, 1999).   
                                                 
8 The bottom line of commercial enterprises is to generate a profit.  
9 Information asymmetries are where information is missing or unknown. 
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With the withdrawal of financial services from certain areas of the UK (Buttle, 2005; 
Bryson and Buttle, 2005; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999; Martin, 
1999; Williams, 1996), economic geographers have concentrated on understanding, 
alternative economic spaces and in particular, alternative financial initiatives that serve 
socially and financially excluded groups and local needs such as credit unions and Local 
Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS) (Amin et al. 1999, 2003; Fuller and Jonas, 2002; 
Lee, 1999; Leyshon and Thrift, 1996, 1997; Leyshon et al. 2003; Purcell and Cobb, 2004; 
Williams, 1996; Williams et al. 2003).  Credit Unions are not-for-profit, independent 
financial co-operatives which are mutually owned (FSA, 2004; Hyndman et al. 2002).  
Credit union members are linked by a common bond of shared beliefs, religion, 
employment or community (ABCUL, 2002; FSA, 2004; Hyndman et al. 2002).  In 
contrast, LETS are:  
‘a system of exchange of services and skills amongst the members of a 
community.  The form of money is essentially the valuation of the various 
services and skills that these members provide for one another’ (Lee, 
1999:209).   
In this way, LETS and credit unions are perceived as an alternative, socially constructed 
form of money which rely on social embeddedness and trust within a particular time and 
place in which to operate.    
 
Economic geographers have also explored global financial systems (Clark, 2005; 
Leyshon and Thrift, 1996, 1997) and firms with high growth potential seeking venture 
capital (Mason and Harrison, 2002; Martin, 1999).  Yet, geographers have neglected to 
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develop geographies of finance for enterprise.  Taylor and Thrift (1983: 359-360) suggest 
that geographers have ignored: 
‘the sources and types of funds available to different types of enterprise 
even though the availability of these funds obviously constrains all 
aspects…of investment decision making… a proper appreciation of the 
nature and availability of various forms of finance is, therefore, central to 
an understanding of the functioning of modern capitalist production’. 
Even though Taylor and Thrift wrote this in the early 1980s, geographers have still not 
responded to this call for research on the supply of finance for enterprise.  There is a 
significant gap in the literature on mainstream finance for enterprise.  In particular, the 
access to debt finance for start-up and existing SMEs and the ways in which mainstream 
financial institutions operate their loan funds in order to maximize their single bottom 
line or profit.   
 
Financial geographers have ignored the finance for enterprise gap (Pollard, 2003, 2007).  
Geography may have neglected to explore the enterprise finance due to the complexity 
surrounding finance for enterprise.  The complexity derives from the variety of finance 
options available to firms which reflect the different requirements of each business sector 
and stage in the business cycle.  Furthermore, in terms of the empirical research required 
to explore firm finance, it is difficult to access SMEs as entrepreneurs do not necessarily 
want to discuss their private financial affairs.  Banks are also reluctant to discuss such 
matters as they operate within a dynamic market that reacts to changes in the economic 
cycle.  In this way, access to banks and enterprise is challenging due to the sensitivity of 
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the research material.  Not surprisingly, there is a gap in the literature in the area of 
access to finance for enterprises, especially the uneven development of mainstream 
finance and for the availability of finance in disadvantaged areas. 
 
This chapter explores SMEs and finance.  The first part of the chapter defines small firms 
and examines the increasing significance of small firms in the economy.  The second part 
of the chapter investigates the supply of finance through mainstream financial 
institutions.  The rapid growth of the small firm population has led to a greater demand 
for external finance.  Increased demand has been limited by supply problems, thereby 
creating a finance gap.  As a result, many firms face barriers to accessing finance which 
sees them seeking alternative strategies and networks.  The third section of this chapter 
explores the alternative economic spaces literature as one solution to the finance gap.  By 
highlighting differences between mainstream and alternative lending practices, the final 
part of the chapter situates CDFIs within the economic geography literatures.  The 
chapter concludes by arguing that a significant proportion of small firms in the UK 
continue to experience barriers to finance which impedes start-up rates and the efficiency 
and progress of many SMEs.  
 
Small Firms 
The key drivers behind small firms are entrepreneurialism and supportive public policy.  
A successful small firm will have a number of key entrepreneurial resources such as 
motivation, finance, skills, expertise and knowledge.  A small firm also needs an 
appropriate external operating environment in terms of taxation and policy to allow the 
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business to develop and grow.  The operating environment includes investment, 
expenditure, cash flow, internal and external operating environment, and the market.  
Together the internal and external factors can determine the strategy and the success or 
failure of a small firm.  This entrepreneurial process also applies to CDFIs and their 
clients, as a CDFI is a business in its own right. 
 
Finance for enterprise is perhaps the key issue for small firms regardless of their 
development stage (start-up to post-growth).  Accessing finance can be problematic for 
enterprises due to a lack of investment readiness.  Investment readiness is defined in the 
following three ways:  
1. The SME is seeking finance.   
2. Business plans are complete and up-to-date. 
3. The SME has a viable business proposition (Mayo et al. 1998).   
The type of finance required can be divided further into capital or revenue finance.  Loan 
capital funding is required to acquire capital (assets, land, machines) while revenue 
finance concerns a firms’ operating budget and includes salary and running costs. 
 
What is an SME? 
The UK Government promotes SMEs as ‘enterprise is a key driver of a modern, high 
productivity economy in which opportunity is open to all’ (HMT, 2004:3.24).  Enterprise 
is perceived to be essential in order to compete in the global economy and it revitalizes 
stagnant local economies (HMT, 2004; Porter, 1990).  Porter (1990) asserted that SMEs 
are vital to local economies, especially those of the inner city as they can stimulate 
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regeneration, particularly if small firms are embedded in the local economy (Taylor, 
1999), as well as empowering those living and working in the inner city as enterprise can 
be seen as an opportunity to rise out of poverty.  Academics and the US and UK 
Governments recognize that SMEs form a significant sector in advanced economies 
(Storey, 1994; Keeble, 1997).  Entrepreneurialism has become a viable option for many 
due to the flexibility and diversity of the sector.  This section, explores the definition of 
SMEs, the complexity of small firm activity, and the significance of entrepreneurship and 
SMEs for the economy.   
 
Defining SMEs 
SMEs have proved contentious to define and their slippery nature remains contested by 
national and international administrations, academia and financial institutions (Storey, 
1994; BOE 2000, 2002, 2004; EC, 2002; Taylor and Asheim, 2001).  To demonstrate the 
difficulty in defining the diverse nature of the SME, the Bolton report (1971) 
acknowledged that small firms cannot ‘be adequately defined in terms of employment, or 
assets, turnover, output or any other arbitrary single quantity’.  Storey (1994:8) agrees 
that there is: 
‘no single, uniformly acceptable, definition of a small firm…[as each 
sector has different] levels of capitalization, sales and possibly 
employment’.   
Thus, ‘objective’ measures of small firms (profit, turnover, number of employees) depend 
upon the market sector in which the small firm is located (Storey, 1994:8).  In an attempt 
to overcome these issues, the Bolton Committee (1971) developed two definitions of 
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small firms: ‘economic’ and ‘statistical’ definitions, both of which are characterized by 
three key elements.  The ‘economic’ definition of small firms is that: first, small firms 
have a minor market share; second, that they are ‘managed by [their] owners or part-
owners in a personal way’; and finally, that they are an independent company which are 
not part of a larger firm (Bolton, 1971:1).  Whilst the ‘statistical’ purpose of defining a 
small firm: 
‘was [first] to quantify the current size of the small firm sector and its 
contribution to economic aggregates such as gross domestic product, 
employment, exports, innovation, etc.  The second purpose was to 
compare the extent to which the small firm sector has changed its 
economic contribution over time.  Thirdly, the statistical definition, in 
principal, has to enable a comparison to be made between the contribution 
of small firms in one country with that of other nations’  (Bolton, 1971:1).  
However, according to Storey (1994), these two definitions conflict.  According to the 
Bolton Committee (1971) a small manufacturing company can have up to 200 
employees, whereas in construction or retail, the company can only have 25 employees or 
less to be defined as small.   In contrast, the economic definition believes that a business 
is managed in a personal way.  Storey (1994), quite rightly, questions whether this can be 
true of a company with 200 employees.  In addition, there is no unifying concept of small 
firm and the turnover of small firms does not account for price fluctuations (Storey, 
1994).  Despite the best efforts of the Bolton Committee (1971), it is clear that small 
firms are difficult to define due to their diverse nature and complex operations. 
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The EC (2007:1) tried to overcome some of the problems associated with the depiction of 
small firms by identifying three categories: 
4. Micro-enterprises: companies with 0-9 employees. 
5. Small enterprises: companies with 50 employees or less. 
6. Medium enterprises: companies with 250 employees or less. 
This definition unifies SMEs through a single concept and incorporates all sectors of the 
economy (Storey, 1994).  Hence the term SME will be used in this thesis.  However, this 
definition fails to reflect the diverse nature of small firms, and ignores the social, cultural, 
political, space and time dynamics.  Thus, the EC definition of SMEs still lacks 
credibility, although small firms can be compared efficiently across markets, regions and 
countries regardless of price fluctuations and changes to currency.   
 
The Decline and Rise of SMEs 
The small firm sector in the UK was in a state of decline until the late 1960s when the 
sector began to grow once more (Bolton, 1971).  Small firms employed at least 6 million 
or 25% of the workforce in the late 1960s (Bolton, 1971), compared to 44% of private 
sector employment in 2003 (BOE, 2004).  The rise of the small firm in the late 1960s 
could be a consequence of economic restructuring and the rise of deindustrialization of 
the UK’s manufacturing sector (Martin, 1999; Storey, 1994).  But the real turning point 
for the rise of small firms came in the 1970s, a decade dominated by economic crisis, 
deregulation and increasing globalisation in advanced economies (Martin, 1999).  An 
increasing demand for specialist products associated with advances in technological 
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innovation meant that small firms were more able to meet the needs of markets and 
realize economic growth (Storey, 1994; Van Osnabrugge, 2000).   
 
The growth in the number of small firms was due to a number of factors.  On the supply 
side, technological advances led to innovations and the creation of new products and 
services (Van Osnabrugge, 2000); the fragmentation of industry led to increased levels of 
subcontracting and buy-outs; education levels have increased and in times of high 
unemployment, self-employment has been viewed as a viable option.  In addition, 
Government’s have embraced the neoliberal philosophy of privatization and deregulation 
for the efficiency of the market which has led to a public discourse surrounding the 
enterprise culture (Storey, 1994).   
 
On the demand side, economic restructuring with increased flexible specialization within 
manufacturing and the rise of the service sector has created niche markets (Storey, 1994).  
These factors led to a paradigm shift which essentially increased the significance of small 
firms for the vitality of the economy (Martin, 1999; Rogaly et al. 1999).  It is widely 
believed that small enterprises are vital for job creation and economic vitality as they 
stimulate wealth within local economies (Acs and Storey, 2004).  The 1980s were 
characterized by the rise of an aspiring ‘enterprise culture’ (Acs and Storey, 2004:871).  
Self-employment proved to be a viable option for those who were long-term unemployed 
or in low wage occupations and it was one method that could be used to shift them from 
the poverty trap (Rogaly et al. 1999) and it also sits comfortably with neo-liberal 
philosophy.   
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Entrepreneurship, Temporary Coalitions and Time 
Over the last decade, advances have been made in understanding entrepreneurship as a 
tool for economic development through exploiting cross discipline debates from 
economics, geography and sociology (Acs and Storey, 2004).  An entrepreneur is defined 
simply as someone that starts their own business.  This definition is by no means 
adequate as it fails to take into consideration all the resources necessary to become an 
entrepreneur (Taylor, 1999).  Arguably, entrepreneurialism only occurs once in the 
lifecycle of a firm and that is at the start-up stage.  To set up a business requires skill, 
and/or experience, and knowledge.   
 
To move away from the neoclassical definition of the firm as a ‘black box’, Taylor and 
Asheim (2001) argue that the firm can be conceptualized in two ways.  The rationalist 
concept defines the firm based on efficiency measures (price) whilst the ‘alternative’ 
(Taylor and Asheim, 2001:4) socioeconomic concept of the firm places ‘the social 
construction of the economy’ (Taylor and Asheim, 2001:3) at its core.  Polanyi (1957) 
developed the social concept of the firm approach and this has produced a number of 
other theories including:  
‘institutionalist, embedded networks, learning, resource-based, discursive 
[or relational] and temporary coalitions’ (Taylor and Asheim, 2001:4).   
These concepts are linked by the notion that enterprise is a dynamic mix of social and 
economic processes.  This thesis employs the embeddedness concept of the firm, 
whereby economic activity is dependent upon the social, cultural, and political context 
surrounding the firm.   
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Linked to the concept of embeddedness is the temporary coalition perspective of the firm.  
A firm can be conceptualized as ‘a networked temporary coalition’ between 
entrepreneurs who seek market opportunities (Taylor, 1999:1).  ‘New firms are, 
therefore, from the outset informally networked with other businesses’ (Taylor, 1999:1).  
Temporary coalitions are networks of firms that operate through individuals and develop 
and vary over time.  This thesis explores firms as temporary coalitions as it is believed 
that individuals are selected to join the firm (staff and board of directors) for their 
knowledge and expertise to develop and enhance the enterprise’s missions over time and 
also considers the processes by which CDFIs become embedded in local financial and 
business support networks 
 
In addition to this, the significance of time is often ignored, especially the timing of 
when, where, how and why a venture is established.  These factors are entirely dependent 
upon the situation, environment and circumstances of the entrepreneur(s) as without the 
right finance, knowledge and capabilities, a firm would not exist.  Acs and Storey (2004) 
suggest that entrepreneurs look for opportunities in the marketplace to transfer resources 
to improve the efficiency of the market (creating profit for themselves, and posing a 
displacement threat to existing enterprises), which itself is dependent upon time and 
space.  Keys and Thrift (1980:117) assert that: ‘if the environment itself is evolving then 
the timing of particular strategies for firm growth is crucial’, as well as the social, cultural 
and governmental factors that can affect enterprise development.  This illustrates that 
time is significant for firm creation, as time is specific to market opportunities, the 
pooling of resources, entrepreneurs and temporary coalitions.   
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Time plays a significant role in exploring enterprises and research as operations, 
processes, markets, and relations change constantly.  Many theories ignore the role of 
time (George and Jones, 2000; Massey, 1999).  Indeed, Marshall (1930:109) highlighted 
the significance of economic climate when addressing economic laws, when he stated 
that ‘time [is] the source of many of the greatest difficulties in economics’ as price 
changes according to demand which is also time specific.  Time and space are 
interconnected (Massey, 1999; Schoenberger, 1997) and are significant in market 
dynamics, firm formation and developments in accessing finance.  Space, time, and 
competition structure capitalism (Schoenberger, 1997).  As such, the internal and external 
networks at a local and national level surrounding organizations are explored to illustrate 
how and why they are embedded within those networks in particular times and spaces.   
 
This section has explored SME definitions and the increasing significance placed on 
small firms to increase productivity, wealth generation and stimulate the economy.  Also, 
it is believed that through employment, society will become inclusive, reducing the need 
for welfare provision (Burns et al. 2004).  This section has therefore outlined the role that 
small firms play in society and the economy and set the wider context for the research.  
The next section explores the issue of access to mainstream equity and debt finance for 
enterprise.   
 
 
 
 
 34
Access to Finance: Mainstream Financial Institutions 
Geographers have overlooked that firms can experience problems in accessing finance 
for their business at start-up or growth stages (Pollard, 2003, 2007; Taylor and Thrift, 
1983).  The academic literature on small firm start-up and growth (but not the financial 
literature in geography) concentrates on access to finance (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Storey, 1994).  This suggests that accessing finance for start-
ups and high growth is critical yet it can prove difficult (Storey, 1994).  Small firms 
require finance for working capital and/or investment expenditure, for example, for 
equipment, and machinery (BOE, 2002).  The barriers to finance experienced by small 
firms often include creditworthiness and lack of collateral to act as security against the 
loan (Barclays, 1987; BOE, 2000; BOE, 2004; Cole et al. 2004; Gertler, 1988; Graham, 
2004; Martin, 1999; Mayo et al. 1998; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Storey, 1994).  Yet few 
have dared to suggest how long it could take for small firms to establish creditworthiness 
and how they should do so if they have no collateral.  As a result of barriers to finance, it 
can be a battle for SMEs to survive.  Many entrepreneurs have inadequate resources to 
fund their business, and some do not have a track record of personal or business accounts 
never mind being able to provide collateral for a loan.  Controversially, Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989) argue that only wealthy entrepreneurs are attracted to starting their own 
business due to their access to capital and are willing to accept the risks associated with 
business failure.  Evans and Jovanovic (1989) conclude that liquidity constrains start-up 
rates of small firms, and wealthier people are more likely to become entrepreneurs due to 
their access to capital.   
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This section explores mainstream access to finance, first, by considering mainstream 
bank lending in the US and UK in terms of criteria, operations and performance.  Second, 
this section explores the finance gap and the Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme 
(SFLGS) which aims to help businesses that are financially excluded.  Third, the section 
explores the significance of equity finance, through venture capital and business angel 
activity. 
   
US and UK Mainstream Financial Institutions 
Banks are commercial businesses and are driven by generating a profit.  As a result, their 
operations try to mitigate risk.  Banking practices in the US and UK have shifted from a 
face-to-face relationship based on a qualitative loan assessment process prior to the early 
1980s (Dyer, 1977) to a more formalised and rigorous quantitative process (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1999).  This is a quicker and arguably, more consistent and effective method of 
assessing risk in the lending process.  Mainstream banks currently assess applicants using 
credit scoring, which takes account of the credit history of the business owner, the 
viability of the business plan, and the skills and experience of the entrepreneur (BOE, 
2000; Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Leyshon and Thrift, 1999; Mayo et al. 1998).  Credit 
scoring has become increasingly common for the credit assessment of small enterprises: 
‘Credit assessment techniques…are a method of judging a credit 
applicant’s risk of default or delayed debt repayment by performing 
statistical analysis on the correlations between past account behaviour and 
other information and the applicant’s eventual repayment performance and 
use this as a basis to predict the new applicants’ likely future performance.  
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There is some evidence that use of these scoring techniques can increase 
the availability of credit to SMEs, speed up response times as well as 
enabling banks to manage risk better’   (BOE, 2004:36). 
Credit scoring requires evidence of a business track record, and at start-up many 
entrepreneurs do not have one.  This can lead to information asymmetries, moral hazard, 
credit rationing, and adverse selection, simply because small enterprises are less likely to 
possess all the relevant information required for credit scoring (BOE, 2000; Cole et al. 
2004; Gertler, 1988; Mayo et al. 1998; Storey, 1994).   
 
Adverse selection occurs when banks increase interest rates to all borrowers, rather than 
identifying high risk and low risk borrowers (BOE, 2000; Storey, 1994).  Adverse 
selection and information asymmetries can lead to credit rationing, and only those 
businesses that are prepared to pay the inflated cost of debt will be able to access loan 
finance (BOE, 2000).  Moral hazard occurs when the loan defaults but an entrepreneur 
has no security cover, leaving the bank issuing the loan to cover the cost (BOE, 2000; 
Gertler, 1988; Storey, 1994).  According to De Meza (2002) information asymmetries 
have led to moral hazard (optimistic lending) and overlending by banks, especially to 
those in disadvantaged areas who are often excluded from accessing finance.  Some may 
be excluded from the system by what might be considered overly harsh, crude and 
mechanistic lending procedures.  But the procedures are logical within the parameters set 
by the lenders and are designed to minimize risk and maximize profit.   
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The Mainstream Loan Application Process 
According to a large UK retail bank (Barclays, 1987) loan applications should be 
assessed on the quality and accuracy of the information given by using the mnemonic 
CAMPARI (which it continues to use today).  CAMPARI stands for; character, ability, 
margin, purpose, amount, repayment and insurance (i.e. security).  ‘Character’ is assessed 
largely on the trust between borrower and the loan officer, as it gauges the accuracy of 
information stated on the application and, more importantly, whether or not the customer 
has the ability to repay the loan (Barclays, 1987).  ‘Ability’ encompasses the degree ‘to 
which a customer is successful in managing their financial affairs’, which includes for 
example, their motivation, skills and qualifications applicable to the business and the 
viability of the loan (Barclays, 1987:8; Mayo et al. 1998; Storey, 1994).  ‘Margin’ 
includes the viability of the loan in terms of it making the business (more) profitable.  
‘Purpose’ is what the loan is for.  ‘Amount’, applies to whether the loan size is too great 
or insufficient for the business to survive.  In addition, banks require the owner(s) of the 
business(es) to contribute personal finance to the project so that any issues that arise once 
the loan has been accepted can be remedied easily through the safety net of the owners 
own funds.    The repayment procedure should be clarified from the beginning of the loan 
process, as the business needs to be able to generate adequate funds to repay the loan as 
well as to be able to function positively (Barclays, 1987).  This is otherwise known as an 
agency issue whereby it is the role of the bank to ensure that the borrower understands 
the loan process (Storey, 1994).  Banks often take security in the form of assets (freehold 
property, business stock or equipment) as a form of insurance should the loan default 
(Barclays, 1987).  Not all customers, however, can provide security which often excludes 
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many individuals and businesses from the market.  Despite the significant changes made 
in the mainstream banking sector, there continues to be a finance gap in the small firm 
market owing to the banks approach to finance and risk aversion to SMEs, particularly 
start-ups with no credit history.    
  
Mainstream Financial Institutions Performance and Practice 
The Bank of England has monitored the performance of banks since the 1990s (BOE, 
2004).  As a result of the economic recession at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
‘there was a breakdown of both communication and confidence between many SMEs and 
their main financ[ial] providers’ (BOE, 2004:33).  This undermined many small firms’ 
ability to function effectively as they tended to rely on short-term, overdraft finance 
whilst banks were changing their business practices by introducing credit scoring 
techniques into the lending process (BOE, 2004).   
 
After a period of steady growth, and low inflation in the UK in the 1990s, small firm 
failure declined so banks became increasingly confident in lending to the sector (BOE, 
2004).  With a greater understanding of small firm needs, banks diversified their lending 
facilities (BOE, 2004).  Although, bank loans to small businesses range from £1000, to an 
average of £7000 (Rogaly et al. 1999:113) banks remain loathe to lend such small 
amounts owing to high transaction costs and the high risk of business failure associated 
especially with start-up businesses (BOE, 2004; Rogaly et al. 1999; Van Osnabrugge, 
2000).  As a result, lending by banks to small firms has been rationed to particular types 
of loan products, for example (Rogaly et al. 1999).   Storey (1994) suggests that by 
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raising interest rates, credit rationing would not exist but this could lead to increased 
default rates.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggest that information asymmetries are used to 
ration credit, and rises in interest rates decrease the quality of the borrower whereas credit 
rationing prevent viable projects from being funded.  With credit rationing, supply cannot 
meet demand, as banks are, in effect, reducing their risk by lending to viable businesses.  
‘Stepped and peer lending’ is regarded as another viable alternative for increasing the 
availability of loans to small establishments (BOE, 2000; Rogaly et al. 1999:113).  
Stepped lending is where a relatively small loan is sanctioned and on repayment the 
borrower has shown that they can be bankable and can borrow a larger sum of money.  
Peer lending is where small numbers of borrowers come together to personally guarantee 
each others loans, thereby minimising the risk of one person defaulting on the loan.  
 
Finance Gap 
Although it is commonly believed that a finance gap exists, research by Cressy (2002) 
questions whether a funding gap exists and if so, what should be done?  Cressy (2002:F2) 
defines the funding gap as either ‘positive’ or ‘normative’.  A positive funding gap occurs 
when the level of lending is lower than demand (i.e. credit rationing), whereas a 
normative funding gap is defined by ‘market failure, [whereby] the appropriate policy 
response to which is an increase in the volume of lending’ (i.e. Government subsidies) 
(Cressy, 2002:F2).  The majority of lending by mainstream financial institutions is 
assessed on quantitative information and, as such, is purely ‘transactions-based’ (Cressy, 
2002).  However, more time consuming and therefore more costly, qualitative 
assessments are used to supplement quantitative evaluations when information 
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asymmetries occur (Cressy, 2002).  Cressy (2002) suggests that such ‘arms-length 
relationships’ only occurs with less established enterprises that cannot produce evidence 
of their business activities.   Uzzi (1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002; Uzzi and Lancaster, 
2003) disagrees with this statement and indicates that it is only when businesses build a 
network of close and arms-length ties with banks over time that they then gain from their 
banking relationship.  In this way, Uzzi suggests that only existing businesses that have 
been able to develop the relationship with the bank will access favourable rates of 
finance.  The literature suggests that start-up businesses are further prevented from 
accessing finance because they are likely to have information asymmetries and lack the 
close relationship with their bank.  
 
The Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) 
The Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) was introduced by the UK 
Government in 1981 and was designed to widen access to finance for small firms.  The 
SFLGS provides a 75% guarantee for bank loans to viable small businesses that cannot 
provide security (Deloitte and Touche, 2002; DTI, 2003).  Eligible businesses must be 
five years old or less.  All loans are from £5,000 to £250,000 for repayment over two to 
ten years.  There are twenty-two authorized lenders of the SFLGS which include the five 
major banks operating within the UK.  This enables SMEs to find the best deal.  In 
2003/2004 almost 6,000 loans worth £400 million were made under the SFLGS (Graham, 
2004).  Default rates of the SFLGS average between 30-35% (Graham, 2004).   
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The high default rate could explain why banks are still reluctant to administer loans under 
this scheme.  The key finding of the Graham review10 (2004) was that many small firms 
do not face barriers in accessing finance, yet for some there is a significant debt gap in 
the UK market as a result of SME owners’ lack of collateral (Graham, 2004).  Providers 
of the SFLGS have under-performed in taking up the SFLGS and rarely market the 
SFLGS.  Many small firms, therefore, are not aware of the scheme (Deloitte and Touche, 
2002).  The reorientation of Government policy to support small firms through banking 
changes and enterprise policy highlights the significance of small firms in the economy.   
 
Equity Finance: Venture Capital and Business Angels 
The availability of venture capital11 has been hotly debated by academics in recent years, 
on the assumption that for the development of the ‘entrepreneurial economy’ venture 
capital is essential (Mason and Harrison, 2002:427).  Much of the research has ignored 
the role of venture capital in redeveloping local economies, and has instead focused on 
the growth of the sector and investment practices from a management perspective (Mason 
and Harrison, 2002).  Equity can play a ‘catalytic role … in the entrepreneurial process 
by providing finance’ to businesses that wish to grow (Mason and Harrison, 2002:430).  
There are three forms of equity finance available for small firms; personal/informal 
equity (from friends and family), venture capital and business angel investment.   
 
                                                 
10 The Graham review (2004) was commissioned to assess the effectiveness of the SFLGS in facilitating 
access to finance for SMEs. 
11 Venture capital is defined as: ‘The provision of finance by professional investors to businesses that are 
not quoted on a stock market and which have the potential to grow rapidly and become significant 
businesses in international markets.’ (Mason and Harrison, 1999:159). 
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Mason and Harrison (2002) believe that there is an uneven distribution of business angel 
and venture capital activity across the UK.  This is a result of ‘spatial variations in 
entrepreneurial activity’ (Mason and Harrison, 2002:432).  There is an uneven spatial 
distribution of venture capital across the UK as investments favour ‘economically 
buoyant geographical locations’ (Mason and Harrison, 2002:432).  Mason and Harrison 
(2002) suggest that equity investment is a demand and supply issue.  So where demand is 
greatest, as in the South East of the UK, equity is supplied.  In addition, the South East 
has the appropriate infrastructure (e.g. law firms, accountants), and long term viability 
compared to other UK regions where the demand may not exist as firms are not 
investment ready.  As such, the availability of equity has ‘considerable significance in 
shaping the pattern of regional economic development’ (Mason and Harrison, 2002:444).  
Many of the investment issues faced by venture capital and business angels are similar to 
mainstream financial institutions.  These are adverse selection, information asymmetries 
and moral hazard.   
 
In the UK, it has been suggested that there are insufficient numbers of small firms that 
are investment ready for business angels and venture capital seeking investment 
opportunities (Mason and Harrison, 2001, 2002).  Martin (1999:181) argues that the 
establishment of formal business angel networks are more efficient in preparing investors 
with their requirements and matching investors with small firms who are investment 
ready.  Nevertheless, the informal investment market is possibly the main resource of 
equity finance (Mason and Harrison, 1997).  Yet significantly, this informal market relies 
on the information supplied through a network of family, friends and associations to link 
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investors and capital.  Thus, formal and informal networks play a key role in funding 
investment opportunities.   
 
Enterprise Best Practice 
Enterprise best practice is characterized by flexibility, benchmarking, lean production, 
strategic alliances and innovation (Schoenberger, 1997).  Strategic alliances have become 
increasingly significant for businesses.  Schoenberger (1997:47) states that ‘strategic 
alliances must be based on trust and open communication or nothing at all’ although she 
acknowledges that alliances are not without their problems and capitalism operates on the 
basis of exclusion and inclusion.  In this way, networked firms can benefit from 
communication and co-operation as it can make them more competitive and open up new 
opportunities.  Moreover, Schoenberger (1997:79) believes that time, space and 
competition are ‘intimately and profoundly bound up with a whole range of material 
practices, social relations, and understandings’ which, in turn, influence the corporate 
culture and strategy of the firm.  Schoenberger (1997:212) adds that ‘in a capitalist 
society at least, firms must compete or die’.  This is true for both for-profit and not-for-
profit organizations in advanced capitalist societies.  The rise of the professional within 
social enterprise management means that there has also been a need for social enterprises 
to mirror their commercial counterparts, especially in the case of benchmarking, and 
accountability.  This has made the third sector become increasingly cost effective and 
efficient, with the assistance of staff, the board of directors and their supporters.   
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This section on mainstream finance has explored the supply of debt and equity finance to 
SMEs.  It has highlighted the barriers to accessing finance due to credit scoring and lack 
of credit history, despite the established SFLGS which aims to bridge the finance gap.  
That said it is clear that gaps remain in the provision of finance for small firms and 
alternative measures have been made to counteract the balance in favour of firms that 
may not have a suitable credit record but do have viable business propositions.  In many 
ways, strategic alliances and networks within which firms are embedded can help to 
satisfy their financial needs though this is dependent upon time and space.  In sum, 
mainstream financial institutions favour lending to enterprises where the rewards are 
substantially greater than the risks.          
 
Access to Finance: Alternative Economic Spaces 
The principle of alternative economic spaces is founded on the understanding that the 
economy is socially constructed (Lee and Leyshon, 2003).  The social economy12 is one 
aspect of the alternative debate and moves between the market and the state thus placing 
the local community at its core (Leyshon and Lee, 2003).  The social economy is 
perceived to be between the public and private spheres, forming an alternative space to 
the mainstream in which to regenerate deprived areas, which is part of the third way 
political agenda (Amin et al. 2003).  Institutions within alternative economic spaces 
include; not-for-profits, social enterprises, co-operatives, charities, private limited 
companies, Industrial and Provident Societies (IPS) and credit unions (Amin et al. 2003).     
Like their for-profit counterparts, charities and social enterprises are difficult to define 
                                                 
12 The social economy is comprised of social enterprises which are defined as businesses that operate with 
social and/or environmental mission giving them a double or even triple bottom line. 
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due to the diversity and complexity of the sector (Bryson et al. 2002).  Yet the third 
sector, as the social economy is also known, is characterized by not-for-profit, 
independent enterprises and by their actions for example, education, poverty relief, 
religion and community services (Bryson et al. 2002; Burns et al. 2004; Leyshon et al. 
2003).  Amin et al. (1999) suggests that the social economy is not a radical form of 
alternative economy but a form of conservative or bourgeois socialism to moderate 
capitalisms impacts without replacing it.  This section outlines what economic 
geographers mean by alternative economic spaces and the significance of alternative 
finance. 
 
What are Alternative Economic Spaces? 
Economic geography has only relatively recently taken an interest in alternative financial 
institutions and the spaces in which they operate (Fuller and Jonas, 2003; Lee, 1999).  
The interest in alternative economic spaces stems from the withdrawal of mainstream 
retail financial institutions from deprived areas, creating markets that are unserved and/or 
underserved by the mainstream banking sector (Leyshon and Thrift, 1996, 1997).  
Moreover, alternative economic spaces are those that local communities can occupy to 
gain financial independence (Lee, 1999).  Economic geography has attempted to identify 
alternative locally based economies in contrast to neo-liberal global capitalism (Fuller 
and Jonas, 2003:55).  The operations of alternative enterprise are supposed to differ to 
those of public and private enterprises.  Amin et al. (1999:2036, original emphasis) assert 
that: 
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‘the social economy provides a means of empowering excluded groups 
and thereby democratizing regeneration activity.  The second claim, often 
expressed in the broader language of economic sustainability, is that the 
experience of entrepreneurship and public-private partnerships can allow 
social economy organizations to become self-financing in the long term 
and therefore independent of the state.  Third, it is claimed by critics of the 
mainstream economy that the social economy has the potential of being 
more than an intermediary stage between social exclusion and 
participation in the formal economy, to constitute a permanent, radically 
different, alternative.’   
There is a danger, however, in assuming that all non-mainstream economic institutions 
are alternative.  Like their mainstream counterparts, they have to survive whether this is 
through the reliance on public (or less often, privately) generated funds and are motivated 
by a double bottom line.  It is likely that social enterprises will rely on public subsidies to 
survive unless it is matched by private investment, therefore with a balanced portfolio of 
public and private funds and social enterprises can then aim to become sustainable (Amin 
et al. 2003).  Many social enterprises rely on short term public funds to operate and there 
is little incentive to do otherwise (Amin et al. 2003).  Even if social enterprises do 
flourish there is no guarantee that their operational model will work elsewhere or that 
they can expand into other markets (Amin et al. 1999).  On this basis, ‘the long term role 
of the social economy with regard to the mainstream is ambiguous’ (Amin et al. 
1999:2046), especially without commitment and trust from ‘social entrepreneurs and 
intermediaries’ (Amin et al. 1999:2048).  In addition, alternative economic spaces rely on 
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mainstream practices for them to operate.  In this way, alternative economic spaces may 
be seen as complementary to the mainstream rather than truly alternative.         
 
Social enterprises have been promoted by the current UK Labour Government as a way 
of filling the gap left by the retreat of the welfare state.  If the Government has aided the 
development of social enterprises and these enterprises rely on Government, local 
authorities and banks for funding and support, for example, they are not isolated from the 
wider economy or society.  As such, it could be argued that alternative economic spaces 
are not truly alternative.  One objective of this thesis is to explore the tensions between 
alternative and mainstream debates through the example of Community Development 
Finance Institutions (CDFIs) which are perceived to be alternative in that they offer an 
alternative source of finance for enterprises that are financially excluded but have a 
viable business proposition.  
 
Uneven Geographies of Alternative Economies 
For social enterprises ‘geography matters’ (Bryson et al. 2002) as the local geographies 
that they occupy exclude and include certain sections of the community.  Owing to ‘the 
geography of … charity [being] closely related to the historical and localized 
accumulation of capital’, charities were founded by wealthy philanthropists.  The location 
of such philanthropy ‘mirrors former geographies of private wealth’ (Bryson et al. 
2002:52).  In this way, ‘charity may effectively exclude those most in need’ (Bryson et 
al. 2002:55).  It is important for social enterprise to become embedded within local social 
networks as the recipients are local (Bryson et al. 2002).  Fundamentally: 
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‘the problem is that the uneven geographies of the third sector implies that 
access to the sector’s services and support is more about location and 
background than real need’ (Bryson et al. 2002:57).  
On this basis it may be suggested that there is uneven development within the third sector 
and there is a divergence between those that support the third sector and those that 
receive support from the third sector.  The debates surrounding alternative economies are 
significant in that they highlight access to finance at a local level to those who are 
marginalized from mainstream services.  Alternative economies may simply strengthen 
uneven development and the spaces between those who are financially excluded (Amin et 
al. 1999). 
 
Social enterprises rely on public funding, which constrains their ability to procure assets 
and determine long term strategies (Amin et al. 2003).  The fragmentation of the welfare 
state has led to social enterprises creating opportunities within the gaps left behind by the 
retreat of the state (Amin et al. 2003).  Amin et al. (2003) suggest that some staff 
employed by social enterprises are driven by a personal commitment to altruism rather 
than salaries, as these tend to be lower than the mainstream sector.  Yet, the rise of the 
social enterprise has led to ‘a class of [mobile] social economy professionals’ that are 
detached from the particular place that they are working within (Amin et al. 2003:47).  
This assertion by Amin et al. (2003) is contradictory and is perhaps, an over 
generalization as some prefer to work within the not-for-profit sector and are interested in 
salary.  There is a tension between salary and professionalisation.  Many of the senior 
posts within the social economy are held by professionals, perhaps because of their 
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expertise and skill deficits within local areas (Amin et al. 2003).  Amin et al. (2003) warn 
that as the social economy becomes increasingly professional in its approach to 
regeneration:  
‘there is a danger that it will become increasingly bureaucratized and 
standardized [into] a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution applied to ‘communities’ 
and ‘neighbourhoods’ by ‘experts’’    
In this way, the nature of the alternative social economy could become contradictory as it 
might function to enhance uneven access when its purpose is to reduce various forms of 
social and financial exclusion and to address local needs.   
 
This section has explored the contradictory nature of alternative economies with 
particular reference to the social economy.  The definition of what an alternative 
economy is, its uneven development and access to services and operational conflict 
within it demonstrate the need for further research in this area.  The next section goes on 
to discuss CDFIs and how they fit within the mainstream and alternative access to finance 
and operational practices to develop the argument within these debates.   
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How do CDFIs fit into the literature? 
CDFIs offer finance for enterprise (for-profit and not-for-profit businesses) and operate 
on a not-for-profit basis with a double bottom line in deprived areas of the US and UK.  It 
has been argued that CDFIs are an alternative vehicle providing for enterprise as they 
operate as a lender of last resort.  It could be argued that they are complementary to the 
mainstream as they are financing enterprises and helping them become part of the 
mainstream system over time.  In light of this, this thesis attempts to understand how 
CDFIs provide access to finance and how they bridge the gap between fulfilling social 
objectives and economic purposes.  
 
SMEs remain at the forefront of economic policy as they are seen to support high 
economic growth, and promote economic stability (BOE, 2004; NSFNR, 1999).  This 
states the case for ensuring small firms continue to receive support and do not face 
barriers to finance, especially those small enterprises in disadvantaged areas that could 
benefit the greatest from such an economic boost which could reduce poverty, stimulate 
jobs and regenerate local economies, which would empower people in the process (BOE, 
2000; NSFNR, 1999).  Yet:   
‘The distribution of enterprise could be spatially uneven, and that policies 
to promote enterprise could be spatially regressive in the sense that the 
prosperous areas would benefit more than the less prosperous’ (Acs and 
Storey, 2004:871). 
This suggests that those entrepreneurs whether they are located in disadvantaged areas or 
not, may benefit from enterprise policies and business support.  The Bank of England’s 
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(2000:v) report on ‘Finance for Small Businesses in Deprived Communities’ asserted that 
a number of elements contribute to banks increased risk and hence reluctance in lending 
to ‘marginal and near bankable businesses’ in disadvantaged areas despite Government 
efforts to create opportunities for all.  The factors which make banks less likely to lend to 
enterprises in deprived areas include information asymmetries: 
‘Lack of business experience; lack of collateral and personal equity; 
concentration in business sectors subject to higher failure rates; 
remoteness; small and localised markets; and high crime rates’. 
The Government’s Policy Action Team 3 (PAT 3), a subsidiary of the Social Exclusion 
Unit, produced a report on ‘Enterprise and Social Exclusion’ (NSFNR, 1999) which 
endeavoured to discover how to stimulate business enterprise and, principally, sustainable 
enterprise in the deprived areas of the UK (NSFNR, 1999).  The key elements of the PAT 
3 strategy were; first, to provide better access to services and increase awareness of 
support facilities; secondly, to remove barriers to enterprise and finance; and thirdly, to 
create more effective institutions to assist enterprise start-up and development by 
adopting a coordinated approach from voluntary, public and private services, at a national 
and local scale (NSFNR, 1999).  Also, it required mainstream financial institutions to 
understand the barriers to finance for small enterprises in disadvantaged areas through 
supporting corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies (McGeehan et al. 2003).  
Furthermore, the key finding of the report was that SMEs in disadvantaged areas faced 
considerable barriers when accessing finance for those firms wishing to start-up or 
develop their businesses.  With Government backing, CDFIs were promoted as lenders of 
last resort, with the aim of bridging the funding gap being experienced by SMEs in areas 
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of high deprivation.  CDFIs are sustainable, independent finance institutions that provide 
capital and support to empower individuals or organizations to develop opportunity and 
wealth in disadvantaged areas.  CDFIs can provide relatively small loans from between 
£1000 to £80,000 and advice to small businesses and for personal finance.  They 
concentrate on finance for enterprise, both for-profit and not-for-profit SMEs.  The 
Government set out the case for CDFIs in that loans not grants were seen as an alternative 
to giving those living and working in deprived areas a hand up not a hand out under the 
support of the Small Business Service (SBS)13 which is responsible for the Phoenix Fund 
(which was established in response to the PAT 3 report in 1999). The Phoenix Fund 
supported CDFIs amongst others by providing them with revenue, capital and loan 
guarantee support in order to deliver loans to businesses in deprived areas.   
 
CDFI Lending Process 
As CDFIs are social financial institutions, their lending process is assessed on both social 
and economic criteria (NFSNR, 1999).  For instance, the application is assessed on the 
viability of the business proposal, whether the client has been refused finance from 
mainstream institutions, if they are creating or preserving jobs, if they are providing new 
opportunities for the community and if it would be an ethically and environmentally 
sound investment (Bryson and Buttle, 2005).  The key criteria of CDFI lending, as in 
bank lending (BOE, 2000), is the viability of the business proposal, essentially the ability 
to repay the loan.  CDFIs do not necessarily require security for the loan, as those in 
deprived areas are less likely to own their own home.  Nor do they require a good credit 
                                                 
13 The SBS was part of the UK’s defunct Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and is now known as the 
Enterprise Directorate under the new Department of Enterprise, Business and Regulatory Reform (BERR). 
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history, as some may not even hold a personal bank account.  From this it could be 
suggested that CDFIs adopt a venture capitalist approach to lending, in that they try to 
employ due diligence to reduce information asymmetries and adverse selection (Mayo et 
al. 1998).  Thus this method reduces ‘surprise’ rather than ‘risk’ as CDFIs are bridging 
the finance gap for businesses that mainstream lenders would not approve without 
security and/or a viable credit history.    
 
According to NEF and Nicholson (2003:22) banks view the small business market as 
‘profitable and competitive’.  However, banks are reluctant to sanction loans to 
businesses that do not have collateral, a track record, a viable business proposal or 
operate in high risk sectors such as retail or catering and are not investment ready.  This 
disproportionately disadvantages SMEs at start-up.  CDFIs assess a loan application on 
the viability of the business proposal and the character of the borrower, taking a 
traditional relationship banking approach.  Also, CDFIs may provide business support 
alongside financial support to strengthen the chances of their client succeeding.  It is 
estimated that CDFIs ‘meet only 10% of the potential demand in the small business 
market’ due to the nature of the different CDFI operations and uneven coverage across 
each UK region (NEF and Nicholson, 2003:29).  In addition, this could be due to the 
market being difficult to access and may also be very small so the demand may not be as 
great as anticipated.  One of the aims of the thesis is to explore the nature and operations 
of CDFIs to determine the scale and impact of their activities by defining how CDFIs in 
the UK and US identify and measure the effectiveness of the socio-economic criteria that 
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drives their business models.  This will also help to identify best practice and to develop 
and inform other UK CDFIs.  
 
CDFIs: Alternative or Mainstream Financial Institutions? 
CDFIs are viewed as alternative institutions as they are providing financial products and 
services for the financially excluded (Leyshon and Thrift, 1994).  Mainstream financial 
institutions are increasingly risk averse and this means that potential customers that are 
located in geographically deprived areas are increasingly likely to be refused credit 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1994).  Leyshon and Thrift (1995) state that financial institutions 
need to be locally embedded in order to understand the needs of borrowers.  Fuller and 
Jonas’ (2002) work on credit unions imply that they offer alternative sources of finance.  
Credit unions offer savings and loan facilities to members that are united by a common 
bond such as a community-bond or employee-bond.  Credit unions are regulated by the 
Financial Services Authority, and offer savings and loans much in the same way as 
mainstream banks.  However, credit unions operate differently to the mainstream 
providers in that they are restricted geographically and offer only personal financial 
products and services to the specific markets they serve.  Thus, it could be argued that 
credit unions offer complementary services to that of the mainstream as they offer 
financial services to those who are excluded from mainstream financial institutions and 
do not compete with mainstream providers.  Collectively, the geographies of finance 
literature focuses on personal financial products and services such as LETS and credit 
unions, ignoring alternatives to the mainstream providers of finance.   
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Buttle (2005:18) aimed to ‘understand the diverse complexities, economic and ethical 
subjectivities, networks and discourses which shape the emerging social finance sector’ 
using an ethnographic approach.  He explored the UK social finance sector, in particular, 
Charity Bank and how it was established, funding the activities of making loans to social 
enterprises and the impact of receiving loans on social enterprises.  As such, Buttle 
focused on financially excluded social enterprises rather than commercial enterprises that 
could not access finance.  The key findings of Buttle’s thesis in relation to social finance 
organizations were that they are complex organizations that operate using a ‘socio-
financial narrative’.  In doing so, they are described as hybrid organizations that could 
also be described as schizophrenic.  This PhD differs in that it explores the complexity 
within US and UK CDFIs as a mechanism for providing finance for near-bankable 
enterprises.  The case study approach also allowed ‘embedded…complex network[s] of 
internal and external relationships’ to be identified and disentangled (Schoenberger, 
1991:181).   
 
Thesis Aims 
The literature review has explored mainstream and alternative finance to highlight the 
gaps in the financial geographies literature.  This literature has focused on mainstream 
financial providers.  In particular, retail bank activity and personal financial exclusion.  
Financial geographies have also explored the notion of alternative economic spaces such 
as credit unions and LETS (Leyshon et al. 2003).  Again, these issues relate to personal 
finance, rather than access to finance for enterprise despite the significance of financial 
exclusion within economic geography.  The literature review has also considered CDFIs 
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as potential alternative financial providers.  This research seeks to uncover a more 
nuanced account of alternative finance given the diversity of the system and mainstream 
finance as other arguments are too simplistic.  The role of CDFIs is to create bankable 
businesses, which is also about mainstreaming enterprise.  Existing US and UK research 
on CDFIs is limited and there are no comparative studies on the US and UK CDFI 
sectors.  Also, much of the research on CDFIs is literature based (Marshall, 2004), thus 
there clearly is an opportunity for empirical work on US and UK CDFIs.  The context 
and role of CDFIs will be explored to reflect the complexity surrounding CDFIs in being 
able to define their activity and where they fit within the mainstream and alternative 
literatures.  Bryson and Buttle (2005:278) have argued: 
‘that trying to identify what produces complexity should be the central 
focus of the analysis of ‘alternative’ financial institutions.  Central to this 
task is an understanding of the motivations and strategies that lie behind 
different ways of performing or practicing business activities’.    
This call to understand the complex nature of operations of alternative financial 
institutions will be realized in this thesis through exploring how and why US and UK 
CDFIs operate, what are the drivers and the issues surrounding their activity.   
 
Conclusions 
SMEs are vital to the US and UK economies and some small businesses are 
disproportionately disadvantaged as a consequence of the existence of a finance gap and 
uneven access to finance.  Small firms are perceived to be effective as they are 
geographically dispersed, can respond to local demand, and become embedded in local 
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networks and local culture.  However, it is clear that small firms face challenges when 
accessing finance as a result of persisting market inefficiencies.   Thus, access to finance 
for enterprise needs further detailed research.   
 
This chapter has discussed small firm access to finance in relation to the terms and 
conditions associated with accessing mainstream debt and equity finance and the 
geographical restrictions that exist in accessing finance.  The chapter has illustrated how 
SMEs can be excluded from obtaining mainstream finance despite the introduction of the 
SFLGS, the development of venture capital and business angel finance.  Alternative 
economic spaces were explored to highlight where CDFIs are situated within the social 
economy.  The next chapter will explore the methods used to undertake the research, 
while chapter 4 examines the nature and operations of the CDFI sector in the US and UK.  
The key question to be addressed is: do financial institutions like CDFIs offer a solution 
to the market gap that exists for SMEs seeking finance?   
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CHAPTER 3  METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter explores the research design and the methods used to investigate if and how 
CDFIs in the US and UK are tackling financial exclusion whilst balancing their financial 
and social objectives.  The research began in October 2004 with the empirical work 
undertaken between October 2005 and September 2006.  The empirical work included a 
mix of qualitative interviews with UK banks, six US and five UK CDFIs, the US and UK 
CDFI trade associations the Opportunity Finance Network (OFN) and Community 
Development Finance Association (CDFA), a number of active clients of one UK CDFI, 
and quantitative analysis of one UK CDFI’s risk profile.   
 
The first part of this chapter outlines the background of this research.  The second part 
explores the qualitative empirical research by exploring the issues and constraints 
surrounding accessing the US and UK CDFIs, and ethics and positionality.  The third part 
of the chapter explores the quantitative empirical research. 
  
The CASE Studentship 
This Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)/Collaborative Awards in Science 
and Engineering (CASE) funded research studentship was initiated by Professor John 
Bryson and ART, a CDFI based in Aston, Birmingham, UK.  ART wanted to fund a PhD 
as it had previously worked with a Masters student and saw the potential for further 
research within academia.  Some of the ART board members felt that if the CDFA were 
not going to produce the work necessary to inform ART and the wider CDFI sector 
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(including Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)) of the issues and challenges, then it 
would initiate some research on the sector itself.  In addition, the measurement of social 
impact was a key issue for UK CDFIs at the time.  This PhD reflects the complexity 
surrounding issues facing the CDFI sector at this time, especially measuring social and 
financial impact given the diversity of UK (and US) CDFIs.  Bell and Read (1998:7) state 
that:  
‘CASE studentships essentially involve non-academic organizations and 
academic departments in the support of doctoral students researching 
topics of mutual interest’.    
The benefits of a CASE studentship include the opportunity to develop skills, work 
collaboratively, provide independent expertise, gain real life experience outside of 
academia and do research that the organization is unable to do internally (ESRC, 2007a).  
ART is the UK’s leading CDFI.  ART is an IPS which uses social investment as a means 
of raising funds.  ART was established in Aston, Birmingham, UK in 1997 and uses a 
pioneering model of finance, as it lends to businesses with a social and economic 
purpose, therefore contributing to regeneration by providing jobs and empowering the 
socially excluded and economically deprived in Birmingham.  ART provides loans at 
commercial rates to viable SMEs and social enterprises that are unable to access finance 
from mainstream financial institutions.  ART evaluates the viability of each loan 
application individually to assess how the loan will impact upon creating and retaining 
local jobs whilst keeping ART financially sustainable.  Therefore, ART has the 
contentious issue of balancing social and financial objectives, which can itself exclude 
potential clients borrowing from ART.  ART needs to be locally and nationally embedded 
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in the financial and business support networks that sustain economic activity in the West 
Midlands, as it is through these activities that ART identifies both potential loan 
borrowers and loan capital.  These two constraints (and contradictions) resonate with on 
going academic debates concerning alternative economic spaces (Amin et al. 1999, 2003; 
Bryson and Buttle, 2005; Buttle, 2005; Fuller and Jonas, 2002, 2003; Lee, 1999; Leyshon 
and Thrift, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999; Leyshon et al. 2003; Martin, 1999; Purcell and 
Cobb, 2004; Williams et al. 2003), the role and geography of social enterprises (Bryson 
et al. 2002) and the embeddedness of economic activities (Taylor, 1999; Taylor and 
Asheim, 2001).  ART’s role is twofold.  First, it provides loans to financially excluded 
SMEs.  Secondly, it plays a national role as it contributes to regional and national SME 
policy on enterprise.  CDFIs are inherently geographical as they are about people and 
places.  The people are financially excluded and the places are disadvantaged.   
 
Ethics 
The ESRC Ethics framework aims to encourage best practice within social science 
research.  As such, the ESRC has set 6 key principles which are; 
• Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity and 
quality 
• Research staff and subjects should be informed fully about the purpose, methods 
and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the research 
entails and what risks, if any, are involved.  
• The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the 
anonymity of respondents must be respected. 
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• Research participants must participate in a voluntary way. 
• Harm to research participants must be avoided. 
• The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest or 
partiality must be explicit (ESRC, 2006). 
These guidelines identify the significance of reflection, which is an essential part of 
research so that the researcher can identify strengths and weaknesses within the process.  
Informed consent and anonymity was granted by all participants therefore all the case 
studies, their employees, office locations and participants within this research, with the 
exception of ART, are anonymous.  This is to ensure confidentiality of the research. 
 
Perhaps one of the most important ethical issues regarding my research is the fact that it 
is a CASE studentship.  It is unusual for a social enterprise with limited funding, like 
ART, to decide to fund a PhD.  However, by undertaking a CASE studentship, ART has  
• ‘The opportunity to access key expertise that may not exist within the 
company or which may not be cost effective to develop in-house.  
• An opportunity to test the value of collaborative research for a relatively 
modest outlay  
• The ability to fund valuable but not necessarily the highest priority 
research, for which an economic case for doing the work in house would 
be difficult.  
• Providing future researchers/potential employees with ‘real life’ 
experience of situations outside academia whereby academics have a 
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better understanding of the public/voluntary sector and employees have 
improved research skills.  
• Developing the skills and careers of staff’ (ESRC, 2007b:1). 
The CASE has enabled a unique opportunity to work with an innovative alternative 
finance institution in the UK.  The role of ART was to facilitate access to the CDFI sector 
in return for three annual reports.  The first year report outlined the preliminary findings 
from the US and was also presented to the board of directors.  The second report 
provided a discussion on sustainability for the board of directors.  The third and final 
report will summarize the key findings of the PhD.  The final report will be based on 
chapter 8 of the thesis.  On the positive side the CASE studentship has provided a unique 
opportunity to access data that would not normally be readily available.  ART has also 
facilitated access to key networks, for example other CDFIs, CDFA, OFN, SBS and 
mainstream banks.  I have three supervisors Professor John Bryson and Professor Mike 
Taylor at the University of Birmingham and the Chief Executive of ART.  Drawing upon 
a number of experts can be advantageous as they have a wealth of ‘knowledge and 
experience’ (Bridges, 2006:17).  There have been a series of meetings with all three 
supervisors at ART offices to discuss progress and the next stages of the research.  Also, I 
have had a number of low key meetings with Steve Walker to learn about ART and the 
UK CDFI sector.    ART have been selective in what they have told me and what I have 
had access to, for example, I have not attended their lending committee meetings and 
have only been privy to what they have told me.  In the research process, it is important 
to remember that what people do not say is often as important as what they do say.  Steve 
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Walker has read the final draft of the thesis to see if the ART information in chapter 7 has 
been placed correctly. 
 
Policy relevance is a key issue for empirical research particularly within geography.  
James et al. (2004:1904) have called for ‘PhD students to explore critical policy issues 
and engage in the construction and/or critique of public policy’.  The research is policy 
relevant as CDFIs were designed to be a policy tool for the current Government, I 
consider that the academic context also holds great significance because of the lack of 
research in this area.  Although there is a distinction between policy relevant research 
rather than policy driven research (James et al. 2004).  Policy relevant research indicates 
that research is independent and has implications for policy, whereas policy driven 
research is potentially outdated by the time it is published as policy moves on.  The 
shifting nature of policy indicates that there is a need to broaden the research 
significance.  In the case of this research on CDFIs, the same debates could be explored 
by other social enterprises, Government policies and small firms in that historically, 
valuable projects are dominated by short-term funding creating further uneven 
development and access to services.  In addition, the debates raised here are valid for all 
SMEs (for profit and not-for-profit), academics, independent research agencies and 
policy at a local and national scale across the US, UK and Europe.      
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Positionality 
The positionality of the researcher has been carefully established so that minimal effect 
has been made on the research itself.  However, the research gathered via interview may 
reflect one particular persons thoughts at a particular time which makes research space 
and time specific.  It is hoped that the research is been without bias as far as possible, 
although being linked to the CASE partner may or may not have its own implications.  It 
was important as a researcher to remain as neutral as possible yet understandably, 
positionality plays an important part in the interview process and analysis.  Although it 
must be noted that reflexivity and positionality impacts upon the research and its 
conclusions.  The key ethical issue of this research aside from my own issues is the 
question of who benefits?  It is hoped that this research goes some way towards helping 
the financially excluded access finance through influencing CDFI operations, mainstream 
banks, supporters of the social finance sector and policy. 
 
The PhD rationale was set out by Professor Bryson in consultation with ART for the 
ESRC application.  Using the ESRC application as a framework, it was my role to 
develop and apply this information to shape and produce the research.  The original 
research questions were as follows: 
1. To explore the processes by which CDFIs become embedded in local financial 
and business support networks. 
2. To identify and analyze the ways in which CDFIs in the UK and US construct and 
measure effectiveness of the socio-financial narratives and criteria that drive their 
business activities. 
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3. To explore the financial costs and means of overcoming them of socio-financial 
narratives that emphasis social benefits before CDFI profitability. 
4. To benchmark ARTs activities and practices against other CDFIs in the UK and 
USA and to identify practice that can inform the further development of CDFIs in 
the UK. 
As the research progressed, it was evident that there has been less emphasis on some 
objectives than originally envisaged.  For example, the concept of embeddedness was 
thought to be a key issue in the investigation largely owing to the changes within the 
CDFI funding environment.   At the start of the PhD, the support for the UK CDFI sector 
in particular was undergoing a significant policy shift which meant that the original 
research proposal had to change.  This highlights that the research process is constantly 
moving according to the environment in which the research takes place.  By developing 
the research objectives (as outlined in chapter 1) I took ownership of the research by 
recognizing that the US and UK CDFI sectors were evolving.  The alterations to the 
research aims were driven by the need to understand how and why the issues that the 
sector faced were changing.  These aims helped to structure and develop the methodology 
to establish how the aims could be applied in certain settings, for example, the interview 
questions.  The research objectives may have changed during the research but the PhD 
title has not because the focus and overall aim has remained the same, to explore if and 
how CDFIs overcome financial exclusion.  
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Timetable of Research 
The first year was spent reading, the second year undertaking research and the third year, 
writing up.  On starting the PhD it was evident that the research process was more of an 
iterative process of reading, writing and research to maintain skills and to develop new 
ideas.  Similarly, the research timetable outlined below indicates the order that each 
phase began but it was a continuous process rather than linear (Figure 3.1).  
  
Figure 3.1: Timetable of Research Methodology 
Phase 1: Literature Review 
Phase 2: Interviews with Key Actors 
Phase 3: Attendance at CDFI Conference 
Phase 4: Interviews with UK Mainstream Bank 
Phase 5: Interviews US 
Phase 6: Interviews UK 
Phase 7: Interviews UK CDFI Clients 
Phase 8: Quantitative Analysis of ART data 
 
Each phase of research developed my knowledge and understanding which also raised 
questions for the next phase.  Phase 1 was an introductory phase, beginning with the key 
literatures surrounding enterprise, access to finance and community development.  This 
gave me a background to the research and knowledge of the key issues which allowed me 
to begin phase 2 and interview key actors at ART (chief executive, board members and 
loan officers) and in the CDFI sector.  Phase 3 was a key phase of research as this 
involved attending a number of conferences specifically designed for the UK CDFI 
sector.  This not only allowed for up-to-date issues to be recognized but they were also a 
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key networking opportunity to recruit potential candidates for the pilot interview and case 
studies.  This phase was repeated a further two times when the CDFI trade association 
held its annual conference.  From the third phase I undertook a number of interviews at a 
mainstream bank (phase 4) and make informed questions.  Learning banking background 
knowledge and terminology played an essential part in being able to do this.  Phase 5 
involved undertaking two research trips to the US to explore 6 CDFIs within two 
locations in addition to the US CDFI trade association.  Phase 6 of the research process 
entailed undertaking research at 5 UK CDFI case studies.  The next part, phase 7 is when 
the UK CDFI data had been completed and a questionnaire of 8 clients of one UK CDFI 
could be undertaken.  The final phase involved creating the data set and analyzing the 
ART risk profile data.   
 
Qualitative Empirical Research: US and UK Case Studies 
Initial research was made into the history and development of the CDFI sector in the US 
and UK whilst undertaking a literature review on CDFIs, social finance, social and 
financial exclusion, small firms, social enterprises, access to finance, performance and 
benchmarking, networks, mainstream financial systems and alternative financial spaces.  
Early research at ART involved reading through their library and observation of the 
lending process.  This allowed the research to compare the lending process at a bank 
locally that operates at a global scale.  At the bank, two interviews were undertaken; the 
area manager and a local business manager of the small business lending team.  These 
individuals outlined their role, explained the referral and loan process, including their 
lending criteria, highlighted the risks involved in lending, default procedures, and the 
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sectors that they operated within.  The loan officers at ART were all former bankers and 
during their interviews, I was able to identify the differences between the bank and the 
CDFI loan process.  There were stark comparisons between the CDFI and the bank 
lending process namely the lack of social criteria in a UK mainstream bank and the use of 
credit scoring to assess the lending risk.  
 
Identification of Case Studies 
The US and UK case studies were identified through collating information from the OFN 
and CDFA websites (Appendix 3.1).  This involved searching the directory of UK CDFIs 
and creating a spreadsheet of data so that information could be gathered on each CDFI 
operating in the UK before identifying the key case studies using the criteria of sources of 
funds, target groups and markets served.  The data collated for each CDFI included 
whether it was a revolving loan fund, which sector it served, key contacts, its history and 
development, the year it was established, whether any support is administered alongside 
the loan, and the sources of funding.  This information was gathered via the CDFIs 
websites and through requesting information from the CDFI itself, for example their 
annual reports and promotional literatures.  However, in the case of the US CDFIs, an 
internet search was all that time would allow.  The US case studies were similarly 
identified although this was limited to two major urban geographical areas in the US.  
However, these areas cannot be disclosed due to the anonymity required by the case 
studies.  Comparative case studies were identified by best practice, they had to provide 
finance for enterprise and had been awarded funding from the US CDFI Fund or UK 
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Phoenix Fund.  This research only investigated revolving loan funds, although credit 
unions are classified as a type of CDFI and can also offer finance for enterprise in the US. 
 
A matrix of UK CDFIs was developed that enabled the identification of potential case 
studies using the key criteria of whether the CDFI offered business development loan 
fund and social enterprise loan fund (Figure 3.2).  These criteria were selected to closely 
reflect the operations of ART that serve these markets.  If in the future the opportunity 
arose, the matrix can be replicated over time to identify change, if any, that had taken 
place within the CDFI sector.  Also, the same could be done with the percentage of 
lending to add complexity to show what proportion of the market has the greatest/least 
demand and to highlight to what degree the market has shifted.   
Figure 3.2: Headings Used in the Matrix of US and UK CDFIs 
CDFI  
Internet address 
Year established 
Geographical area 
Tel no 
Address 
Contact 
Loan type 
Lending criteria 
CITC accredited (UK only) 
Phoenix Funded/recipient of CDFI Fund 
Notes 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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Access: UK CDFIs 
The CASE studentship facilitated access to the CDFI sector, which could have been 
difficult to access without the CASE studentship.  ART has acted as a gate opener to 
CDFIs in the US and UK.  Through ART, access to contacts at the UK CDFI trade 
association, the CDFA, have been made and from this to the US CDFI trade association, 
the OFN (formerly known as the NCCA).  Nevertheless, gaining access to the case 
studies remained a challenge despite introductions by the OFN and ART.  Even when 
access was granted for the research, it was limited due to time, sensitivity of the CDFI 
sector and data protection.  Also, within the banking sector there are issues over data that 
result from banking conventions that prevent the release of information to third parties.  
Originally it was envisaged that access to case studies would not be a problem due to 
ART’s links with the UK CDFI trade association, the CDFA who would then open the 
door to US CDFI trade association, the OFN that could then act as gate opener to the US 
CDFI case studies. 
 
In the UK, potential case studies were contacted by telephone initially by the Chief 
Executive of ART, Steve Walker and then a follow up by email.  In the case of US 
CDFIs, this was sent via the OFN on my behalf.  Potential UK and US case studies were 
sent a standard email to their Chief Executive (Appendix 3.2).  Email was selected for 
speed and efficiency.  Face-to-face contact with the OFN’s chief executive Mark Pinsky 
was established at the CDFA’s annual conference in 2005.   
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Unfortunately, access was denied by a number of US and UK CDFI due to resource 
constraints.  The remainder of the case studies declined to give access to clients.  At one 
UK CDFI case study, I was only able to interview the Chief Executive due to resource 
constraints.  The restricted access that was experienced in the UK is indicative of the 
development stage of the industry and also that it is part of the financial sector.  This is 
despite the fact that the age of UK CDFIs ranged from over 20 years old to less than 2 
years in operation and the enterprises do not compete in the same markets or 
geographical areas.  Also, due to funding changes that occurred during the research, 
CDFIs had to operate in an increasingly competitive environment especially in terms of 
accessing loan finance to lend on to clients.   
 
Without doubt, key contacts have been crucial to accessing the case studies networks.  
The most important place in which to talk to UK CDFI practitioners and UK case studies 
has been the CDFA annual conference.  The CDFA held its annual conferences in Melton 
Mowbray, Bristol and Ashford, Kent between 2005 and 2007.  The CDFA represents the 
majority of UK CDFIs and their annual conference attracts policy makers, stakeholders 
and international CDFI practitioners.  This UK conference has facilitated the US research 
as US practitioners have also attended this conference as keynote speakers.  On this basis, 
people, time and space have also played a major role in this research.   
    
Access: US CDFIs 
Funding was awarded by the ESRC to carry out the research in the US.  This money, 
along with school research funding allowed for two research trips to the US (one trip 
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lasted two weeks and the other a week) over a 6 month time period, including attendance 
at the AAG annual conference in March 2006.  The National Community Capital 
Association (NCCA) or OFN as it is now known, was helpful in assisting with the 
identification of case studies.  US CDFIs were selected in the same way as UK CDFIs.  
An OFN staff member who was responsible for special projects was given the task of 
introducing me via email to potential case studies in the locations identified.  On the 
whole, the US CDFI sector was open and welcoming. They were keen to share 
information and learn about their UK counterparts.  
 
During Autumn 2005 empirical research was undertaken at four CDFIs located in rural 
and urban areas on the East coast of the USA as well as the national trade association for 
CDFIs, the OFN.  The CDFIs that were investigated had revolving loan funds that offered 
finance to small businesses, as well as offering loans to other sectors and technical 
assistance.  Each CDFI operated at a sub-regional or city scale although one CDFI 
operated in other states across the USA.  The CDFIs that were examined were selected on 
the basis of location, markets served and best practice.  The research identified four key 
themes: the operations (i.e. the loan process) networks, performance measurement and 
sustainability.   
 
A key source of data on US CDFIs is the CDFI Data Project (CDP) which is compiled by 
the NCCA (Rubin with Zielenbach, 2006).  However, the CDFI data project has limited 
scope due to a poor response rate.  This is because the NCCA only has 160 members out 
of a possible 1000 US CDFIs.  As a result of the large sector and time constraints, two 
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regions were identified as potential case study areas. This allowed the identification of 
CDFIs that operated very similarly to that of ART.  In the US, however, the loan funds 
are more diverse than in the UK which led to the research being undertake at CDFIs that 
sometimes dealt with a variety of markets which included lending to SMEs and social 
enterprises.  In the US SME markets differ to those of the UK due to the classification of 
what constitutes a small enterprise in terms of number of employees and turnover, for 
example a US small business is one which employs less than 500 people compared to a 
UK small business is defines as employing 50 people or less (EC, 2007).   
 
Pilot Studies 
Two pilot studies were undertaken between Spring and Summer 2005.  The first set of 
pilot studies were undertaken in Dublin whilst assisting a second year undergraduate field 
course with 4 key actors in the social finance sector in Ireland.  The second pilot study 
was undertaken at Impetus, a CDFI in Malvern, UK which was a relatively new CDFI at 
that time.  The case studies were selected for the pilot because of their location and 
timing.  The success of these interviews determined the format for the rest of the 
research.  
 
Interviews: US and UK CDFIs 
Once access to a CDFI was agreed via the Chief Executive, recruitment of interviewees 
was not an issue.  Prior to the interview, the interviewee was told how and why they were 
selected for the research and an outline of the research was given to each participant with 
contact details of my supervisors should they have any questions.  The participant was 
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asked if they gave consent to name them and their organization in my thesis or if they 
would like guaranteed anonymity (Figure 3.3).  The organization was also informed that 
they would receive a summary of the research findings in return for their assistance.  57 
formal interviews were carried out with a total of 6 US and 5 UK CDFIs, a UK high 
street bank, US and UK CDFI trade associations, key actors within the sector and 8 UK 
CDFI clients. Over 80 hours of data were recorded and transcribed, generating over 300 
pages of transcript.  By undertaking empirical work in the US and UK, this research 
explored a broad selection of CDFIs yet also obtained depth through a case study 
approach.  By interviewing a number of people within the same organizations 
information can be checked and verified, thereby adding validity to the research.  The 
case study approach also allowed ‘embedded…complex network[s] of internal and 
external relationships’ to be identified and disentangled (Schoenberger, 1991:181).  This 
research differs to Buttle’s (2005) thesis which in part, also explored ART, by taking a 
comparative approach to identify and understanding the complexity that exist within the 
operations and activities of US and UK CDFI. 
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Figure 3.3: List of Interviews  
 
No. Code Location Organization 
Type 
Position Interview Context 
 
Interview 
Date 
 
       
1 1a US CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
07.10.05 
2 1b US CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Private Equity 
07.10.05 
3 2a US CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
11.10.05 
4 2b US CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Small Business 
11.10.05 
5 2c US CDFI Associate 
 
Research 
11.10.05 
6 2d US CDFI Director 
 
Energy 
11.10.05 
7 2e US CDFI Director 
 
Private Equity 
11.10.05 
8 2f US CDFI Associate 
 
Research 
11.10.05 
9 2g US CDFI Director 
 
Funding/Investment 
11.10.05 
10 2h US CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
11.10.05 
11 3a US CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
13.10.05 
12 4a US CDFI Vice President 
 
Investment/Operations 
17.10.05 
13 4b US CDFI Vice President  
 
Small Business 
17.10.05 
14 5a US Trade 
Association 
Associate 
 
Research 
12.10.05 
15 5b US Trade 
Association 
Consultant 
 
Business Support  
12.10.05 
16 5c US Trade 
Association 
Associate 
 
CDFI Sector 
12.10.05 
17 5d US Trade 
Association 
Chief Executive 
 
CDFI Sector 
12.10.05 
18 5e US Trade 
Association 
Associate 
 
Financial Support 
12.10.05 
19 6a US CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations  
06.03.06 
20 6b US CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
06.03.06 
21 6c US CDFI Technical Support 
 
Technical Assistance 
06.03.06 
22 7a US CDFI Vice President 
 
Operations 
07.03.06 
23 8a UK CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
13.01.06 
24 8b UK CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
10.01.06 
25 8c UK CDFI Loan Consultant Loan Process 10.01.06 
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26 8d UK CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
13.01.06 
27 8e UK CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
19.01.06 
28 8f UK CDFI Director 
 
CDFI Sector 
20.01.06 
29 8g UK CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
07.02.06 
30 8h UK CDFI Director 
 
CDFI Sector 
05.06.06 
31 9a UK CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
10.02.06 
32 9b UK CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
10.02.06 
33 9c UK CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
10.02.06 
34 9d UK CDFI Client Liaison 
Officer 
 
Debt Collection 
10.02.06 
35 9e UK CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
10.02.06 
36 10a UK CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
03.05.06 
37 11a UK CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
21.06.06 
38 12a UK CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
21.06.06 
39 12b UK CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
21.06.06 
40 13a UK CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
27.06.06 
41 13b UK CDFI Outreach/PR  
 
Impact 
27.06.06 
42 13c UK CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
27.06.06 
43 13d UK CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
27.06.06 
44 13e UK CDFI Director 
 
Operations 
27.06.06 
45 13f UK CDFI Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
27.06.06 
46 14a UK Bank Loan Guarantee 
Unit 
 
Small Firm Loan 
Guarantee 
04.04.06 
47 14b UK Bank Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
15.08.05 
48 14c UK Bank Loan Consultant 
 
Loan Process 
17.08.05 
49 15a UK RDA  Consultant Funding and CDFI 
Support 
 29.06.06 
50 16a UK CDFI Chief Executive 
 
Operations 
09.09.05 
51 17a UK Small business 
owner 
CDFI Client Loan Process and  
Impact of Loan 04.07.06 
 77
 
52 17b UK Small business 
owner 
CDFI Client Loan Process and  
Impact of Loan 
 05.07.06 
53 17c UK Small business 
owner 
CDFI Client Loan Process and  
Impact of Loan 
 06.07.06 
54 17d UK Small business 
owner 
CDFI Client Loan Process and  
Impact of Loan 
 07.07.06 
55 17e UK Small business 
owner 
CDFI Client Loan Process and  
Impact of Loan 
 19.07.06 
56 17f UK Small business 
owner 
CDFI Client Loan Process and  
Impact of  
 19.07.06 
57 17g UK Small business 
owner 
CDFI Client Loan Process and  
Impact 07.08.06 
 
 
Interviews were undertaken with CDFI staff members and board of directors to access 
rich and quality information.  It was important for the researcher to be well-informed 
about the organization and terminology prior to the interview as this minimized problems 
as I was able to use and understand technical banking terminology, such as moral hazard 
and risk (Schoenberger, 1991).  In addition, there are many acronyms used to describe 
CDFIs, their activities and funding schemes within the US and UK CDFI sector, also in 
US the loan officers are known as consultants, which if I had not known this, could be 
misinterpreted.  The same interview format was applied to all participants at each CDFI.  
This allowed for inconsistencies and complexity within an organization to be highlighted 
(Schoenberger, 1991).  However, the most important questions depended on the 
interviewees role within the organization.  For example, the questions for the Chief 
Executive were centred around their personal career history, the establishment and 
development of the organization, operations and strategy.  Board members were asked 
about their personal career history, operational strategy, operations of the board and loan 
officers were interviewed about personal career history, the loan application and decision 
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making processes, and the investment filter that were applied and linked to the CDFIs 
double bottom line.  By personalizing the interview, communication with the interviewee 
can be developed (Quinn Patton, 2002).   
 
Structured interviews whereby the same questions are asked for all interviews allowed 
the data to be comparable.  Semi-structured interviews acted as a framework yet adds 
flexibility for the answers so that the interviewee could tell their story.  By using a 
dialogue, it allows the interviewee to shape the research by covering issues that the 
researcher may not have considered but the researcher can keep the interview focused.  A 
mix of open ended and closed questions as appropriate were used in order to access 
detailed information (Appendix 3.3).  When questioning, asking ‘why?’ was used 
sparingly as it can make interviewees guarded as if they are being interrogated.  Instead, 
probing questions were used to clarify, expand and/or explain what the interviewees had 
said such as ‘in what way’ (Quinn Patton, 2002).   
 
Interviews have complex power relations that shift between interviewer and interviewee 
depending on who is speaking, what questions are asked, position (e.g. student/Chief 
Executive) conscious and unconscious bias, discrimination, difference of class and 
gender (Bennett, 2002).  Smith (2006:652) calls for researchers to ‘consider that the 
power relations social scientists sometimes employ in relation to society at large do not 
necessarily translate directly into the interview space’.  So for example, when 
interviewing regardless of who it is, whether it is staff at a financial institution or the 
chief executive of an organization, it is important to realize that the interviewee does not 
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necessarily control the interview depending on the questions asked and approach to 
interviewing.  In this research, it was important for the interviewee to be given a voice 
and to let them tell their story (Bennett, 2002) but the interviewer could steer the 
interview by using a semi-structured interview approach which could be followed 
depending on how the respondent answered.   
 
A certain level of rapport was developed during each interview due to my knowledge of 
the CDFI sector.  Some interviews were time limited which restricted the development of 
rapport and a certain level of trust.  Conversely, whilst in the US, personal characteristics 
such as my English accent, perhaps helped me to build rapport with the interviewees.  
The location of interviews might have affected responses as interviewees selected the 
choice of venue.  The CDFI staff were interviewed in a meeting room or office at their 
organization, apart from one US CDFI Chief Executive that I interviewed at a local café.  
Due to the nature of their role, the board of directors also chose their interview location.  
These were held at the CDFI offices, their own office, a cafe or in one case, involved a 
telephone call.  Face-to-face interviews were preferred, but if not possible then telephone 
interviews were sufficient.  The only issues really were when I arrived at an office and 
the secretary could not get hold of the person I was scheduled to see; in one case they had 
forgotten about the interview and then stated that they had expected to be sent the 
questions as that would have enabled them to prepare the answers.  All interviews, 
including telephone interviews were recorded using a dictaphone.  This made some 
interviewees conscious of what they were saying but on the whole, people did not mind 
being recorded.   
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However, by using a tape dictophone my interviews could then be transcribed by an 
audio typist which allowed me to analyze my findings and help me to aim to finish within 
three years.  An independent audio typist was commissioned to transcribe the majority of 
interviews for accuracy, neutrality and to capture the entire interview, rather than select 
key issues to transcribe.  On the same basis, the interviews were analyzed using Nvivo, a 
computer programme designed to organize, manage and analyze qualitative data.  Nvivo 
allows the data to be coded so that ideas and themes can be linked.   
 
Client Survey 
It was believed that by interviewing only CDFI staff, the research would be 
unrepresentative.  The voices of clients were considered to be just as important if not 
more so in that they have had experience of the products and services offered by CDFIs.  
In this way, a survey of CDFI active clients at one CDFI was undertaken.  Active clients 
are defined as those borrowers that are currently repaying their loan.  The only way that I 
was able to access clients was if they were selected by the CDFI.  This element of the 
research is in no way representative of the CDFI but gives some indication of what the 
clients of CDFIs are like, their business and its needs.  The interviews were undertaken 
via telephone to reduce time and cost.  Many of the business owners worked alone and 
were often very busy, so numerous phone calls were made to see if they are able to 
undertake the interview at that time.  This meant that even though the questionnaires only 
took between 10 and 20 minutes to complete, it took 8 weeks before I had gathered this 
data.  The client questionnaire gave details of personal information, the loan, business, 
and their experience at the CDFI (Appendix 3.4).  All clients were guaranteed anonymity. 
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Quantitative Empirical Research 
The quantitative empirical research consisted of generating data based on ART’s loan 
data to create a risk profile.  The risk profile aimed to predict active loans that were most 
likely to default under the ART operational model.  The 17 variables included individual 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, whether the borrower was employed prior to the 
loan, and whether the borrower had knowledge of the business or the sector.   
 
Figure 3.3: ART Loan Data 
• The nature of the borrowers business and loan. 
• History of the loan (who introduced the borrower to ART). 
• Performance of the loan (whether the loan was written off). 
• Percentage lost at write off stage.  
• The time frame from when the loan was sanctioned. 
• If the loan was part of a larger finance package (with another lender  
or a multiple loan from ART).   
 
 
A database was created using SPSS and analyzed by myself and the quantitative model 
was processed by Paul Plummer, Professor of Geography at the University of Calgary 
who was commissioned to process the data due to his expertise on econometric modeling.  
In doing so, it was an attempt to deepen the analysis as my expertise is in qualitative 
research and this element of the research played a minor part in the thesis.  The database 
included 231 observations but this is a modest sample size and a large number of 
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observations were missing.  Owing to the limited sample size the analysis cannot be 
representative of ART’s operations.   
 
Triangulating qualitative and quantitative empirical data allows for greater credibility and 
robustness of research (Baxter and Eyles, 1997:512): 
‘Credibility refers to the connection between the experiences of groups 
and the concepts which the social scientist uses to recreate and simplify 
them through interpretation’. 
In doing so, it also allows the methods to be transferable to other case studies verifying 
the research in the process.  Schoenberger (1991) adds that interviews enrich quantitative 
analysis, highlighting complexities that would not have been identified through 
quantitative investigation alone. 
 
Conclusions 
The research process was an extremely positive experience.  If this PhD were to be 
repeated I would not change many things apart from keeping a detailed research diary on 
my laptop.  Keeping a research diary electronically would have been a useful tool to 
record my schedule, literature, progress, and the development of ideas.   
 
In conclusion, the purpose of this research is to understand the alternative geographies of 
finance that are being created by CDFIs in the UK and US and to identify best practice 
that will contribute to the future development of CDFIs in the UK.  This chapter has 
explored the issues, complexities and methodologies of this research.  The use of both 
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qualitative and quantitative data arguably makes this research into the CDFI sector 
distinctive.  The next chapter begins to explore the CDFI sectors in the US and UK and 
the environment in which they operate.  
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CHAPTER 4  THE STATE OF THE CDFI SECTOR IN THE US AND UK 
 
This chapter outlines the historical context and development of CDFIs in the US and UK.  
The chapter begins by briefly introducing the concept of financial exclusion (the finance 
gap).  The role and function of CDFIs are then examined.  US CDFIs are explored first to 
set the context for their UK counterparts.  The US CDFIs set an example for the UK in 
terms of how financially excluded enterprises could be provided with access to finance in 
marginalized communities.  This section illustrates how and why US CDFIs emerged in a 
series of three phases, the nature of their operations including the size and scale of their 
activities, and the policy background.  This is followed by an analysis of UK CDFIs that 
follows the same structure.  Finally, the chapter compares US and UK CDFIs by 
highlighting the key issues for the future of CDFIs.   
 
There are two types of financial exclusion; first, personal financial exclusion and 
secondly, business financial exclusion.  What unites these different types of financial 
exclusion is the inability to access credit, whether it is in the form of an overdraft or a 
loan.   Financial inclusion on the other hand, aims to overcome financial exclusion.  
Financial exclusion can be overcome by access to a bank account to build a track record 
or credit history.  This is where CDFIs fit into the picture.  CDFIs bridge the gap between 
mainstream financial providers and alternative predatory, illegal and legal moneylenders.  
In this way CDFIs not only aim to help businesses and individuals access credit they also 
want to impart a social benefit by providing a means for borrowers to become included 
into the mainstream financial system (Bryson and Buttle, 2005).  Thereby, CDFIs 
connect the marginalized with the mainstream.   
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Community Development Finance Initiatives14 (CDFIs) are a relatively new phenomenon 
in the US and UK that can be traced back to the 1960s.  This chapter identifies the 
different types of CDFI but concentrates on one type of CDFI, the Community 
Development Loan Fund (CDLF) which will be referred to as a CDFI.  Informed by the 
literature on CDFIs, policy documents and communication with key players within the 
CDFI sector, this chapter explores the creation and development of the CDFI sector in the 
US and UK.  The academic literature surrounding CDFIs is limited despite CDFIs being 
a potentially politically and economically valuable policy tool.  Research is now being 
undertaken by a number of academics (Buttle, 2005; Rubin and Stankiewicz, 2001; Rubin 
with Zielenbach 2006).  In comparison, US CDFIs or revolving loan funds as they are 
formerly known, have been in operation since the 1960s but limited research has been 
undertaken by academics, Government and the trade associations due to the diversity of 
the sector and difficulties over data access (Rubin, 2006).   
 
Community Finance in the US and UK 
This preliminary section explores what CDFIs are and their diversity.  The next section 
also shows that CDFIs are complex social finance institutions.   
 
Defining Contemporary Community Finance 
Community finance incorporates a variety of forms, yet all have the common goals of, 
first, meeting social and financial objectives and, second, challenging financial exclusion.  
In these terms, these organizations operate to a double bottom line.  Mayo et al. (1998:3; 
                                                 
14 Community Development Finance Initiatives became Institutions up until the introduction of the Phoenix 
Fund.  
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HMT, 2001) divides the term CDFI into five financial institutional models: ‘credit 
unions, community loan funds, micro-finance, mutual guarantee societies, social banks’ 
(Table 4.1).   
 
Table 4.1: CDFI Definition  
Financial  Institution Definition Example 
 
 
Community 
Development Credit 
Unions 
 
‘Financial co-operatives owned and 
controlled by their members.  They offer 
savings and loans.  Each Credit Union 
has a common bond which determines 
who can join it.  The common bond may 
be for people living or working in the 
same area, people working for the same 
employer or people who  belong to the 
same association, such as a church or 
trade union’ (CDFA, 2003:1). 
 
 
? North London Chamber, 
London 
? Enterprise Credit Union, 
London 
 
 
Community  
Development Loan 
Funds 
Operate within specific disadvantaged 
areas to sanction loans to SMEs, social 
enterprises and/or individuals. 
? Aston Reinvestment Trust, 
Birmingham 
? Developing Strathclyde, 
Glasgow 
 
Community 
Development Micro-
Finance 
Small amounts of capital for personal 
and/or businesses with less than ten 
employees.   
 
? Street UK, Birmingham   
? The Prince’s Trust, UK 
Mutual Guarantee 
Societies 
A group of SMEs ‘pool their savings in 
banks, so that they can offer collective 
guarantees which enhance the value of 
loans to members and help achieve better 
lending and deposit rates’ than they 
would as individual companies (Mayo et 
al. 1998:16).   
 
? Co-operative Housing 
Society,  UK 
Social banks Offer regular financial services, on a 
profit making basis, yet have social 
and/or environmental aims. 
 
? Triodos Bank, UK 
? Charity Bank, UK   
 
The NCCA (2004) definition is essentially a subset of Table 4.1.  However, according to 
the NCCA (2004) there are only four models of CDFI in the US;  
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1. ‘Community development bank: A for-profit CDFI that is federally 
regulated, insures deposits, and provides a wide range of banking 
services to low-income communities.  
2. Community development credit union: A nonprofit financial co-
operative that provides a range of consumer financial services and is 
owned and operated by lower-income persons, often members of a 
particular group or tied to a defined geographic area.  Federally and 
state regulated and insured.  Services [are] generally offered to 
members only. 
3. Community development loan fund: A CDFI that aggregates capital 
from individual and social investors typically at below market rates 
and then relends this money primarily to housing developers, 
individuals, businesses, and community service organizations in 
lower-income communities.  Generally nonprofit and self-regulated. 
4. Community development venture capital fund: A CDFI providing 
equity and debt with equity features for small-to-medium-sized 
businesses.  Can be nonprofit or for profit’ (NCCA, 2005:47). 
The NCCA’s definition of CDFI was used for both the US and UK CDFIs as mutual 
guarantee societies are harder to clarify as CDFIs and all of the other types, including 
credit unions, can identify themselves as being a type of CDFI.  This research focuses on 
revolving loan funds as these institutions provide access to finance for enterprise.  Bryson 
and Buttle (2005:274) state that: 
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‘CDFIs…provide access to finance as well as advice to small businesses.  
There are many different types of CDFI ranging from credit unions in 
which members with a common bond save in the form of shares that are 
re-lent to members to various forms of revolving loan funds, or 
Community Development Loan Funds (CDLFs), in which a CDFI pools 
its members contributions and supplements the loan capital with grants or 
funding obtained from mainstream banks, governments or not-for-profit 
foundations’.  
CDFI loan funds are a relatively new phenomenon in the UK.  Here in the UK, they are 
regarded to be in their ‘infancy’ compared to the US (Ainger et al. 2002:8) where they 
emerged as a result of local banks shifting their operations towards national and global 
markets leaving opportunities for providing finance locally.  CDFIs have been 
championed by the UK Government since the late 1990s.  However, many social 
financial institutions in the US and UK developed from the bottom up since the 1960s 
and 1970s (Mayo et al. 1998). Yet it was only when the Government provided support to 
these types of institutions in the 1990s that they were relabeled as CDFIs in the US and 
UK.        
 
US and UK CDFIs have social as well as economic objectives.  This means that they 
fulfil a double bottom line, as opposed to a mainstream, single bottom line based around 
profit maximization.  The social objectives of CDFIs hide a myriad of other aims that 
define CDFI operations; environmental and ethical responsibilities, and equal 
opportunities.  The double bottom line remains at the core of CDFI operations thus 
unifying their operations despite their complexity and diversity. 
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The US CDFI Sector 
The US CDFI sector emerged in three phases; in the 1960s, the 1990s and the 2000s 
(Table 4.2).  The foundation of ShoreBank in the US led to the creation of the first phase 
of CDFIs in the US during the 1960s and 1970s.  The phase was triggered by the civil 
rights movement and the introduction of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 
1977.  In the 1990s, a second phase of CDFIs emerged due to the creation of the CDFI 
Fund in 1994 by the Clinton Administration, the establishment of a national association 
of CDFIs, the OFN in 1987 and the strengthening of the CRA by tightening legislation.  
The third phase of US CDFIs are largely reactive policy tools used to fill gaps in the 
capital market, depending on where funding is available, for example, organizations have 
diversified their operations and funds have been created in response to 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina.  This section will, first, outline the context and the current state of the 
US CDFI sector, then go on to explore the policy, support for US CDFIs, nature and 
operations of US CDFIs, the significance of financial literacy in US CDFI activities and 
the sustainability of US CDFIs.   
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Table 4.2: Drivers of the Three Phases of US and UK CDFI Activity  
 
US UK 
 
      1960s/1970s First Phase 
• Civil rights movement 
• Deregulation of banking 
• CRA 
 
       1960s/1970s First Phase 
• Industrial and Common 
Ownership Finance 
established 
• Princes Trust established 
      1980s/1990s Second Phase 
• Savings and Loans crisis 
• Rationalisation of bank 
branches 
• CDFI Fund 
       1990s Second Phase 
• Rationalisation of bank 
branches 
• National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal, Policy Action 
Team 3, Enterprise and 
Social Exclusion 
 
       2000s Third Phase 
• Diversification and 
consolidation 
 
       2000s Third Phase 
• Phoenix Fund 
 
 
(Source: Own research)  
 
The First Phase of US CDFIs: The 1960s and 1970s  
Along with the civil rights movement, the deregulation of banking in the US in the 1960s 
and 1970s allowed banks to increase their operations from state-based into national and 
international operators.  CDFIs arose to fill the local banking niche the mainstream banks 
had withdrawn from.  The pioneer of the community bank and the community loan fund 
was ShoreBank, South Shore, Chicago, USA (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995).  The original 
owners of the bank planned to move from South Shore to the central business district 
(ShoreBank, 2004): 
‘The reasons for this relocation were related to the demographic, 
economic and racial transformations which the area had undergone during 
the 1960s and early 1970s…’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995:324). 
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The bank was taken over in 1973 by a group of altruistic entrepreneurs.  The new owners 
of ShoreBank had experience in banking, social services and social justice.  
Fundamentally, they believed that a mainstream bank with both social and economic 
objectives could revitalise deprived local economies (ShoreBank, 2004).  Through 
ShoreBank’s loan fund, the bank supported entrepreneurialism in the area by 
administering financial support to micro-enterprises and small businesses and by 
sanctioning mortgages to residents of South Shore, ShoreBank demonstrated that 
redlining was a discriminatory and ultimately unsound practice.  ShoreBank set out to 
justify its belief that the financially excluded, those on low incomes and ethnic 
minorities, could be bankable.  By reaching out to the financially excluded, ShoreBank 
now fulfils a triple bottom line in that it aims to create a social, economic and 
environmental return (ShoreBank, 2004).   
 
ShoreBank’s mission has remained consistent in that it has sought to invest in ‘people 
and their communities to create economic equity and a healthy environment’ (ShoreBank, 
2004).  Despite making serious losses during the first two years of trading, ShoreBank 
has since invested over $1.7 billion in community development, with $220 million being 
invested in SMEs and $540 million in real estate (ShoreBank, 2004).  In 1978, 
ShoreBank extended its activity from serving low to moderate income areas in the 
Chicago area by establishing a housing development company (a not-for-profit 
organization) and an ethnic minority venture capital fund (ShoreBank, 2004).  By 1986, 
ShoreBank began to reproduce its model of lending to underserved communities 
elsewhere in the US.  As a result ShoreBank doubled in size and merged with Indecorp, a 
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Chicago based ethnic minority bank (ShoreBank, 2004).  ShoreBank has expanded 
further across America and into emerging markets in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia 
(Mathison, 2003).  Emerging markets are sectors with potential high growth in 
developing countries.  By investing in new markets, ShoreBank remains innovative and 
progressive.  ShoreBank emerged and remains a pioneer of community finance by 
innovating new products and services whilst continuing to be competitive on a local and 
international scale. 
 
The Second Phase of US CDFIs: The 1990s 
The finance gaps created by the savings and loans crisis in the late 1980s and the 
rationalization of bank branches in a cost cutting exercise arguably stimulated the second 
phase of US CDFI development.  At this time in the 1990s, US CDFIs took on the role of 
local banks, keen to match local knowledge with local products and services.  As Figure 
4.1 shows, there was a steady growth of CDFIs in the 1980s but this was surpassed by the 
number of CDFIs being established in the 1990s.  In addition, the CDFI Fund, which was 
launched by the Clinton Government, supported the development of CDFIs and 
encouraged new CDFIs to form.  However, it is also likely that organizations that 
operated in a similar way to CDFIs began classifying themselves as CDFIs rather than 
new CDFIs being established. 
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Figure 4.1: Number of New CDFIs in US (1930-2003)  
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(Source: NCCA, 2005:8) 
 
The Third Phase of US CDFIs: The 2000s 
The third phase of CDFI development was a consolidation phase, when a number of 
CDFI mergers occurred (Baue, 2006).  To date, there are no precise figures for the 
number of CDFIs in operation across the US as CDFIs are unregulated and membership 
of the trade association is not compulsory.  The number of CDFIs is estimated to be 
currently between 700 and 1000, located in both rural and urban areas (Table 4.3), 
although the number of CDLFs in the USA is estimated to be around 400 (Table 4.4) 
(NCCA, 2004).  Credit unions and loan funds are the most popular mechanism for 
delivering finance to underserved markets (Table 4.4).  This also reflects the need for 
savings facilities that are offered by credit unions as well as debt finance that loan funds 
and credit unions provide.  However, it also highlights the limited response that the CDFI 
data project has had in collating information on US CDFIs15.   
                                                 
15 The diversity of CDFI operations and the challenging nature of measuring CDFI performance is 
demonstrated through the limited research undertaken even by national trade associations such as the OFN. 
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Since 2002, the creation and growth of CDFIs has slowed and a small number of CDFI 
mergers have occurred (Figure 4.1) (NCCA 2004).  The OFN has a small proportion (just 
over 1.5%) of these CDFIs as members (NCCA, 2004).  This is because the OFN requires 
members to have a track record of activity; members of the OFN have a developed 
lending portfolio16 and are working towards sustainability.  The majority of CDFIs 
operate in a single town, city or metropolitan area or in multiple counties (NCCA, 2004).  
Since the start of the data collection to the end of the 2003 financial year, US CDFIs had 
sanctioned over $8.8 billion in finance, and created and/or preserved 167,000 jobs 
(NCCA, 2005:5).  Currently, the average loan size varies between $9,327 and $90,174 
depending on the market sector (Table 4.5).  The key features of the US CDFI market are 
that a considerable percentage of its lending portfolio is for affordable housing and 
community projects (Ainger et al. 2005).  The majority of loans are secured (principally 
against real estate), default rates are low, interest rates are competitive (with mainstream 
banks), and the institutions themselves are supported by the CRA.  This implies that the 
USA CDFI sector has reached some degree of maturity or development.  This is due to 
changing State and Federal Government policy and structures, rationalization of bank 
branches in disadvantaged areas, market demand and the stage of the economic cycle.  
Nonetheless, the USA CDFI sector is constantly innovating and diversifying. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 A developed lending portfolio is where a CDFI balances its sources of funding and lending activity. 
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Table 4.3: Rural-Urban Distribution of US CDFIs  
 
Location of US CDFIs 
 
% 
 
 
Major Urban Area 40 
 
Minor Urban Area 27 
 
Rural 33 
 
 
(Source: NCCA, 2005:12) 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Number of CDFIs in US in 2003  
 
No of CDFIs 
 
% of market share 
 
 
Community Development Banks 32 7 
 
Community Development Credit Unions 265 56 
 
Community Development Loan Funds 159 33 
 
Community Development Venture Capital 21 4 
 
Total No of CDFIs 477 100 
 
(Source: NCCA, 2005:5) 
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Table 4.5: Median Loan and Investment Size by Sector in US 2003  
 
Sector Amount % 
 
Business 70,000 32 
 
Housing 45,416 21 
 
Micro 9,327 4 
 
Personal Development 4,476 2 
 
Community Services 90,174 41 
 
Total 219,393 100 
 
(Source: NCCA, 2005:17) 
 
 
US CDFIs have substantial amounts of capital which they can lend to clients.  Net loan 
loss default rates are below 1%, with a 90 day delinquency rate of 3.5% (NCCA, 2005).  
Significantly, if a loan repayment is late, the loan is rescheduled (NCCA, 2004).  This 
conceals or decreases the actual default rate.  Also, to complicate matters, default rates of 
each submarket are combined in the annual reports.  Table 4.5 shows the proportion of 
lending in each market.  The lower the level of lending could be equated to a high risk 
market, which is balanced by loans made in lower risk markets.  For example, micro 
enterprise lending accounts for 4% of all loans, where little security is available if at all, 
compared to community services which account for 41% of loans and are usually 
guaranteed through property.  Moreover, technical assistance and the monitoring of 
clients is built into the lending and monitoring process ensuring that the loan can be 
managed through the relationship with the loan officer that is developed as part of the 
loan application process.  The close relationships that are developed between loan 
 97
officers and clients increases the financial understanding and literacy of clients which 
may ensure that clients are no longer financially excluded from mainstream banking.   
 
The data outlined above reveals the scale and achievements of US CDFIs since their 
conception.  It is worth noting that US CDFIs appear to be reluctant to exchange 
information, contribute to the data project and become a member of the US CDFI 
national trade association.  This suggests that the US CDFI sector lacks cohesion and 
there is competition for funding from Government, foundations, religious institutions, 
and in some cases, clients, within the sector. 
 
Evolving US Policy Context: Regulation and the Operations of US CDFIs  
The US has a long history of state and local banking.  However, the rationalization of 
banks, as a result of the liberalization of US banking laws in the 1970s, witnessed many 
financial institutions withdrawing from communities.  This created friction between local 
communities and the banks that had moved out of local economies.  Essentially, this 
desertion by banks highlighted the need for reinvestment in the most deprived areas, 
notably the inner cities.  In the early 1970s, grassroots organizations and banks in 
Chicago reconciled their divergent needs by reviewing the lack of finance and insurance 
available to those in ‘unsafe’ neighbourhoods as well as racial discrimination in financial 
services.  The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) framework was developed to 
counter discrimination, disinvestment and redlining (Pinsky, 2005).  Subsequent 
Government legislation created the US CRA in 1977 which was designed to make 
financial institutions accountable for their actions in the communities they served.   
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The CRA was the start of strategic community finance designed specifically to redevelop 
local economies and encourage regeneration.  The key elements of the CRA are the 
lending, service and investment tests which require financial institutions to disclose their 
activities to regulators (OCC, 2005).  Financial institutions failing to comply with the 
CRA have sanctions imposed upon them (OCC, 2005).  By disclosing lending 
information, banks can identify market gaps and their behaviour rating system can impact 
upon the banks’ reputation as a poor score would indicate that the bank is failing to meet 
the requirements of the community (Marshall, 2004).  The aims of the CRA are to ensure 
that; first, all the community’s credit requirements are met, second, redlining is restricted, 
and third, financial activity in low to moderate income areas is regulated.  The CRA 
‘encourages commercial banks and savings associations to help meet the credit needs of 
the communities in which they are chartered, consistent with safe and sound banking 
practices’ (Avery et al. 1997:713).  The CRA ignores the practices of mortgage and 
pension companies which weaken the CRA and does not prevent discrimination against 
those in low and moderate income areas.  Therefore, the CRA is not inclusive of all 
financial practices.  To gain CRA approval, banks must pass the ‘service test’ whereby 
they are tested on the distribution of branches (which should be evenly spread across all 
communities), monitor the opening and closure of branches, the applicability of services 
provided by the bank to each community and the general accessibility and effectiveness 
of the bank’s services (Avery et al. 1997:714).  If banks fail to meet the CRA’s criteria, 
negative publicity will impact upon their level of business and in extreme cases could 
even result in protests by the communities deserted by the financial institutions.  It is 
interesting to note that few banks have received negative reports, with only 1% of 
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financial institutions being identified as non-compliant or in need of operational 
improvement to comply with the CRA (Marshall, 2004).  This could be due to the high 
cost and reputational risk of institutions that fail to meet the needs of their local 
communities.   
 
The CRA made banks more accountable and their activities more transparent, which 
could have made disillusioned investors put their trust in financial institutions through the 
introduction of new products, services, business opportunities, partnerships, markets and 
delivery systems.  Over the last twenty years restructuring of the US financial industry 
has been driven by technological advances that have tended to transform relationship 
banking to an arm’s length relationship between banks and client.  One indication of this 
has been the use of credit scoring and also branch closure (Avery et al. 1997; Bitler et al. 
2001; Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994, 1996, 1995, 1997, 1999; 
Martin, 1999).  The restructuring of the financial sector means that financial institutions 
continue to shift their activities away from underserved, unprofitable areas to lessen their 
exposure to risk.  Nevertheless, the CRA changed banks’ perception of profitable lending 
and investment in historically underserved markets.  Moreover, the CRA changed the 
behaviour of banks.  In practice, the CRA monitors the services and branches of banks in 
low-moderate income communities.  Financial institutions are assessed approximately 
every 2 years (Pinsky, 2005).  The CRA has the power to delay or deny a merger and 
deny or delay a request to expand an existing branch or open a new branch, but perhaps 
the most significant of all is the damage that can be inflicted on a bank’s reputation and 
profits if a bank is perceived as not serving the needs of communities (Pinsky, 2005).  
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This includes access to products and services (e.g. mortgages, credit facilities).  Yet 
Banks can choose a regulator for each aspect of their lending and can change regulator. 
This can threaten the viability of the CRA as banks can choose a less thorough or 
damaging report (Pinsky, 2005).  Nevertheless, the CRA has had a positive impact on 
bank provision in low and moderate income communities.   
 
US banking regulation at a national and state level is highly fragmented owing to 
differing state powers; it is highly politicized and often contradictory due to federal 
banking regulation.  For example, the CRA is overseen by four different regulatory 
bodies: the Federal Reserve, which looks after banks active in the US; the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures bank deposits and is the chief 
‘regulator of state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve Board’; 
the Office of the Controller of the Currency (OCC), which monitors national financial 
institutions; and the Office of Thrift Supervision, which monitors federal and state thrift 
institutions (Marshall, 2004:252).  Owing to the different institutions that monitor the 
activity of financial institutions, the level and influence of CRA and banking regulation is 
questionable and is unlikely to be consistent between States.    As banking regulation is 
both at the national and state level, the US has a system that is locally embedded 
(Marshall, 2004).  The US top-down and bottom-up approach sees a coordinated effort in 
tackling financial exclusion.  US public-private partnerships have been forged as a result 
of the CRA which has led to financial institutions becoming embedded within local 
communities thus stimulating local economies and regeneration. 
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The nature of the CRA exercise has served as a public relations tool for banks so it has 
not become overly burdensome for them.  Banks’ experience of the CRA has been more 
positive than negative, as lending to low and moderate income communities has shown 
that there is a market in lending in such areas.  The Chief Executive Officer of the OFN, 
Mark Pinsky, believes that the CRA should be extended to include pensions and 
mortgages (Pinsky, 2005).  Speaking on behalf of the OFN (2005), Pinsky believes that, 
in the future, banks will adopt CDFIs’ business strategies as CDFIs know how to lend 
successfully in emerging markets.   Emerging markets are defined as areas that show 
potential for investment, and in the case of CDFI activity, this is usually at the geographic 
frontier of deprived areas: 
‘A successful CDFI is perhaps best compared to a niche venture capital 
firm that deploys its superior knowledge of an emerging market niche to 
invest and manage risk better than other investors. CDFIs are often ‘early 
birds’ or ‘market scouts’ who see the market potential of overlooked 
customer segments. But there is a clear market test involved. Like other 
frontier investors, CDFIs cannot survive unless they find paying 
customers. They must make loans and investments that are repaid. And, in 
the end, they must aim to be supplanted. By definition, CDFIs’ customers 
are not yet fully served by the market. But the end goal is always to 
change the psychology of the marketplace to catalyze more investment by 
the private sector’   (Summers, 1998:1). 
CDFIs are working in niche markets and whilst they are working with excluded groups, 
they have to mitigate risk through due diligence and approving loans that have the 
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greatest chance of being repaid or being underwritten by state guarantee funds.   
However, in the US banks have become increasingly competitive due to the restructuring 
of the financial industry and CDFIs are not lenders of last resort which, in some instances 
makes banks and CDFIs compete with each other for viable deals.  Also, CDFIs require 
funding from the private sector in addition to public sector support and their revolving 
loan fund.  The CDFI sector has adopted banking terminology such as ‘emerging 
markets’, to attract investment.  Yet this has not drawn sufficient capital to the industry 
because investors are risk averse and are not necessarily interested in the emphasis placed 
by CDFIs on fulfilling a double bottom line.  The weakening of the CRA under the Bush 
Administration has resulted in fewer investments being made to deprived areas (Rubin, 
2006) and CDFIs have become increasingly significant for those who are financially 
excluded, including people on low incomes, ethnic minorities and women (NCCA, 2004).   
 
Opportunity Finance Network (OFN) 
The trade association for US CDFIs, OFN, was formed in 1986 as the National 
Association of Community Development Loan Funds (NACDLF) to support community 
development loan fund activity but changed its name in 1997 to the NCCA to increase its 
membership to include community development credit unions, community development 
venture capital funds, micro-enterprise lenders, and CDLFs.  The NCCA re-branded itself 
in Autumn 2005 to become the OFN to attract new investment into the sector.  To date, it 
has a network of over 160 CDFI members (NCCA, 2005).  The aims of the OFN are to 
provide finance for CDFIs; training and support for CDFIs and their investors; and to 
communicate performance and impact on behalf of the CDFI sector (NCCA, 2005).  
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CDFIs ‘aim to achieve a double bottom line [by] achieving both social, and ultimately 
financial returns’ (Ainger et al. 2002:25).  The OFN have benchmarked the performance 
of CDFIs through the CDFI Assessment and Rating System (CARS) programme, to 
identify and to highlight the benefits of the industry.  Such benefit targets include job 
creation and preservation, improving housing, welfare and entrepreneurial skills (NCCA, 
2004).  Measuring the impact of CDFI activity in their operating area would increase 
their accountability and enable them to attract additional investment.  By attracting 
further investment, many CDFIs can become sustainable in the long term and/or take on 
additional risk as CDFIs are currently undercapitalized (Ainger et al. 2002).   
 
Support for US CDFIs 
In 1994, the US Government created the Community Development Finance Institutions 
Act to grant direct funding to CDFIs and for bank subsidiaries promoting community 
reinvestment.  The CDFI Fund was created under the Reigle Community Development 
and Regulatory Improvement Act (1994) to promote access to capital, stimulate local 
economic growth by supporting and training CDFIs and allocating tax credits through the 
New Markets Tax Credit Program (NMTC) which is designed to encourage private 
investment into CDFIs (CDFI Fund, 2005a; NCCA, 2004).  The CDFI Fund consists of 
the Bank Enterprise Award (BEA) programme that provides an incentive for banks to 
invest in local CDFIs and specialist support and funding for Native American CDFIs 
(CDFI Fund, 2005a; NCCA, 2004).  The CDFI Fund supports the following community 
financing activities in disadvantaged areas:  
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‘Affordable Housing Loans, Affordable Housing Development Loans and 
Related Project Investments; Education Loans; Home Improvement 
Loans; Commercial Real Estate Loans and Related Project Investments; 
and Small Business Loans and Related Project Investments’ (CDFI Fund, 
2005b:8). 
Since the CDFI Fund was established it has awarded over $700 million to CDFIs and 
attracted over $8 billion through its NMTC initiative (CDFI Fund, 2005a; NCCA, 2004).  
The 1994 act, recognized that lending to those on a low and moderate income could be 
profitable and the legislation was constructed for financial institutions to take advantage 
of untapped markets which also fulfilled banks’ CSR agenda.  However, the Bush 
Administration has halved the funding available to CDFIs under the CDFI Fund from 
$118 million in 2001 to $55 million in 2006 (Rubin, 2006).  Nevertheless, with the 
assistance from Government and mainstream financial institutions under the CRA, the 
US CDFI sector has grown into a valuable industry.   
 
The Nature and Operations of US CDFIs 
US CDFIs, like mainstream financial institutions, adopt a risk averse approach despite 
lending to at risk groups by securing collateral to guarantee each loan.  Interest charges 
depend on the sector and the associated level of risk.  For instance, the highest level of 
interest is for micro-enterprise at 8.8%, compared to housing to individuals (as opposed 
to organizations) at 5.0%.  The average interest rate is 6.9% (NCCA, 2005:6).  The case 
for these variable interest rates stems from the fact that CDFIs are not a cheap source of 
finance but are helping excluded groups access finance at a viable rate of repayment in 
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order to make them bankable in the future.  Interest rates must be set above the bank rate 
to cover the risk associated with the loans and the rate must also go some way to ensuring 
that a CDFI is financially sustainable in its own right.  As all loans are secured, default 
rates are low, interest rates are competitive, and the institutions themselves are supported 
by the CRA, thus embedding the CDFI sector within the US.    
 
Collectively, US CDFIs understand that banks are risk-averse and that many people 
living in low-income areas are financially excluded.  According to Mayo et al. (1998:41) 
near-bankable business proposals can access finance through ‘subsidies or off-loading 
costs onto borrowers and through partnerships between banks’ and CDFIs.  Banks can 
offload risk to CDFIs by only investing up to an amount which can be secured, and the 
CDFI can top up the rest of the loan required.  For example, if a business start-up requires 
$100,000 and the bank only approves $75,000, a CDFI can top-up the loan to the full 
amount required.  CDFIs work in partnership with the public, private and voluntary 
sectors to fund business and social enterprise, personal consumption and housing 
projects.  Arguably, through this partnership, CDFIs have made many excluded 
individuals and firms bankable through understanding the needs of their local market.  
CDFIs have made the financially excluded bankable because of their networks, being 
embedded in the communities that they serve and willingness to lend to this market.   
 
The welfare system in the US differs to that of the UK, as the public sector plays a 
limited role.  Social housing, for example, is largely non-existent in the US, so many 
CDFIs offer loans for the construction of social housing: ‘Community or Neighbourhood 
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Land Trusts are specialized non-profit membership organizations established to hold land 
for the benefit of specific communities’ (Mayo et al. 1998:42).  As such, 21% of CDFI 
lending is for social housing in order to preserve affordable housing for those on low 
incomes (Table 4.5).  As well as providing finance for housing, US CDFIs offer finance 
for the not-for-profit sector which allows social enterprises to purchase and/or redevelop 
property, which itself can act as security against the loan (Mayo et al. 1998).  Community 
loans comprise 41% of US CDFI loans.  Another major proportion of CDFIs lending 
goes to micro-enterprises and small businesses which, when combined, totals 36% of 
CDFI lending (Table 4.5).  To avoid the risks involved in small firm start-up, US CDFIs 
concentrate their lending on enterprises over a year old and micro-finance from start-up 
to growth (Mayo et al. 1998).  In addition to this, some CDFIs secure each of their loans 
and any deficits are met by the US Government’s Small Business Administration’s 
guarantee scheme (SBA) and MicroLoan17 programme, which provide up to 80 percent 
of the guarantee for the loan (Mayo et al. 1998).  Through guaranteeing each loan, CDFIs 
are able to maintain competitive interest rate levels for their clients (NCCA, 2004).  
Interest rates are, however, set higher than those available from mainstream financial 
institutions.  It could be suggested that as US CDFIs require security for each loan they 
are risk averse and are trying to reach financial sustainability fast. 
 
Financial Literacy 
Financial literacy programmes are defined as training and technical assistance (which is 
dependent on the type of loan, for example writing a business plan or managing a current 
                                                 
17 The US MicroLoan program gives funding to non-profits, such as CDFIs, to make loans (up to $35,000) 
and technical assistance to micro enterprises.   
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account).  Technical assistance is offered alongside a CDFI loan to give the borrower the 
best chance of succeeding in business and repaying the loan.  Technical assistance is 
tailored to the needs of the borrower and can range from attending classes on marketing 
to a referral to an accountant.  The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 
revised the Fair Credit Reporting Act largely to improve the transparency of credit 
information for consumers as well as increase the level of financial literacy through 
education (Avery et al. 2004).  Braunstein and Welch (2002) suggest that relationship 
lending is essential to take into account the level of financial literacy.  Increasing 
financial literacy ensures that as the state retreats from welfare support, banks attract 
more business. CDFIs are bridging the gap between the excluded and the mainstream as 
well as improving financial literacy making individuals and firms bankable in the future.  
Coincidently, CDFIs are monitoring their investments and ensuring that the loans are 
being repaid through external financial literacy programmes. 
 
Sustainability 
US CDFIs may have demonstrated that a finance gap exists in the low and moderate 
income market.  However, the market has shifted as a result of banks becoming 
increasingly competitive and CDFIs have had to adapt accordingly.  This means that 
successful US CDFIs must be flexible and dynamic financial institutions. The OFN 
(2004:3) reports that: 
‘the US CDFI industry is changing rapidly as a result of changes in 
economic and demographic trends in the communities CDFIs serve as well 
as shifts in public and private funding sources’.   
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CDFIs are funded by financial institutions (under the CRA), not-for-profit foundations 
and Government’s CDFI Fund and the SBA (NCCA, 2005).  Yet under the Bush 
administration, CDFIs have seen considerable reductions in the level of financial and 
CRA support due to the present state of the US economy (NCCA, 2004).  The CDFI 
Fund has decreased in recent years and the level of investment required by banks to fulfil 
their CRA objectives has also been reduced, which has resulted in a reduction in CDFI 
lending capital.  The decrease in the CDFI Fund has had a knock on effect upon those 
who are financially excluded as the funds are not sufficient to meet demands, nor can 
funds account for the high level of risk or cost of small loans to those in low and 
moderate income communities.  Without financial subsidies from investors and the 
Government, many CDFIs may face closure as they have been myopic and relied on 
policy, rather than becoming independent by developing their own portfolio and reserves 
from the outset. Operational sustainability, therefore, is another key challenge for CDFIs.   
 
Financial sustainability is essential for any business to be a success.  Yet CDFIs have to 
fulfil the double bottom line.  Consequently, sustainability is harder for not-for-profit 
CDFIs to attain than for-profit businesses owing to the reliance on external grant funding 
and the markets associated with their lending.  CDFIs aim to be sustainable in the long 
term with their loan fund providing sufficient capital for lending and revenue for 
operational costs.  This is to ensure that CDFIs can operate without public subsidy yet 
can continue to function and also mitigate exposure to risk.  According to Ainger et al. 
(2002:25): 
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‘CDFIs are performing well if they reach 60-80% financial sustainability. 
Others argue that the industry has been overly subsidy-dependent, which 
has had a negative impact on productivity and efficiency’.  
The OFN (2004) has stated that many CDFIs are working towards self-sufficiency by 
staying competitive (compared to mainstream financial institutions and their non-profit 
counterparts) and introducing higher fees, working in partnership with other CDFIs, 
managing capital more effectively, and re-evaluating their operations to determine which 
cost saving strategies would be most appropriate, for example, reducing operating costs, 
and outsourcing of resources, staff, and back office operations.  Outsourcing parts of the 
CDFIs business to other not-for-profits has created alliances within the sector.  CDFIs 
that specialize in back office activity can offset the risk of lending by having another 
income from managing borrowers’ loans for other CDFIs. Some CDFIs have diversified 
their products and services to include business advice services and equity finance, whilst 
others have reduced their lending activity by focusing on the most visible and beneficial 
(to the community and CDFI) sectors such as community facilities and housing (Rubin, 
2006).  Sustainability can conflict with the double bottom line as CDFIs are targeting 
high risk clients to fulfil their social and financial objectives.  CDFIs sustainability may 
undermine the ability of a CDFI to target unbankable businesses and instead encourage 
them to develop lending strategies that closely mirror those in operation in the 
mainstream financial institutions.  It could be argued that US CDFIs complement the 
mainstream financial institutions as they have demonstrated that previously underserved 
markets can become bankable so long as the risk is mediated by the State and other non-
profit organizations.  Some US CDFIs may be comparable to US banks as many operate 
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on a state, national, and even international scale, and control significant financial 
resources.   
 
US CDFIs are designed to occupy niche markets, serving excluded groups in deprived 
areas.  Despite their longevity, US CDFIs are continually challenged.  CDFIs must 
constantly innovate and diversify their services and products to bridge the gap between 
commercial services and alternative lenders.  For example, the financially excluded face 
barriers to accessing mainstream finance so they turn to predatory lenders that can offer 
loans and mortgages.  However, the high cost of these financial products can lead to 
untenable repayments and homes being repossessed (Pinsky, 2005).  CDFIs, therefore, 
aim to provide an alternative to predatory lending and mainstream finance.  The activity 
of CDFIs indicates that the funding gap continues to exist in the US despite the creation 
of the CRA.  The CDFI sector remains diverse and relations with banks are varied and 
individualized depending on CRA effectiveness and the level of funding support from 
mainstream banks.  CDFIs are likely to become increasingly significant in the future due 
to the continued need for welfare support.  Some important elements of the US CDFI 
movement have been transferred to the UK especially in terms of the provision of loans 
that meet the conditions of a double bottom line as well as lending locally via relationship 
banking.  Yet it remains to be seen whether UK CDFIs will have the same longevity and 
success as their US counterparts as they develop in response to a set of different policy 
and institutional contexts. 
The UK CDFI Sector 
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Like their US counterparts, UK CDFIs have emerged in a series of three phases; the first 
in the 1960s and 1970s, the second in the 1990s and the third in the 2000s.  Despite these 
similarities with the US CDFI development, the drivers of those phases are different.  It is 
important therefore, to note that the development of CDFIs in the UK did not follow the 
US pattern.  UK CDFI activity is on a far smaller scale compared to the US; UK CDFIs 
are generally small, are restricted in the types of finance that they offer (due to funding 
limitations) and are relatively young organizations.  In addition, the policy framework 
surrounding UK CDFIs is weak compared to that which has developed in the US.   
 
In the UK, CDFIs operate in a diverse range of financial markets.  UK CDFIs can offer 
personal finance in the form of savings, current accounts and loan facilities, business 
finance such as loans (Charity Bank and Triodos Bank also offer insurance and savings 
facilities), finance for social enterprises (socially orientated businesses, that are largely 
not-for-profit) and less commonly, loans for home improvement (CDFA, 2004b).  The 
CDFA, the trade association for UK CDFIs, defines CDFI as: 
‘a new financial tool for social, economic, and physical renewal in under-
invested communities.  They lend and invest in deprived areas and 
underserved markets that cannot access mainstream finance.  They are 
sustainable, independent organizations that provide financial services with 
two aims: to generate social and financial returns.  Some CDFIs offer 
loans while other provide equity investment – a few offer them both.  
They serve different types of customers including individuals, micro, 
small and social businesses’ (CDFA, 2004b:1). 
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However, it is misleading to state that CDFIs are sustainable from their outset as CDFIs 
aspire to become sustainable or independent of public funds due to the risks involved in 
lending to the financially excluded.   
 
UK CDFIs are also diverse and dynamic and shift according to market and funding 
requirements.   However, CDFIs can be defined collectively as independent financial 
institutions that provide capital and support to empower individuals or organizations at 
the edge of commercial margins to develop opportunity and wealth in disadvantaged 
areas.  The term CDFI is used to include a range of different business structures, 
operations, markets.  As such, it is questionable whether UK CDFIs are creating a 
coherent sector or movement.   
 
The future of CDFI funding in the UK is uncertain as it is anticipated that there will be a 
shift from public to private investment in CDFIs and potential and existing investors may 
require positive performance to verify that their investment is justified.  For private 
investment to be interested in CDFIs, there needs to be a certain level of awareness and 
their missions need to be clear.  This and other issues are explored in the next section. 
 
The First Phase of UK CDFIs: The 1960s and the 1970s 
The UK has an uneven history of community finance.  Even though co-operatives have 
existed since the 19th century, the first phase of community finance began in the 1960s 
with the creation of community credit unions (Brown et al. 2003; Collin et al. 2001).  In 
1971, Triodos Bank the UK’s first national social financial institution was established to 
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provide loans to social enterprises; Triodos fulfils a double bottom line of generating 
social and economic returns.  The second social financial institution to be established was 
the Industrial Common Ownership Finance Ltd (ICOF).  ICOF started a revolving loan 
and savings fund for co-operatives and social enterprises in 1973 (see www.icof.co.uk) 
and the Princes Trust was founded in 1976, a youth charity giving young, disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs the opportunity to become self-employed by grants and micro loans.  From 
this, the significance of social financial institutions has grown and there are now over 
eighty CDFIs in the UK.   
 
The Second Phase of UK CDFIs: The 1990s 
The concept of CDFI was constructed in the US in 1994 and applied formally to the UK 
by the Labour Government in 1999 (NSFNR, 1999).  However, a number of social 
financial institutions such as the ART (1997) existed prior to the application of the CDFI 
label in the late 1990s.   Inspired by the success of the pioneering community finance 
initiatives in the UK and the increasing need for finance for excluded groups, the second 
phase of community finance developed in the 1990s (Collin et al. 2001).  The 
development of community finance in the UK in the early 1990s began with the 
formation of DSL (1993).  These institutions along with the US experience inspired a 
national initiative for the creation of revolving loan funds.   
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 The Third Phase of UK CDFIs: 2000s 
The UK CDFI sector has grown considerably since 1999 with the introduction of the 
DTI’s Phoenix Fund18 (Collin et al. 2001) (Figure 4.2, 4.3, 4.4).  The UK CDFIs created 
post 1999 can be identified as the third phase of CDFIs as these organizations were 
largely established in response to Government policy and as such are project based 
CDFIs that shift their operations in response to available funding streams.  There were six 
CDFIs in operation in the UK prior to 1994 and over eighty CDFIs with revolving loan 
funds in operation today.  The growth of the sector during the 2000s and the introduction 
of the Phoenix Fund allowed the UK CDFI sector to grow and experiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The PAT 3 report recommended the creation of the Phoenix Fund, a challenge fund to provide revenue, 
capital and/or loan guarantee support in order to deliver loans to businesses in deprived areas with a 
bottom-up, flexible approach for part funding CDFIs (NSFNR, 1999). 
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 Figure 4.2: The Regional Geography of Community Development Loan Funds in 
the UK up to 1999 
 
(Source: Bryson and Buttle, 2005:282) 
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 Figure 4.3: The Regional Geography of Community Development Loan Funds in          
the UK up to 2003 
 
(Source: Bryson and Buttle, 2005:283) 
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 Figure 4.4: Age of UK CDFIs in 2004  
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CDFIs vary in their structure.  Some CDFIs have been established by altruistic 
individuals, local authorities, enterprise agencies or in response to the Phoenix Fund.  The 
majority of CDFIs have a group company structure, for example, they are IPS and 
Company Limited by Guarantee.  Other CDFIs have a single company structure (again 
tending to use Company Limited by Guarantee) but an increasing number are selecting to 
use charitable status.  Some UK CDFIs have borrowed CDFI models from other 
institutions (such as Street UK, that were inspired by micro finance institutions in Eastern 
Europe) which have been successfully established elsewhere but have experienced 
problems as they have not directly addressed the local market and have failed to become 
locally embedded.  In this way, the top-down development of CDFIs may not always be 
appropriate to the market as the CDFI may need to change to fit the needs of the 
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community.  Therefore, CDFI flexibility and local knowledge are key factors for success.  
Many CDFIs are in the early stages of growth and are on a steep learning curve in 
developing their operations and lending activities and this is reflected in high default 
rates.   
 
Table 4.6: Geographical Market Served by UK CDFIs 
 
Geographical Area 
 
No of CDFIs 
 
 
Town/city 11 
 
Sub-region 25 
 
RDA region 7 
 
England 4 
 
Scotland 1 
 
N Ireland 2 
 
UK 5 
 
(Source: CDFA, 2005: 14) 
 
The UK trade association for CDFIs, the CDFA undertakes an annual survey to generate 
information about the UK CDFI sector in order to measure progress.  Over 40% of CDFIs 
are in the first year of financing or are yet to start financing.  The research undertaken by 
the CDFA would be more robust if the research was divided into those CDFIs that had 
been fully operational for longer than two years and CDFIs that are under two years old 
(CDFA, 2005).  The CDFA (2005:4) admits that the ‘ability to report on performance 
remains mixed’ and results are blurred due to the diversity and youth of the CDFI sector 
in the UK.  CDFIs tend to be concentrated in urban areas, particularly that of ‘the North-
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West, London and the West Midlands’ (CDFA, 2005:4).  Nearly half of UK CDFIs 
operate at a sub-regional scale (Table 4.6) (CDFA, 2005:14).   
Due to the diverse nature of the UK CDFI sector, not all national CDFIs incorporate 
every financial need and tend to concentrate on a specific market, which continues to 
leave finance gaps.  As such, there is geographically uneven development of CDFI 
activity across the UK.  Thus, Scotland, Wales, the South, East Midlands, East Anglia, 
North-East and rural areas of the UK may suffer the greatest financial exclusion by 
enterprise due to the lack of CDFI activity in those areas.  The average size of loans to 
individuals is £500, compared to £5,200 for micro-enterprises, £28,000 for SMEs and 
£50,000 to social enterprises (Table 4.7).  As such, established social enterprises have the 
greatest lending value and also lowest risks.  However, there are very few loans 
sanctioned to social enterprises (5.5%) (Table 4.8).  Social enterprises tend to rely on 
public sector grants, are able to access finance from mainstream sources, are unaware of 
their options, or are risk averse (BOE, 2003).  The majority of CDFIs specialize in micro-
finance, which includes personal and business finance (Table 4.8).  Yet personal and 
business start-up finance is extremely high risk as the majority of loans in the UK are 
unsecured.  Also, smaller loans are expensive to administer and cost the same as larger 
deals from social enterprises.  In this way, CDFIs need to balance their risk/reward ratio 
with every loan that they assess, in accordance with their missions and their sustainability 
strategy.  CDFI operations vary by sector, geography and type of financial instrument, for 
example, finance for enterprise. CDFIs also deal with a diverse range of markets and 
supply different products (Table 4.9).  There is little coherence and no simple pattern of 
CDFI activity in the UK.  This analysis reveals the diversity of finance that is offered by 
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CDFIs and how it is difficult to define and identify a unified sector.  However, it is 
important to note that successful CDFIs respond to changes in the external environment 
so CDFI operations change over time.   
 
Table 4.7: Average Loan Size of UK CDFIs in 2004 
 
Type 
 
Average Loan size in UK          
£ 
 
 
Micro Finance 5200 
 
Small Business 28000 
 
Social Enterprise 50000 
 
Individuals 500 
 
Average Loan 20925 
 
(Source: CDFA, 2005: 3) 
 
Table 4.8: Lending by type of company, UK CDFIs, 2004  
 
Percentage of Market size by Sector 
 
% (of value) 
 
£  
 
No of loans 
 
 
Micro enterprise 25.2 11,467,985 2271 
 
Small enterprise 7.8 3,556,229 191 
 
Medium enterprise 9.5 4,328,629 26 
 
Loans to Individual 2.7 1,214,943 2719 
 
Social enterprise 54.7 24,874,895 305 
 
(Source: CDFA, 2005:23) 
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Table 4.9: Markets Served by UK 
CDFIs 
 
Markets Served 
 
No of CDFIs 
 
M 11 
SME 8 
M/SME 8 
M/SME /SE 6 
SE 6 
Support 5 
SME/SE 4 
M/SE 3 
P/M 3 
M/SME/Support 2 
P/M/ SME/H 2 
P/M/Support 2 
SE/Support 2 
VC/SME 2 
M/H/SE 2 
M/ SME/SE/Support 1 
M/Support 1 
P/H 1 
P/M/H 1 
P/M/SE 1 
P/M/ SME/SE 1 
SE/H/SME 1 
SME/H 1 
SME/SE/VC 1 
VC 1 
VC/SE 1 
W/SE/M 1 
W/VC/SE/SME 1 
Wholesale 1 
 Total No of CDFIs 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    
 
 
Key 
SE- Social Enterprise 
SME- Small and Medium Enterprise 
P- Personal 
M- Micro enterprise 
VC- Venture Capital 
H- Housing 
 
(Source: Own research) 
 
 
 
Between 2003 and 2005, UK CDFIs have created and/or preserved 95,000 jobs and are 
providing finance to nearly 10,000 businesses (CDFA, 2005).  Many UK CDFIs are in a 
period of growth and despite the emergence of a number of new CDFIs, the sector is 
beginning to strengthen and mature (CDFA, 2005).  As a result, CDFIs are continuing to 
diversify their operations by experimenting with new products, and/or offering services in 
new geographical areas (CDFA, 2005; Cook, 2005).  To date, CDFIs have provided over: 
‘£147,000,000 in loans and investments- a 40% growth in portfolios on 
2003… [and have]… £400,000,000 available to lend and invest 
representing an 80% growth on 2003’ (CDFA, 2005:2). 
 
 
 2
The UK Policy Context 
In 1999, PAT 3 produced the report ‘Enterprise and Social Exclusion’ (NSFNR, 1999) to 
discover how to stimulate business enterprise and principally sustainable enterprise in 
deprived areas of the UK (NSFNR, 1999).  The key finding of the report was that SMEs 
in disadvantaged areas faced considerable barriers when accessing finance for those firms 
wishing to start-up or develop their businesses.  Therefore the PAT 3 strategy was to 
provide:  
‘A.  Better access to services: people in deprived areas need better 
access to services that will help businesses succeed.  This means 
improving business support and finance. 
B.  Removing barriers to enterprise: there are unnecessary barriers that 
stop people from moving into self-employment and prevent some types of 
businesses succeeding.  These need to be removed. 
C.  More effective institutions: Central, regional and local government 
all have key roles to play in regeneration.  So does the private sector in its 
own long term self-interest.  These parties need to work better together 
and to have a stronger sense of shared objectives’ (Original format, 
NSFNR, 1999:32).  
With Government backing, CDFIs, as the revolving loan funds became labelled, were 
promoted as lenders of last resort with the aim of bridging the funding gap being 
experienced by SMEs in areas of high deprivation.  The PAT 3 report stated that those 
who live in deprived areas lack access to finance due to an absence of collateral, thus 
mainstream financial institutions are reluctant to lend small amounts due to high costs in 
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the lending process and the high risk of sanctioning finance to businesses located in 
deprived areas (NSFNR, 1999).  So with the support of the Department for Trade and 
Industry’s (DTI) SBS, RDAs, Business Link, and the private sector, CDFIs emerged with 
the aim of bridging the funding gap being experienced by enterprise and individuals 
(NSFNR, 1999).   
 
The UK Government is also working towards increasing the level of financial literacy 
and poverty alleviation through community empowerment.  The Government is 
promoting self-employment (Mosley and Steel, 2004) as a means of fulfilling its aim of 
reaching 80% employment levels by 2007 (HMT, 2005b).  New Labour’s concern for 
social justice and subsequent financial inclusion policies were inspired by the US Clinton 
administration’s ‘Third Way’ which considered financial inclusion as a means of 
encouraging enterprise and increasing competition to create a new active, participatory 
welfare system (Giddens, 1998; Marshall, 2004).  CDFIs are perceived by the state to be 
a financial vehicle to reduce welfare payments and to stimulate regeneration in deprived 
areas.   In sum, the Government set out the case for CDFIs in that ‘loans not grants’ were 
seen as an alternative to giving those living and working in deprived areas an incentive to 
adopt a more entrepreneurial outlook (NSFNR, 1999:4) and shifting dependency away 
from welfare benefits to be replaced by access to credit that would encourage enterprise 
and opportunity in deprived areas (HMT, 2004).   
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Community Development Finance Association (CDFA)  
In the UK, the CDFI market is underdeveloped compared to the US, yet with the creation 
of the CDFA in 2002 the UK CDFI sector was expected to strengthen and grow.  The 
CDFA was established as a result of the UK Government’s Social Investment Task Force 
(SITF) report ‘Enterprising Communities: Wealth beyond Welfare’ (SITF, 2000).  Thus, 
the CDFA was designed specifically for the movement by existing CDFIs.  The CDFA 
currently represents 95% of the UK CDFIs (CDFA, 2005:61).  The CDFA’s role is to 
coordinate and strengthen the CDFI sector further by encouraging growth, diversity, 
performance which it does through providing training events, annual conferences, and 
networking opportunities for its members and supporters.  In addition, the CDFA 
influences policy through developing funding opportunities and legislative frameworks as 
well as acting as the voice of the sector. 
 
The CDFA’s strategy is to develop ‘a thriving community development finance sector’ 
and ‘to promote and strengthen the CDFI sector by supporting its growth and influence, 
enhancing its capacity to deliver and advocating on its behalf’ (CDFA, 2004b:1).  The 
CDFA is working towards a common ground for its members and supporters, one 
element of which is to set benchmarks and standards.  In doing so, the CDFI sector can 
reflect on its performance and assess its influence on society.  By setting performance 
indicators and targets, a CDFI can begin to measure its effectiveness and use that 
measure to attract fresh and additional investment and investors.  Collin et al. (2001) 
argues that for UK CDFIs to develop, performance and accountability are key to 
sustainability.  As evident in consecutive annual surveys by the CDFA, some CDFIs are 
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reluctant to share information and performance with the rest of the sector (CDFA, 2004c, 
2005).  This could be a result of the competitive bidding process for funding from UK 
and European sources.  In addition, older CDFIs are not separated from young CDFIs 
which hides the development process of CDFIs and makes the CDFAs data inaccurate.  
This also reflects the diversity and competitive nature of the sector despite many CDFIs 
targeting specific geographical areas with no other competitors.   
 
Support for UK CDFIs 
CDFIs are funded through a variety of public and private funding sources.  European 
funds, Government, RDAs, Local Authorities, Business Link, Banks, trusts and 
foundations could contribute to CDFI activity in the UK.  To ensure that new CDFIs were 
created and existing operations developed, public funding was essential.  The argument 
for creating the Phoenix Fund was to tackle market imperfections, increase access to 
finance for enterprise and address the wider social and economic issues in disadvantaged 
areas (GHK, 2004).  CDFIs are designed to fulfil a double or triple bottom line of 
economic, social and/or environmental objectives; combined this is a high risk 
operational model and focuses on financial exclusion.  The Government set out the policy 
framework and the financial support which offsets the risk carried by CDFIs so that they 
could viably lend to low and moderate income people.  The Phoenix Fund was controlled 
by the SBS.  The Phoenix Fund subsidized CDFI operations and loan funds through grant 
funding. The Phoenix Fund established two types of funding for CDFIs to bid for, 
revenue and capital and CDFIs were able to bid for this funding.  The application process 
did not require CDFIs to complete a standard form.  Instead applicants were assessed on 
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the potential to reach excluded target groups, the adoption of innovative approaches, best 
practice within the growing sector, potential or actual commercial viability, and they had 
to be able to provide measurable outcomes of their activity.  In its existence:  
‘The Phoenix Fund held [three] bidding rounds between 2000 and 2003, 
with the final successful applicants being announced in spring 2004. As a 
result the Phoenix Fund supports over 60 CDFIs, providing them with 
support in excess of £42 million’ (SBS, 2005:1). 
The majority of UK CDFIs were established post 1999 when the PAT 3 report was 
produced and the Phoenix Fund was launched.  Without the Phoenix Fund 30 CDFIs 
would not be in operation (GHK, 2004; Ramsden, 2005).  Another perspective is that the 
CDFIs formed in response to the Phoenix funding may simply be short-term policy 
responses.  In a study for Advantage West Midlands (AWM), Deloitte and Touche (2002) 
have argued that the Phoenix Fund alone could not address all the financial requirements 
of enterprise in disadvantaged areas.  For example, business support also needed to be 
administered alongside the loans.  An impact study of the Phoenix Fund revealed that in 
nearly half of eighty projects that had received support, 40% of all their operations and 
revenue costs were provided by the fund (Ramsden, 2005).  With the loss of the fund due 
to a shift in Government policy towards personal finance, a considerable funding gap for 
CDFIs has developed.  Those CDFIs that are dependent on the Phoenix Fund may be 
highly unstable, especially if they are unable to attract new sources of private funding to 
replace the public funds.  UK CDFIs that existed prior to the Phoenix Fund have become 
more viable in the long-term as a consequence of the Phoenix Fund as they have 
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developed their operations and built up their loan portfolio as the Phoenix Funds acted as 
a guarantee fund for defaulted loans.   
 
In April 2006, the UK Government transferred responsibility for the Phoenix Fund from 
the SBS to RDAs as part of the Government’s plans for devolution (CDFA, 2004b).  Yet 
reports by GHK (2004) and Ramsden (2005) both reveal that a significant proportion of 
CDFIs remain dependent upon Government support despite the ending of the Phoenix 
Fund.  Many CDFIs have not reached sufficient scale and maturity to be independent of 
external funding.  In addition, many CDFIs have not planned for the long-term or sought 
alternative sources of funding for them to continue operating.  Younger CDFIs that have 
not reached their target market or attained a certain level of viability could face an 
uncertain future.  Mayo et al. (1998:47) predicted that RDAs could ‘oversee the provision 
of technical assistance, the disbursal of guarantees and support for partnerships’.  Thus, it 
was expected that RDAs would take on the role of the SBS (Ramsden, 2005), yet the only 
RDA to have developed a fund specifically for CDFIs is AWM.  This is because CDFIs 
within the West Midlands and AWM have worked in partnership to develop a strategy of 
CDFI support for the region and lobbied AWM for the continued support of CDFIs.  As 
AWMs fund for CDFIs only supports funding for SMEs (up to £50,000) a finance gap 
may be developing in the region for micro-enterprise (businesses with 0-9 employees)19.   
 
Another UK Government initiative for supporting CDFI activity is Community 
Investment Tax Relief (CITR).  The CITR was introduced in 2002 by SITF with a mission 
                                                 
19 AWM’s Advantage Small Loan programme (ASLP) initially was unable to support micro loan finance 
providers up to £10,000. 
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to help bridge the gap between finance for regeneration on a commercial basis and the 
support from Government to facilitate enterprise as a means for regenerating deprived 
areas.   Under this scheme investors get tax relief which encourages them to lend to 
CDFIs (including bank loans), also the CDFI can access loans at a lower rate of interest.  
To become CITR accredited, a CDFI has to show that ‘the promotion of enterprise, 
economic development and social inclusion in disadvantaged communities [is] its main 
goal’, have a proven track record and have ‘viable plans for long-term sustainability’ 
(HMT, 2001:14).  To date, only £38 million has been invested in CITR.  When Sir 
Ronald Cohen launched the scheme in 2002, it was envisaged that £1bn worth of 
investment would be made in four years.  In 2006, two of the main providers of CITR 
have halted their programmes owing to problems with the administration of the scheme, 
thus the impact of CITR has been poor (Connon, 2006).  CITR has, evidently, suffered 
internal constraints which need to be rectified as soon as possible.  It was believed that 
the CITR could be an effective tool to strengthen the CDFI sector and shift CDFIs into 
the mainstream further by forcing them to work alongside financial institutions and 
business support agencies (GHK, 2004).  CDFIs have been slow to take up the CITR, 
possibly due to the fact that they have to provide details of their track record; many 
CDFIs are still in their infancy and its difficult for a small, young organization to obtain 
this type of funding.  As such, young CDFIs that have not built up a track record and are 
not investment ready, may face similar problems to those firms that they are trying to 
support. 
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Traditionally, the Bank of England oversaw the regulation of the banking industry 
(Marshall, 1994).  However, the restructuring of the Financial Services Act in 1986 
shifted UK financial services industry towards the more competitive US model where the 
selling of products and services was liberalized and the British banking industry became 
increasingly aggressive in its quest for profit (Leyshon and Thrift, 1994; Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1995).  As a consequence there was a ‘flight to quality’ by the financial industry to 
the middle classes, excluding the poorer members of society (Leyshon and Thrift, 
1994:268; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995:318).  In 1997 as a way of addressing inequality in 
financial institutional activity, the New Labour government merged: 
‘financial regulation and supervision under a Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) with a purview that included supervision of banking, insurance and 
securities’ 
(Marshall, 1994:255).   
This change in policy streamlined regulation, as the FSA is answerable to the Treasury.  
This also makes it increasingly stable and transparent for financial institutions and the 
regulator.  According to Marshall (2004), this also promotes financial inclusion within 
and between institutions through the development of partnerships between the 
Government and financial institutions.  Thus, in this way, regulation through the 
Government is standardizing financial practices.  It has been noted that a finance gap 
remains between CDFI and mainstream financial institutions and this has led to questions 
of whether a CRA for the UK is necessary (Collin et al. 2001; Marshall, 2004; Mayo et 
al. 1998; Palmer with Conaty, 2002).  A UK CRA could make financial institutions 
engage further in CSR.  Implementing the US CRA in the UK using a cookie cutter 
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approach (or a one size fits all method) would probably not be effective as the ‘British 
banking industry is well consolidated’ (Mathiason, 2003:1) in addition to the UK’s policy 
and institutional context which perhaps does not warrant a US CRA.  A CRA would 
make banks serve excluded groups directly or indirectly via CDFIs, as Barclays bank, 
Halifax/Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Royal Bank of Scotland/NatWest bank are already 
doing, and banks could be fined if they did not comply (Mathiason, 2003).  But would the 
introduction of a UK CRA meet the needs of disadvantaged communities? How would it 
be regulated and what are the criteria for assessing those needs? The Bank of England 
monitored20 banking activity in deprived areas for small businesses (BOE, 2000; 2002; 
2004; Marshall, 2004).  Alternatively, UK financial institutions need to become locally 
embedded like their US counterparts, so that public and private partnerships can 
synchronize their efforts in tackling financial exclusion.  Marshall (2004:258) believes 
that the UK’s example of financial institutions addressing financial exclusion is more 
‘coherently focused on the most disadvantaged and wider ranging than their US 
counterparts’ which with ‘a tradition of self-regulation and freedom from state 
interference is highly prized’ makes introducing a CRA to the UK a challenging prospect.  
As the political system, banking regulation, culture and society remains different in the 
US, so it would not necessarily be wise to apply a cookie cutter approach to transfer the 
US CRA to the UK. 
 
The Nature and Operations of UK CDFIs 
CDFIs are continually adapting their operations to the market.  Nevertheless, lending to 
those that are financially viable but excluded from mainstream finance is relatively high 
                                                 
20 The SBS now monitors UK banking activity. 
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risk.  As many CDFIs operate revolving loan funds, they rely on the loans being repaid 
on time and in full in order to on lend as well as cover revenue costs.  In terms of impact, 
the CDFA acknowledges that CDFIs ‘are working in unknown territory’, as maintaining 
a balance between their financial and social objectives is a test of character in as much as 
that CDFIs are trying to identify and reach their target market whilst attempting to 
become sustainable (CDFA, 2004b:3).  Although, according to the CDFA (2005), CDFIs 
are realizing their social objectives by reaching their target market through the level of 
loans sanctioned, number of jobs created and/or preserved, and the percentage of ethnic 
minorities, women and other excluded groups that CDFIs have served.  However, there 
are other aspects that could be measured such as postcodes of employer and employees to 
determine whether those who live in deprived areas are being served by CDFIs.   
 
As CDFIs depend on accessing funding provided by Government or not-for-profit 
foundation and other parties, they must be able to demonstrate their effectiveness.  The 
CDFA annual survey includes data on financial performance which is defined as portfolio 
quality and risk, for example delinquency rate, defaults (net loan losses- net of any 
recoveries/gross loans outstanding which are also known as write offs), and income 
(CDFA, 2004a).  In the 2004 CDFA annual survey delinquency rates averaged at nearly 
9% and defaults fell from 2003 to just over 7% (CDFA, 2005:5).  These figures are 
relatively low which reflects the youth of the sector.  It is anticipated that the default rates 
will rise as the sector matures and CDFI clients become less able (or willing) to repay 
their loan (CDFA, 2005).  This is because many small businesses have a high failure rate, 
especially young firms (Storey, 1994).  Usually, when a business fails, repaying 
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mainstream financial institutions takes precedence over CDFI loans.  Loan interest rates 
vary according to each CDFI and the target market (SME/start-up/social enterprise) in 
which it operates.  The average loan interest rate is over 16% (CDFA, 2005:30).  Social 
enterprises have lower rates of interest which vary from 3% over base rate to over 9% 
fixed (CDFA, 2005:30).  These lower rates of interest for social enterprises reflect the 
relatively secure nature of such loans and the source of funding for UK CDFIs to lend to 
this market.  Moreover, the interest rate level depends on whether the CDFI charges fixed 
or variable rates of interest which fluctuate depending on the rate of inflation and the 
source of the capital that the CDFI has used for its loan fund.  UK CDFIs can offer 
finance at rates that are higher than mainstream financial institutions as they are taking on 
additional risk as they are lenders of last resort, operate in disadvantaged communities 
and rarely have access to collateral to guarantee the loan.    
 
In the 2005 budget, the Government shifted its focus towards personal finance (HMT, 
2005a).  With the loss of the Phoenix Fund project based micro-enterprise CDFIs may 
follow the policy and shift to the provision of personal finance.   CDFIs are currently 
dividing personal and business finance into separate spheres, yet the two are interlinked 
and are often blurred by (potential) clients of CDFIs.  This is especially the case for 
micro businesses, where the owners of the business often do not have separate bank 
accounts for their business and personal needs.  In a study on the financial services 
utilized by US small firms, Bitler et al. (2001) considered that sources of personal finance 
are likely to be used in enterprise start-up stages or by those who cannot access 
mainstream finance.  There is a danger that if the CDFI sector shifts towards personal 
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finance, funding may not be available for such activity and the lending risks are greater.  
Given the longevity of credit unions, co-operatives and friendly societies in the UK these 
mechanisms may be better suited to providing savings and loans for personal 
consumption and home improvement whilst attempting to alleviate social exclusion and 
poverty (Fuller and Jonas, 2002). 
 
Flow of Funds 
The funding sources that a CDFI draws upon can impact on its organizational strategy.  If 
CDFIs rely on public funds alone, then they have a short-term strategy as they must 
respond to the directives placed upon them by Government policy.  However, a conflict 
arises when they must also try to conserve resources for the future.  CDFIs may find that 
they need to recoup money lent during the first phase of operations before they can lend 
more money.  This potentially makes a CDFI financially unsustainable.  In comparison, if 
a CDFI has its own financial resources that are supplemented by public funds matched by 
additional private funding, then the focus shifts to the long-term and towards financial 
sustainability.  If CDFIs have accessed a grant for their capital to on lend then it is 
effectively free money and the CDFI can absolve itself of the risk if the loan defaults as 
the grant funding underwrites the cost.  More than half of CDFIs have an average fund 
size of £500,000 (CDFA, 2005:33).  The loan funds can be leveraged by banks or 
guaranteed under the Phoenix Fund to offset the risk poised to CDFIs in their lending to 
near bankable businesses and individuals.  It is ironic that the majority of CDFIs 
themselves are micro-enterprises or small firms with limited track records, security and 
credit histories.  This can result in banks being reluctant to lend to CDFIs if they do not 
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have the right credit history and loan book.  Thus, CDFIs face similar challenges to those 
they are serving when accessing finance for their operations.  As a result, a number of 
CDFI wholesalers have emerged such as BIG Invest, to serve CDFIs whilst they become 
sustainable and build a track record.  For those CDFIs that can access a loan, social 
economy banks such as Unity Trust Bank, offer finance for CDFIs.  In the future, with the 
demise of the Phoenix Fund, such borrowing will be vital in order for CDFIs to continue 
to operate.  However, this facility will only be available to a minority of CDFIs as the 
funding needs to be matched by other private sources to reduce the risk of lending to 
CDFIs.  The CDFIs also need to have a successful track record as they need to be able to 
demonstrate that they can repay the money borrowed.  Owing to the markets they serve, 
CDFIs can be themselves relatively high risk enterprises.  
 
Financial Literacy 
CDFIs have a key role to play in addressing financial and business literacy through 
offering additional support or business advice to borrowers.  Financial literacy is also part 
of CDFIs financial inclusion and poverty alleviation missions although not without added 
financial and policy support as this can undermine a CDFIs financial sustainability.  
Some UK CDFIs are managed by enterprise agencies and therefore operate in a different 
way to other CDFIs as they can access different funding sources and also provide 
business advice.  As UK CDFIs employ an average of five full-time staff, they do not 
have the resources or capacity to support all clients needs (CDFA, 2005).  According to 
Mayo et al. (1998:3) there remains a significant disparity ‘between the scale of the 
problem and capacity of the solutions’ available within the sector.  Many CDFIs offer 
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business advice in the form of assisting with business plans or making referrals alongside 
the loan process (CDFA, 2005).  Yet this is another challenge for CDFIs as they manage, 
monitor and provide advice to their clients so that defaults are low, whilst balancing the 
costs of delivering support.  CDFIs try to work in partnership with other business support 
agencies although the level, extent and effectiveness to which this occurs has not been 
measured.  Networks of RDAs, local authorities, business support agencies, enterprise 
agencies, mainstream financial services, and private business support agencies work with 
CDFIs to act as a source of referrals, understand the community needs, and ensure 
excluded groups are being targeted and reached.  CDFIs emphasize the importance of 
having regular contact with their clients in order to understand local market needs.   
 
CDFIs rely on relationship banking and the business proposal to assess the viability of the 
loan which depends on a close relationship being developed between the CDFI loan 
officer and client.  When dealing in emerging economies such as disadvantaged areas, 
tangible knowledge of a clients’ business such as visiting the business premises and 
interviewing the owner of the enterprise is more relevant in assessing the viability of an 
application than using credit scoring techniques.  Owing to the importance of local 
knowledge, UK CDFIs remain localized, despite a number of CDFIs operating at a 
national scale.  A tension exists between becoming embedded within the local 
community and becoming sustainable that CDFIs need to address.  If CDFIs become too 
large, there is a danger that they will lose focus and will not address the needs of a local 
community.  Yet it is essential that CDFIs try to become self-sufficient in order to operate 
without Government subsidies as they tend to be short term.  Sustainability only applies 
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if the strategy of the CDFI is not to act as a policy tool.  UK CDFIs focus upon finance 
for enterprise due to the strong belief by Government that small firms are the backbone of 
the UK economy and are an effective way of creating jobs and economic growth.  As 
such, there is evidence to show that CDFIs that are embedded within private and public 
partnership networks are more dynamic and active (Bryson and Buttle, 2005).  They are 
increasingly likely to innovate and experiment in different approaches to increase deal 
flow, investment and reduce default and loan failure.     
 
Investment readiness is a key issue for firms accessing finance (Deloitte and Touche, 
2002).  Therefore, business support is vital in the loan process to get firms to coordinate 
their business plan and make business projections.  As well as providing financial 
support, CDFIs can offer business advice as part of the application process.  CDFIs either 
view business support as integral to the loan application, or as a separate issue and so 
refer clients to external agencies.   Therefore, business support tends to be uneven within 
and between CDFIs (CDFA, 2005).  CDFIs that offer more formal forms of business 
support to clients could have more successful businesses and as a result, have lower 
default rates than those CDFIs that do not offer business support.  This also raises 
questions of sustainability for both CDFIs themselves and their clients.  Organizations 
that offer financial and business support are often enterprise agencies that have 
diversified into offering finance to micro-enterprise and SME which include Bolton 
Business Ventures (BBV), Lincolnshire Development, and East London Small Business 
Centre (ELSBC).   
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Organizational strategy is about how CDFIs achieve their missions.  However, there can 
be a disparity between a CDFIs strategy and its mission.  A CDFIs mission and strategy 
are dependent upon how, why, where, and when it was established.  Mission and strategy 
should both be strong factors in influencing CDFI operations.  Yet, UK third phase policy 
driven organizations that were established in the 2000s, may have been set up rapidly 
without understanding the needs of the borrower, operations of a loan fund or the longer 
term strategies required to run a successful CDFI.  This type of CDFI is largely 
dependent upon state funding and is thus exposed to enhanced levels of uncertainty.   
 
Sustainability 
Sustainability is a key issue for CDFIs as they have to maintain their operations through 
lending to those at the commercial margins and ensure that loans are repaid to 
demonstrate their validity and to finance their operations.  There are three stages of 
sustainability: financial sustainability, operational sustainability and market place 
sustainability (Ainger et al. 2002).  Financial sustainability is defined as the organization 
being able to cover its costs purely through its lending activities. Operational 
sustainability is where the organization can cover its revenue costs through earned 
income (Ainger et al. 2002).  Market place sustainability is a short to medium term 
strategy to work towards operational sustainability.  Sustainability is a major challenge 
for CDFIs as they have to fulfil a double bottom line.  CDFIs aim to be financially 
sustainable but it is extremely unlikely that this will ever be the case for the majority of 
CDFIs.  A more rational approach is for CDFIs to work towards operational 
sustainability.  Few UK CDFIs are currently market place sustainable.  This is because 
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CDFIs need to find a niche for fulfilling social objectives (Mayo and Mullineux, 2001) to 
serve market needs and in the long term, become sustainable.  Collin et al. (2001) believe 
that a cultural shift is required for CDFIs to become sustainable at an operational level.  
Thus CDFIs need to lessen their dependency on public subsidies and rely on their own 
internal revolving loan fund for operational revenue and capital to on lend.  This requires 
a CDFI to focus on the medium to long term strategy of their business and generate a 
number of external funding sources so that there is less risk of failure.  It also implies that 
loans are made to lower risk clients in order to reduce default rates.  In this way, CDFIs 
are not dissimilar to any other small businesses which have to be flexible, innovative and 
dynamic.       
 
In essence, CDFIs face the same issues as other financial institutions in widening their 
own access to finance (Mayo et al. 1998).  Thus, CDFIs must try to innovate and 
experiment with their application processes and lending techniques, organizational 
structure, funding for operational and revenue purposes, and knowledge of borrowers 
(Mayo et al. 1998).  The difficulty is ensuring that they continue to reach their target 
markets and maintain a continuous deal flow whilst meeting both their social and 
financial objectives.  In addition, CDFIs are also small firms and are undergoing similar 
processes that they encounter in their client.   
 
Conclusions: US and UK CDFI Comparison 
This chapter has explored one way in which relief from financial exclusion for enterprise 
is partly overcome through the operations of US and UK CDFIs working in marginalized 
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communities.  The US and UK have a long, complex history of financial exclusion.  
Marshall (2004) suggests that an effective direct comparison between the US and UK 
movement towards financial inclusion and CDFIs cannot be undertaken as the majority of 
UK initiatives are in the early stages of development compared to the US, work in 
different markets and have achieved different scales so it is difficult to assess their 
impacts.  Moreover, the US has an explicit financial inclusion policy whereas the UK has 
a more complex web of partnerships and networks working in different ways and at 
different levels, thus making financial inclusion disparate.  It is clear that CDFIs in the 
UK and US share the same fundamental aims.  Yet the institutional context, lending focus 
(whether business or personal finance), scale of the CDFI operations (which impacts 
upon their lending capability), social and financial impact, dependence on external 
sources of funding and sustainability levels differ markedly.   The US and UK CDFI 
sectors share similar Government financial support such as the CDFI Fund/Phoenix Fund, 
NMTC/CITR, SBA Guarantee Scheme/SFLGS, and both have a mix of top-down and 
bottom up approaches which balance institutional support and the key objectives of 
CDFIs.  Yet Marshall (2004) and Mayo et al. (1998) would argue that the UK lacks the 
equivalent of the US CRA which forces banks to lend to underserved markets.  Arguably, 
if this was introduced and successfully implemented in the UK, then CDFIs would 
continue to operate and banks would donate money to CDFIs.  Yet the CRA in the US 
highlights the extent of the problem as the banks do not take on enough risk and this 
creates the funding gap that CDFIs are trying to fill.      
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US and UK CDFIs differ in their approach to lending.  In the US, for example, there is a 
trend to lend only where security is available to guarantee the loan.  Therefore, US CDFIs 
reduce risk levels compared to the UK.  In the UK where start-ups are financed alongside 
established businesses, and there is also a shift away from the provision of business to 
personal finance which is high risk and security is only taken where available.  It is not 
surprising that US CDFIs have experienced faster growth rates than their UK 
counterparts due to the size of their market and age.   
 
The establishment and development of CDFIs is not a straightforward process and is a 
continuous challenge.  This chapter has illustrated the nature of CDFI lending activity in 
the US and UK highlighting the opportunities and risk/reward ratio that needs to be 
balanced within the lending process.  As a result of the diversity within CDFI markets 
and the tensions that exist within the business models, US and UK CDFIs could be 
classified as a ‘hybrid’ sector, constantly trying to balance their social and financial 
objectives.  As Buttle (2005:223) suggested, some CDFIs could even be ‘schizophrenic’ 
in their approach, owing to the conflicting cultures of being a financial institution and a 
not-for-profit.  It is this contradiction in the lending process that this research aims to 
investigate within and between CDFIs in the UK and US.   
 
This chapter has discussed the key issues surrounding US and UK CDFIs.  The 
overriding issue is the sustainability of CDFIs.  The viability of CDFIs depends on their 
ability to follow the market and the funding opportunities accordingly.  With the reduced 
funding and support from the US and UK Governments, the CDFI industry is facing 
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challenging times.  It is anticipated that for CDFIs to cut revenue costs of their 
operations, outsourcing, mergers, partnerships and network opportunities will be created 
and enhanced for them to survive.  Community finance has evolved and shifted over 
time, so it is not surprising that CDFIs have to demonstrate their impacts and outcomes.  
This is especially important with many CDFIs in receipt of public subsidy.  It is 
important to recognize that community finance initiatives were created in response to a 
gap in the market.  Perhaps CDFIs now have to respond to other market gaps and seize 
new opportunities.  In sum, CDFIs remain in a state of flux, are constantly evolving and 
are dynamic, fluid entities in order to reach their social and financial aims and achieve 
sustainability in the long term.  Moreover, the inconsistent development of CDFIs within 
the US and UK is creating highly uneven geographies of finance which impact on the 
financially excluded. 
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CHAPTER 5  THE NATURE AND OPERATIONS OF US AND UK CDFI CASE 
STUDIES 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the nature and operations of US and UK CDFIs, 
using case studies from the two countries to highlight the different loan fund models 
which reflect the diversity and complexity of the CDFI sectors within them.  The chapter 
begins by outlining how and why the CDFI case studies were established, the missions 
and role of CDFIs, the structure of the organizations and how and why CDFIs may have 
changed since their inception.  The second part of the chapter explores the different 
markets21 that the CDFI case studies serve, whilst the third part outlines the CDFI loan 
application process; from how clients are reached to the decision making process 
whereby loan applications are authorized or declined, and the monitoring of loans.  The 
final part of the chapter explores the role of performance and how and why this is 
measured.  In this way, this chapter reflects on the concepts and themes on enterprise and 
finance as outlined in the previous chapters.   
 
The Pre-Loan Process 
The operations of the US and UK CDFI case studies are defined by their missions, 
market, geographic area, products and services, such as business support and its 
organizational structure.  The US and UK CDFI case studies vary according to how and 
why they were established, who they were established by and their missions, which 
defines their social and economic objectives.  The key characteristics of the US CDFI 
case studies are highlighted in Table 5.1 and UK CDFIs in Table 5.2.  The US and UK 
                                                 
21 Market can be defined in terms of business sector and geographical area.  
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CDFI case studies were all loan funds with the exception of one CDFI which was a 
community development bank that had a loan fund as part of its operations and the UK 
CDFI are all loan funds.   
 
US CDFI Case Studies 
The US CDFI case study firms were established between 1973 and 1999 (Table 5.1).  
The US CDFIs developed loan funds for SMEs in response to finance being another facet 
of their missions, demand and/or a gap in market.  Half of the US case studies began 
lending shortly after their inception.  Three of the six US CDFIs in this research only 
began offering loans to small businesses when Government support was available under 
President Clinton’s CDFI Fund and only one US CDFI had been established since the 
introduction of Government support for CDFIs through the CDFI Fund in 1994.  
Although three CDFIs that had financed small businesses post-1994 when the CDFI fund 
was introduced, one US CDFI had only started operating in 1999.  During the third phase 
of US CDFIs, one of the US CDFI case studies was initially developed from an 
organization that began by providing employment training and subsequently began to 
provide loans.  Another CDFI that emerged in the third phase began its loan fund before 
opening its business support centre.  US CDFIs were established in response to the 
changing banking environment in the 1980s and 1990s (Barr, 2005; DeYoung et al. 2004; 
Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994, 1995, 1997).  The CRA also played 
an important role in encouraging CDFI development and formulation.  In addition, half of 
the US CDFIs did not operate in small business lending markets until they had support 
from the CDFI Fund which strengthened the sector (Pinsky, 1995).  Without Government 
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subsidy, the risks of lending to small businesses were too great or small business lending 
was not a market that they had fully developed and so was not part of their original 
missions.   
 
 
Table 5.1: US CDFI Case Studies 
 
  
US CDFI 
Case  
Study 1 
Case 
 Study 2 
Case  
Study 3 
Case  
Study 4 
Case  
Study 5 
Case  
Study 6 
 
 
Year Established 
 
1986 
 
1985 
 
1992 
 
1991 
 
1999 
 
1973 
 
Year small 
business loans 
established 
 
2001 
 
1998 
 
1992 
 
1991 
 
1999 
 
1973 
 
Geographical 
area served 
 
City 
 
Sub-region 
 
Sub-region 
 
City 
 
City 
 
Sub-National 
 
Markets served 
 
M, C, SME, 
VC, P 
 
E, H, C, VC, 
SME 
 
H, SME, C, M 
 
M 
 
SME, C 
 
M, SME, VC, 
C 
 
Total lent to 
SMEs 
 
$23 m 
 
Unknown 
 
$4 m 
 
$40 m 
 
$2.6m 
 
$62m  
 
Interest rate 
 
1% 
 
9.5% 
 
7-11% 
 
10-18% 
 
Variable 
 
Variable 
 
Default rate 
 
9% 
 
10-15% 
 
3% 
 
5% 
 
30% 
 
Unknown 
 
Other services 
 
Workforce 
training 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Technical 
assistance, 
Advisory 
services 
 
Loan size 
 
SME $500-
$100,000, 
C $100,000-
$1,000,000 
NMTC 
$1,000,000+ 
 
SME 
$25,000-
$750,000, 
C $50,000-
$2,000,000  
 
M less than 
$15,000, SME 
$35,000-
$100,000, 
H $200,000-
$300,000 
 
M $500-
$50,000 
 
Start-up  
$5,000 and 
less, 
SME 
$25,000-
$250,000 
 
unknown 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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Table 5.2: UK CDFI Case Studies 
 
 
UK CDFI 
Case  
Study 7 
Case  
Study 8 
Case  
Study 9 
Case  
Study 10 
Case  
Study 11 
 
 
Year Established 
 
1996 
 
1993 
 
1983 
 
2001 
 
1998 
 
Year M/SME loans 
established 
 
1997 
 
1993 
 
1985 
 
2001 
 
2000 
 
Geographical area 
served 
 
City 
 
Sub-Region 
 
Sub-Region 
 
Sub-Region 
 
Sub-Region 
 
Markets served 
 
SME, SE 
 
M, SME, SE 
 
M, SME, SE 
 
M, SME, SE 
 
M, P, HI 
 
Total lent to SMEs 
 
£4.67m 
 
£5m 
 
£3.9m 
 
£2m 
 
£1.6m 
 
Interest rate 
 
12% SME, 4% 
SE 
 
12.5% 
 
12.5% 
 
19% 
 
22-24% 
 
Default rate 
 
22% 
 
12% 
 
15% 
 
8.4% 
 
8% 
 
Other services 
 
Business 
support 
 
 
 
Business 
support, 
business 
mentors, 
business space 
  
Financial 
advice 
 
Loan size 
 
£10,000-
£50,000 
 
£1000-£20,000 
 
£500-£30,000 
 
£250-£30,000 
 
Up to £5000 
 
No of Jobs created 
and/or preserved 
 
2310 
 
2126 
 
1420 
 
835 
 
220 
 
No of  loans 
authorized 
 
321 
 
500 
 
570 
 
208 
 
1900 
 
Key 
Loan Sectors:  
C- Community 
E- Energy  
H-Housing  
HI- Home Improvement  
M- Micro  
P- Personal Consumption 
S- Small Business  
VC- Venture Capital  
 
(Source: Own research) 
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UK CDFI Case Studies 
The UK CDFI case studies were founded between 1983 and 2001 which, compared to the 
US CDFIs, is a decade later than the first US CDFI case study (Table 5.2).  Two of the 
UK CDFIs launched in the same year that they began lending, one of which was created 
in response to the introduction of the Phoenix Fund (Table 5.2).  The remaining three UK 
CDFIs, one UK CDFI began as an enterprise agency which offered business advice and 
later added loan finance to its operations.  The UK CDFI in question started its loan fund 
in 1985 for micro and small businesses as a lender of last resort.  It found that clients 
were rejected by banks for finance as they had no collateral or savings.  This UK CDFI 
case study also provides its clients with a business incubation service in terms of work 
space, finance and advice, and continues to operate by attempting to fill market gaps.  
The Chief Executive at this particular CDFI believed that CDFI operations are about 
plugging gaps that the private sector has not filled.  Two other UK CDFIs were founded 
and launched in the same year (1993 and 2001).  Four of the UK CDFIs were launched 
prior to Government support being available for CDFIs under the Phoenix Fund.  One 
UK CDFI stated that initially they raised funds from mainly private sources and in 1999: 
‘[Our CDFI] then moved into the Phoenix Fund because the Labour 
Government in particular had an interest in the CDFI sector in the [United] 
States’ (8a, UK, 13.01.06). 
It is worth noting that all the UK CDFIs (with the exception of the former enterprise 
agency) classified themselves as CDFIs.  In contrast to the US CDFIs, three of the UK 
CDFI case studies were instigated by local authorities or local enterprise agencies.  
Similar to the US, two UK case studies were founded by visionaries, inspired by the US 
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CDFI industry who then worked with a team of individuals who had experience of 
lending that could transform the ideas into reality.  Therefore, the US Government’s third 
way agenda suggests that the financial system is shifting towards alternative forms of 
finance for both individuals and businesses (Giddens, 1998).  Amin et al. (1999) suggests 
that the social economy, which includes CDFIs, moves between the state and the market 
which shifts the risk from state responsibility to the local community.  On this basis, the 
UK and US CDFIs were viewed as an alternative model of finance for those individuals 
who had been unable to access finance from mainstream institutions (Leyshon et al. 
2003).   
 
The US CDFI case studies were originally established by altruistic individuals and/or 
groups to create wealth in deprived areas and with the aim of regenerating those areas.  
The backgrounds of the founders included social work or running their own small 
business who had witnessed and/or experienced difficulty in accessing finance as a result 
of discrimination, redlining and other forms of financial exclusion.  The primary mission 
of all the US CDFI case studies was to create jobs, wealth, and opportunity in 
disadvantaged areas (NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  One US CDFI noted that:   
‘lending [to] small businesses…to create jobs,…its very much within our 
mission, its just yet another vehicle to provide jobs to low skilled 
employees and develop neighbourhoods’/economic development’ (1a, US, 
07.10.05). 
Another US CDFI stated: 
‘[Our] mission is to provide financing and training to people who lack 
access to traditional sources of credit and so…in our mission we don’t 
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make a distinction between where they come from, what type of business 
they have, but it turns out that the majority of people in that situation are 
minority or immigrants’ (4a, US, 17.10.05). 
US and UK CDFIs aim of creating wealth and opportunity in disadvantaged areas was 
not fully realized until they began lending to small businesses with or without the support 
of the CDFI Fund.  Small firms play a fundamental role in the economy, particularly their 
potential for creating employment, opportunity and wealth (Acs and Storey, 2004; BOE, 
2000; Cressy, 2002; Keeble, 1997; Martin, 1999; Mayo et al. 1998; Porter, 1990; Storey, 
1994).  The missions of UK CDFIs are similar to those of US CDFIs in that they 
endeavour ‘to improve the prosperity of the people living within our communities’ (13a, 
UK, 27.06.06) by providing loan finance.  In sum, the raison d’etre of US and UK CDFIs 
was to create ‘economic wealth’ (9a, UK, 10.02.06) in deprived areas: 
‘the people…[in the local community]…said they wanted a link between 
the banks and building societies which were flying out of the area because 
of lack of business... There was very little in the way of economic activity 
going on and many of the shops were shutting and it was becoming a drug 
and [an] economic ruin area’ (8a, UK, 13.01.06).   
The creation of wealth through enterprise is key to the future success of deprived areas 
(Porter, 1990).   
 
At the start of their operations, each of the US and UK CDFIs identified particular groups 
that suffer from financial exclusion and have targeted their operations to serve their 
needs, for example, women owned businesses, and minority ethnic businesses (NEF and 
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Nicholson, 2003).  But by serving one section of the community, the market is not large 
enough to sustain CDFI operations.  The following demonstrates why one US CDFI case 
study was established and how it has developed since its inception in the early 1990s:   
‘The organization was founded by the African-American 
community…[who] realized that there was an issue of access to 
capital…[However] it was really hard to…build a high quality 
organization just serving one segment of the population. So the idea was 
then [that] we would expand into other communities…that had similar 
issues.  But even that was not gonna provide the economies that we 
wanted so what we said was … ‘why not serve the whole market place’ 
cos we understood that there was [sic] issues of access to capital even in 
rural areas, or even in non persons of colour, there was still issues of 
access to capital so why don’t we, if were gonna have staff available and 
management available why don’t we offer this to the whole market place?’ 
(3a, US, 13.10.05). 
This attitude also reflects the tension in creating an organization that has to balance and 
maintain its original missions with the aim of becoming financially sustainable in the 
long term (NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  In contrast, according to one US case study, it has 
remained true to its original core values since its inception in the 1970s:  
‘I think that probably three things that have stayed the same.  One is the 
concept of entrepreneurial energy,...the second thing is that there is value 
in the regulated commercial bank model, and the values come in a number 
of ways but in a big way the major one is the ability to go to scale, but 
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there are lots of pieces of that, some of which relate to being regulated.  
[The] third point which is that [the organization] always had this notion 
that while the commercial bank was a really important financial engine, it 
couldn’t do it itself and that…job training [is essential when lending to 
small businesses in partnership with other locally based organizations]’ 
(7a, US, 07.03.06). 
Yet this US CDFI has the advantage of operating as a bank which allows it to use 
depositor’s funds for its lending activity as opposed to relying on grants from the public 
sector.   
 
Markets Served 
US CDFIs offer finance to affordable housing projects, energy saving and sustainable 
energy projects, SMEs, emergency personal finance and equity finance (Table 5.1).  The 
diverse range of markets is a result of the finance gap for individuals, businesses, social 
enterprises, hospitals and schools in underserved communities.  The size of loans range 
from $300 to $5 million (Table 5.1).  The size of SME loans range from $500-750,000 
(Table 5.1).  US CDFIs offer equity finance, working capital, emergency finance, finance 
for start-up and existing businesses, revitalization of housing/community projects, 
personal consumption and energy conservation (Table 5.1).  UK CDFIs provide finance 
to micro enterprises, SMEs, social enterprises and to a lesser extent, home improvement 
and personal consumption (CDFA, 2004).  UK CDFIs emphasize the significance of 
finance for enterprise as a result of the Labour Government initiative and the existence of 
the welfare state.  The size of loans varies according to the markets that they serve.  The 
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UK CDFIs offer finance between £250 and £50,000.  The average loan made by UK 
CDFIs is £10,000.     
 
The majority of US lending portfolios comprise housing and/or community projects 
which are secured by real estate and are, therefore, low risk.  The portfolio is then 
balanced with higher risk lending such that: 
‘the reason why we do non-profits is they create community impact and 
they provide a community service and a lot of times they have…problems 
with access to capital so we lend to them…so all those [loans] in the 
housing and non-profits subsidize the small business lending, micro 
lending that we do, because we have yet in 12 years, never written off a 
housing or non-profit loan, so that’s again a whole subsidy notion’ (3a, 
US, 13.10.05). 
The business and personal lending is largely secured by guarantee which in this case can 
be a personal guarantee or secured through the US CDFI putting a lien on property or 
equipment: 
‘security…could be in the form of a personal co-signer or separate 
personal guarantee and then also cars or whatever sort of machinery in 
collateral and…an all asset lien …on the business saying that if for some 
reason you do not pay, we can claim up to this amount...We don’t do that 
for everybody, again it’s a matter of [if] they’re more formal or the larger 
loan amount then something like that might happen’ (4b, US, 17.10.05). 
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In this way, US CDFIs are lowering the default risk of loans.  By balancing high risk 
markets with lower risk markets, US CDFIs are acting in the same way as mainstream 
banks.  However, it is important to note that US CDFIs are not lenders of last resort and 
so are on occasion, providing loans to bankable businesses.  Similar to the US, the 
majority of the UK CDFI case studies offer finance for social enterprises as well as for-
profit enterprise.  The reason for this is to balance the higher risk of lending to for-profit 
businesses with the lower risk social enterprise market.  The markets may seem simpler 
compared to the US, however, according to all but one UK CDFI, a very small 
percentage of UK CDFIs can successfully lend to social enterprises as social enterprises 
are risk averse and as grants are available, they would prefer to take the cheaper and safer 
option.  However, US CDFIs have a greater size of funds and their lending activity is 
dominated by secured housing loans.  UK CDFIs have had to balance their portfolios 
more carefully than those in the US.  Moreover, UK CDFIs do not take collateral to 
secure the loan and there an ethical question in relation to clients securing loans against 
their home (if they own a property in the first place) and the loan defaults, is it right to 
make a family homeless?  As such, it could be interpreted that UK CDFIs balance their 
social objectives with their economic objectives.       
 
The geographic area served by US CDFIs ranges from City wide to sub-national where 
CDFIs operate in a number of different States across the US.  City wide CDFIs are still 
large organizations that tend to have a number of offices and/or loan officers located 
around the city.  The sub-national CDFIs take a similar approach so that local knowledge 
is used to the greatest effect.  As such, US CDFIs mainly operate in urban areas which 
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have the greatest areas of deprivation.  On the basis of the CRA, CDFIs operate in 
markets that are underserved by mainstream financial institutions (Barr, 2005; Leyshon 
and Thrift, 1994, 1995, 1997; Marshall, 2004, Mayo et al. 1998).  However, one US 
CDFI discussed working in ‘emerging markets’ (2h, US, 11.10.05) as it is not necessarily 
the best decision to move into markets that need the most help.  This US CDFI stated that 
these emerging markets are located at the frontier of the disadvantaged areas and 
consequently they are ignoring truly disadvantaged areas to reduce lending risk.  In this 
way, some CDFIs are operating as banks have done historically through redlining areas 
that are perceived to be high risk.  As CDFIs strategically target ‘emerging markets’ 
rather than deprived markets, and are thus  acting as complementary to mainstream 
financial activity.  Through previous bad experience, CDFIs are not working in truly 
deprived markets and are not taking on higher risks associated with small business 
lending even when balanced in other markets.  Therefore, US CDFIs are relatively risk 
averse.  Instead they are hoping that by working on the frontiers of disadvantaged areas 
and in making the area more competitive, new jobs will be created through knowledge 
spillovers (Acs and Varga, 2004).   
 
The geographic area served by UK CDFIs is at a city and sub-regional scale.  Operating 
at a local level has meant that there is deep knowledge of the local area.  This has allowed 
CDFIs to become embedded within the locality and to meet the needs of the clients by 
having a close working relationship with them.  These findings match those of the UK 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG, 2006:38) which states that 
Government policies have a greater chance of success if they are embedded in the 
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communities which they serve as they have to build networks of trust and have the 
‘flexibility to adapt to specific local conditions’.   
 
The current geographic coverage of CDFIs in the UK is uneven and so there is potential 
for growth in the future, either through mergers or takeover of areas from less successful 
CDFIs.  Some CDFI funding is restricted to local ‘transitional areas’ which are defined 
by postcode:  
‘In terms of our defaults there’s a big problem because pretty much all of 
our defaults are in the poorer areas and hardly any defaults are in the 
transitional areas but the problem is that our money is split 70/30 and you 
can’t transfer between the two.  So you need to keep an eye on everything’ 
(9c, UK, 10.02.06). 
Clearly there is tension in lending to the transitional areas and the high risk associated to 
these markets whilst aiming to become financially sustainable in the long term.  Yet it is 
the role of the CDFI to balance this conflict of interests by using local knowledge, 
partnerships with the community and the experience of staff.  Also, the use of the term 
‘transitional area’ is similar to the use of ‘emerging markets’ in the US.   
 
Operational Structure  
The scale of CDFIs varies widely, especially between the US and UK.  CDFIs in the US 
are significantly larger than their UK counterparts.  The smallest UK CDFI has 5 full-
time staff whilst the largest CDFI in the US has over 60 full-time employees.  One UK 
CDFI employs 8 full-time employees and 25 self-employed business advisors.  In this 
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way, the CDFI is reducing its costs and therefore the risk.  These figures do not include 
board members which provide their services on a voluntary basis.  Three UK CDFIs 
employ one person specifically to monitor and manage the clients in terms of repayment 
and defaults.  In the US, there is a clear operational structure to the CDFIs and:  
‘[by having separate departments] it keeps everything more efficient. The 
loan consultants22 know that they are, [and] will always be the primary 
contact for a client whether or not its dispersed or not’ (4b, US, 17.10.05). 
Two UK CDFIs monitor their clients with the support of their back office which notifies 
the CDFI of any issues that may arise when repayments are due.  The CDFI lending team 
then deals with the clients, which could have negative implications due to the 
embeddedness of the client/loan officer relations.  The average number of loan officers at 
each UK CDFI is two.  In the US, the average is 12, plus administration and support staff, 
technical assistance providers and so on.  These figures are not surprising given the size 
of the geographical areas and different markets that the UK and US CDFIs serve.  
Nevertheless, US and UK CDFIs are working on tight operational budgets and time 
frames.  In this way, the loan due diligence and monitoring process could be 
compromised as a result of staff being overstretched. 
 
Since their inception US and UK CDFIs have become increasingly professional in their 
operations.  One US CDFI described the development of the organization: 
‘when I first started at [the organization] it was just me and an 
administrative assistant and the first person I hired,…I really couldn’t 
                                                 
22 In the US, loan officers are known as loan consultants.  Generally, the US loan officers are employed by 
the CDFIs but can be independent and self-employed.   
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attract lenders or people with financial background because who wanted to 
come work for a really small organization and we couldn’t afford a person 
with business lending experience so we hired a person that had more of an 
economic development or social service background and then because I 
was a banker, I tried to teach them all the lending aspects, the lending 
culture, it was really a slow go because they had the mission part but it 
takes years and years to develop a lending culture or really develop 
lending experience. So eventually I embarked on a strategy to 
hire…former bankers that had a commercial lending background and then 
I had to [teach] them the mission part, we found that was much easier…to 
bring in new people lets say with a college degree didn’t have any lending 
experience cos we already had established a culture of lending…I think a 
lot of CDFIs when they start off they tend not to hire the lending type, 
they tend to hire the social service type that have the mission piece and 
then try to learn the lending, they really struggle I know we did in our 
early years we struggled that way too’ (3a, US, 13.10.05). 
The strategic shift of hiring staff with banking experience rather than a social background 
indicates that there was a need to create an increasingly professional industry to enhance 
their operations (Emerson, 2003).  In doing so, CDFIs are creating a corporate culture 
that is informed by their strategy, whereby staff have shared values and their behaviour 
can reflect the values of the firm (Schoenberger, 1997).  By hiring ex-banking employees, 
CDFIs are continuing the orthodox banking approach to create an increasingly 
professional sector. 
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The move towards a more formal, mainstream approach suggests that CDFIs are 
formalizing their activity by taking a more considered approach with regard to funding 
and lending practices.  In this way, it appears that increasingly US CDFI practices are 
formalized as a survival mechanism: 
‘I hope for it to survive as a genre, they need to commit to bigger funds 
that sustain themselves.  Ours is one of the biggest in the market, there is 
only one other that’s on our scale or two others I think many of them are 
way too small so you can create sufficient diversity and they can’t manage 
themselves financially, they don’t have any staying power in the market.  I 
mean there’s just so many issues so I’m hoping when liquidity comes into 
the market I don’t know that that will happen but if that happens then you 
know they can afford and should you know should bring in more 
professional management’ (2e, US, 11.10.05).   
CDFIs need to take risks in order to attract and access a range of funding streams so that 
they can grow and diversify their markets.  With reference to US CDFI staff one US 
CDFI states: 
‘It’s been an amateurs market and that’s not good you know … good 
people need to be paid, need to be incentivized just like they were in any 
other part of the market. In fact, arguably I mean I don’t say this for 
myself personally, but arguably in some respects its harder than any other 
part of the market because you’ve got two objectives and so you know the 
pay scales have to address that issue and there has to be quality or there is 
no point in doing it. So are we headed there, I feel like [our organization’s] 
 158
done that.  We have just terrific seasoned experienced staff that really 
knows what they’re doing and are supported by their strong workforce.  
We’re really pioneers in that respect, so I feel really good about that.  Now 
that doesn’t mean were gonna succeed by the way, but at least it means 
that we have given our investors the right formula in my opinion for 
creating a successful platform’ (2e, US, 11.10.05). 
Employment of staff from the banking sector ensures that there is formal banking 
knowledge to draw from, but also can cause problems as banking professionals need to 
be re-educated so that they evaluate loan applications in a different way.  US CDFIs have 
to balance getting the appropriate staff and level of earnings in line with their missions 
which is also an issue for all the UK CDFI case studies.   
 
Mainstream financial institutions are risk averse and potential customers that are located 
in geographically deprived areas are increasingly likely to be refused credit (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1994).  Leyshon and Thrift (1995) state that financial institutions need to become 
locally embedded in order to understand the needs of borrowers.  Bryson and Buttle 
(2005) suggest that UK CDLFs are alternative in that they are set up by social 
entrepreneurs.  However, within US CDFIs and possibly to a lesser extent UK CDFIs, 
there has been a shift from being an alternative source of finance towards becoming more 
mainstream in their approach.   As such, it could be understood that US and UK CDFIs 
have undergone a process of change through their development, where at the beginning 
they were alternative financial institutions, but they have developed into hybrid 
organizations which combine orthodox and alternative business models and processes to 
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accomplish their objectives (Rose, 2000).  The shift may have impacted upon their 
portfolio performance and ability to reach their target market as riskier deals are seen as 
not conducive to becoming financially sustainable.  In the case of US CDFIs prefer to 
seek real estate based deals such as community and housing developments which fulfil 
both their social and financial objectives.  Despite these deals being significant for the 
community, they are not creating long term employment opportunities.    
 
The US and UK CDFI sectors have undergone a series of different phases, driven by 
Government funding support.  The first phase of CDFIs was triggered by individuals 
recognizing the market gap for enterprise finance.  The second phase was inspired by the 
success of the first which consequently led to Government support for the sector.  The 
third phase of CDFIs are project based, largely established on the back of the available 
funding schemes.  These are policy driven or more correctly Government programme 
driven organizations.  US and UK CDFIs missions, regardless of when or how they were 
established, have remained constant and are based on the creation of jobs, wealth and 
opportunity in disadvantaged communities.  In addition, the US CDFI markets are more 
sophisticated and diverse than their UK counterparts as US CDFI operations are larger 
and more complex.  That is not to say that US CDFI are superior to UK CDFIs, but US 
CDFIs operate in a more competitive, yet financially supportive environment.  However, 
the increasing professionalisation of the US CDFI sector has also made the sector 
increasingly risk averse which in turn is institutionalizing some US CDFIs into the 
mainstream.  In sum, US and UK CDFIs have streamlined operations to remain efficient 
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organizations.  However, CDFIs are becoming increasingly professional and in doing so, 
there is increasing tension between CDFIs missions and their operations.   
 
The Loan Application Process  
This study undertook research at a large high street bank in the UK to explore the 
similarities and differences between the mainstream financial institution loan application 
process for enterprise and the alternative CDFI lending process.  
 
The Lending Application Process in a UK Mainstream Financial Institution  
UK high street bank lending begins with referrals made through local branches, existing 
customers or key business introducers, for example, accountants.  If clients apply to the 
bank online and the application is straightforward, the loan can be assessed against 
standard criteria at an offshore call centre (which reduces the cost of the loan application 
and increases the bank’s profit).  If the application is complex then the loan is assessed in 
the UK at a centralized location.  If clients contact the bank’s local business manager, 
applications are made in a face-to-face meeting.  There are no application forms, as all 
applicants are different; for example, sole traders, partnerships, limited companies.  The 
meeting between lender and borrower takes around 45 minutes but this depends on the 
complexity of the application.  Sole traders and partnerships can access up to £50,000 
unsecured, but the interest rate is higher for unsecured loans.  Local business managers 
can authorize these applications with the bank’s credit team.  Limited companies can 
access above £50,000 if there is security available to guarantee the loan.  If they require 
more than £50,000, the national, centralized general lending team assesses the application 
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and to do this require three years accounts plus expenditure and cash flow forecasts.  The 
loan decision can be made within three hours.  The interest rate, on average, is variable 
4% over base plus a fee of 1.5%.  The interest rate is fixed if the customer is high risk.  
Security against the loan is essential so that the customer can repay if the business fails.  
From this research, start-up businesses prefer to apply for overdrafts facilities as they 
think they will be rejected for a loan.  As such, many people fear banks and think that 
banks are unapproachable.  There is, therefore, a process of self-exclusion from 
enterprises accessing bank loan finance (Fraser, 2004).  
 
Mainstream banks mitigate risk by allocating funds to each market, for example high 
risk, medium risk and low risk (Table 5.3).  However, 80% of loans are made to low risk 
enterprises and high risk enterprises are supported with 50% matched funding by clients.  
At this particular high street bank, clients who miss one repayment and are unable to be 
contacted by telephone at their business or home are sent two letters with a formal 
demand to pay the remainder of the loan.  If the client is unobtainable, the debt recovery 
unit takes over the case. 
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Table 5.3: UK Market Lending Risk   
 
High Risk Markets 
 
Medium Risk Markets 
 
Low Risk Markets 
 
• Engineering 
 
• Off licences 
 
• Old people’s homes 
 
• Restaurants 
 
• Play centres • Dentists 
 
• Pubs 
 
 • Doctors 
• Solicitors 
 
  • Supermarkets 
 
 
(Source: 14c, UK, 17.08.05) 
 
The CDFI Loan Application Process 
The CDFI loan application process is complex and differs with each application.  The 
loan application process includes the following steps:  
• referral to the CDFI by a mainstream bank, accountant, business introducer, word 
of mouth, etc;  
• the borrower submits an application;  
• the lending team assess the application in terms of due diligence and the 
risks/rewards of the loan; and 
• setting the terms and conditions of the loan.   
The CDFI loan monitoring process will be explored later in the chapter.     
 
The CDFI loan application process begins with the referral process which often involves 
an introducer.  This is followed by an assessment process in which applications are 
examined, in terms of their risk-reward ratio, as well as social and financial objectives 
and sustainability.  The CDFI loan application process is dependent upon enterprises 
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being investment ready.  The investment issues faced by CDFIs are similar to mainstream 
financial institutions; adverse selection, information asymmetries and moral hazard.  
Adverse selection is where the owner of the small firm has distorted their capabilities and 
the investor cannot substantiate such claims until the deal has been completed.  However, 
due diligence (a pre-deal analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the project) is 
essential in assessing all potential investments so information asymmetries and moral 
hazard (selecting an unsuitable investment) can be reduced.   
 
Referrals 
In all the studies, potential clients were referred to US and UK CDFIs via networks of 
banks, local enterprise agencies, accountants, solicitors, word-of-mouth, in some cases 
other CDFIs and, to a lesser extent, through direct advertising.  UK and US CDFI referral 
networks are largely determined by their funding sources, supporters and active 
networking.  As such, CDFIs are dependent on both public and individual private 
institutions for both referrals and funding.  However, the referral process from each 
institution varies widely for each CDFI and is largely dependent upon the goodwill of 
others as the referrals are made on an informal basis.  Consequently, the efficiency of the 
referral network can be inadequate.  In three of the US CDFI case studies, the deal flow 
(the number of potential clients) was an issue as banks at the time of the interview were 
approving an increasing number of loans to micro enterprises and small businesses.  In 
the UK, two CDFIs noted that they struggled with a lack of deal flow and another three 
UK CDFIs said this was because CDFIs lack recognition within the community in 
general.  Therefore, there is a low awareness of CDFIs within the communities that they 
 164
serve, or perhaps a market does not exist, or needs to be developed via awareness 
development programmes (NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  The lack of deal flow could be 
due to the social objectives of CDFIs.  This has implications for both the lending process 
and survival of the CDFI.  Moreover, local networks take time to develop and are then 
only temporary.  If a CDFI fails to make links with the local community then they risk 
being isolated organizations which would undermine their viability and sustainability.  
 
The key to creating a viable, sustainable CDFI is through balancing the loan portfolio.  
The UK CDFI loan application process is compared to a UK mainstream bank in Figure 
5.4 then highlights the different approaches taken in decision making.   The UK CDFI 
process includes; application submitted, assessment of social and financial criteria, 
market research, interview, due diligence, recommendation, decision and if successful, 
the loan is disbursed.  In particular, it shows the interactions between those involved in 
the process and the time and places in which the decisions are made.  The rapid decision 
making dialogue within the bank is streamlined and efficient due to the reliance on credit 
scoring.  Also, at the UK bank, loan applications are generally made informally via 
telephone or internet rather than candidates making formal applications due to the 
reliance on computers.  Efficiency and effectiveness and how they are defined are the key 
differences between banks and CDFIs lending processes, as CDFIs source funds from 
Government, not-for-profit foundations and banks they can afford to take higher risks as 
they receive grant and loan funding (Bryson and Buttle, 2005).   
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The CDFI loan application process is more detailed owing to their role as lenders of last 
resort and the number of people involved in making a decision on a loan.  The first stage 
of the CDFI loan process is where the loan consultant assesses the loan application for 
any missing information, undertakes market research and a social and financial analysis 
of the loan application.  The second stage of the process involves interviewing the 
applicant at their premises or, if a start-up business, at the CDFIs offices.  This involves 
assessing the character of the borrower, whether their business is viable, if they have the 
ability to repay the loan, and also complete any missing information.  If the applicant 
passes this stage then the third stage involves the lending team making a recommendation 
for a loan and setting the conditions.  The final stage of the application is where the loan 
officer meets with the loan manager (if the application is for less than £20,000) or the 
lending team which is comprised of board members with knowledge of lending (if over 
£20,000).  This is when the loan application is discussed according to the CDFIs social 
and economic objectives and assessed against the CDFIs loan portfolio.  There are 
constant discussions by the lending committee that are ‘informed by experience and 
practice’ (Bryson and Buttle, 2005: 279).  According to Bryson and Buttle (2005), there 
are two forms of discursive formations within the CDFI lending process.  First, there is 
the ‘discursive formation of profitability’ where risks and rewards are played out to 
determine whether they can act in an ‘alternative discursive’ way so that the CDFI 
maximizes its own sustainability (Bryson and Buttle, 2005:279).  Second, there is the 
‘alternative discursive formation of value’ whereby profit values are replaced by values 
relating to overcoming financial exclusion (Bryson and Buttle, 2005:279).  Alternative 
discursive lending decisions are based upon a CDFI making its lending decisions by 
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balancing social, ethical, environmental and economic values (Figure 5.1).  This includes 
‘social capital, the re-evaluation of environmental capital, local regeneration, the 
retention and creation of jobs for local people, and the financial obligations to ensure the 
[CDFIs] own long-term sustainability’ (Bryson and Buttle, 2005:278).  CDFI operations 
makes the lending decision relatively time-consuming especially when each individual 
within the lending team may have their own definition of what the CDFIs social and 
economic objectives are and whether or not a proposition is viable.  As such, these 
discussions produce temporary balancing of a CDFIs social and financial objectives and 
in effect a case by case balancing: 
‘Each [CDFI] develops and modifies their lending through a set of social 
criteria or ideologies that limit lending activity to a specified target group 
of unbankable or near bankable borrowers’ (Bryson and Buttle, 2005:279). 
In this way, the lending criteria shifts with each loan application and is therefore a 
persistent source of tension as, in practice, it is difficult to separate alternative discursive 
profit and value.  One UK CDFI questioned whether you can define social and economic 
objectives separately as they are inextricably linked (10a, UK, 03.05.06).   
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Figure 5.1: Chart to Show Factors in the CDFI Decision Making Process  
Social 
 
 
 
 
Environmental                 Financial 
 
 
Ethical 
 
 
(Source: Own research) 
 
The CDFI loan process is fraught with difficulties and has yet to try to be as rigorous as 
possible.  In this way, those involved in the loan dialogue are ultimately controlling the 
decision making and the CDFIs objectives.  In awarding loans, banks aim to generate a 
profit whereas CDFIs aim to balance their social and financial objectives against the 
risk/reward ratio of the organization and generate a surplus to cover their overheads.  The 
tension between the depth of reach and sustainability of a CDFI has to be balanced within 
each loan decision.  This highlights the complexity and dynamism of CDFIs.  The 
complexity of CDFI operations highlights the difficulty in measuring CDFI performance, 
particularly the social measures such as impact of the CDFI loan.  Performance 
measurement is also time consuming and expensive, while many small CDFIs do not 
have the resources or skills for this activity.  Ultimately, the tensions in the CDFI loan 
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process questions the CDFIs management style and challenges the notion that a CDFI can 
become sustainable and balance revenue, loan income and portfolio against defaults.  
This explains why some CDFIs have become more commercial or policy led in their 
operations.   
 
Table 5.4: Loan Decision Flow Chart of UK Mainstream Bank and UK CDFIs for 
SME Lending Activities  
 
UK Mainstream Bank 
 
UK CDFI 
 
• Day 1 Loan request (45 minutes) 
• Application details- years in business, 
Owner Occupation, Value of assets. If 
request is over £50k, also require 3 years 
accounts and forecasting expenditure and 
cash flow. 
 
 
• Day 1 Application Submitted with 
business plan, trading information (if 
applicable), bank account statements.  
• Social and Financial Criteria Assessed- 
number of jobs created/sustained, benefit 
to local community, environmental impact, 
investment ready.  
• Recommendation made. • Desk research, Market analysis. 
• Up to £50k (unsecured) decision is made 
by an automated system. 
• Above £50k (secured) General Lending 
Team assess application (3 hours). 
• Approx Day 14 Interview- Character 
assessment (1-1.5 hours). 
• Further research/information gathered if 
necessary. 
 • Due diligence. 
• Recommendation by Loan Manager. 
• Up to £20k (unsecured) decision made by 
loan consultant and Chief Executive. 
• Between £20k-50k (unsecured) Lending 
Team Assess Application. 
• Day 1/2 Decision- Loan 
Authorized/Declined. 
• Day 2/3 Loan Dispersed. 
• Decision- Loan Authorized/Declined. 
• Day 28+ Loan dispersed. 
• Monitoring, delinquency management. 
 
Note: Diagram shows decision making at different times and speeds. (Source: Own research) 
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All applicants for a CDFI loan have to complete a standard application form as well as 
submit a business plan and financial data such as banking statements.  The application 
takes an average of four weeks to process in order to complete due diligence which 
involves the scrutiny of the application to overcome information asymmetries and reduce 
the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard (BOE, 2000; De Meza, 2002; Mayo et al. 
1998; Storey, 1994): 
‘Due diligence is how we monitor the cases, especially prior [to] lending.  
Its very much [about] getting information.  If it’s a trading company due 
diligence is far easier, if it’s a limited company you’ve got records, you’ve 
got accounts, you’ve got a track record and bank accounts, you’ve got the 
accountant you can speak to, due diligence from the customers, you can 
check all those out to an extent but you never foretell the future especially 
when some of the accounts are 12 months old.  If you’ve got management 
accounts prepared in-house…[they] can be skewed to support a loan 
application which isn’t justified and it does happen and has happened.  
Due diligence for a new client and a number of smaller clients are in 
simple sectors to be honest [as] they are not technical businesses [and] 
between us there is…lots of experience of banking over the years so if it’s 
a day nursery, and engineering company, software designers, we tend to 
know roughly bits of that sector, desk research through Google, tracing 
competitors and Intel reports if it’s a decent size so we try to do a lot of 
desk research, especially a lot of the due diligence goes into the person 
who is running the business we do personal credit searches, we’ll check on 
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their registry if they say they own their own house we’ll check it to see if 
they do, we’ll find out how much the house was bought for so we do a lot 
of that stuff, the background checks on individuals as much as we can 
within the confinement we’ve got’ (8c, UK, 10.01.06). 
In all the CDFIs in the UK and US, a credit check is undertaken to verify details of the 
applicant and check the state of the applicants affairs so that any issues can be 
highlighted.   In addition, a credit check also allows the CDFI to assess whether the 
applicant can afford to repay the loan.  This is part of the social and ethical ethos of CDFI 
operations.  In the UK, CDFIs also require applicants to submit a letter of decline from a 
bank.  In the US, applicants do not need to do this as CDFIs are not lenders of last resort 
on the premise that banks do not lend to such high risk clients or not do provide small 
loans to firms, for example, loans less than $100,000 are not profitable (8h, UK, 
05.06.06) (BOE, 2004; Rogaly et al. 1999; Van Osnabrugge, 2000).  This is in spite of 
the CRA which requires mainstream financial institutions to provide products and 
services to underserved communities (Barr, 2005; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994, 1995, 1997; 
Marshall, 2004; Mayo et al. 1998).  In this way, banks fund US CDFIs to take on this 
market so that they absolve themselves of the high risk of lending to disadvantaged 
communities and fulfil the requirements of the CRA.       
 
CDFIs assess applications on character, cash flow, capacity to take on debt and 
commitment to repay the loan (NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  In the context of an 
enterprise loan, two UK CDFIs stated that regardless of whether it is a social enterprise or 
for-profit enterprise, the loan application is assessed on the basis that the business is 
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viable and has the potential for success as well as the ability for the loan to be repaid 
(BOE, 2000).  According to one UK CDFI the enterprise application process requires: 
‘a business plan and a cash flow forecast.  They come in absolutely every 
range…from beautifully bound works of art that are probably not worth 
the paper they are printed on a lot of the time, to literally someone who 
has written out a business plan on the back of a cornflake packet, because 
I actually [say]…I just want your ideas as to what you’re gonna do, where 
you’re gonna do it, how you’re gonna do it and what the end result is 
going to be.  So that actually the fact that they’ve had an input into 
producing a type of business plan, I’m not looking for formal works on 
it,…[then] take out a 2 hour interview [with the client]…So from there 
what I’m looking at is how they speak about what they’re going to do, you 
know their body language, how animated they are when I come to sort of 
put them through the mill about the cash flow when I sort of say ‘and is 
that how much you’re gonna earn’ if they can look me in the eye and say 
‘yes’, I believe that’s what I’m gonna do, its all sorts of things that its, 
because 9 times out of 10 when they bring their cash flow in, their 
business plan in, I go well thank you for that you know, have a quick flick 
through and say well, you know, we’ll leave that aside for a minute, you 
tell me about it…and then I’ll go back and cross reference’ (13f, UK, 
27.06.06). 
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The application processes for all CDFIs interviewed as part of the study were very similar 
and the only difference between US and UK CDFIs is the format of their application 
forms. 
 
In comparison to CDFI lending practices, research undertaken at UK banks reveals that 
banks make lending decisions based upon credit scoring models and they do not usually 
require firms to complete an application form if they already have a business or personal 
account (Barr, 2005, BOE, 2000; Leyshon and Thrift, 1999, NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  
The majority of lending by mainstream financial institutions is based on quantitative 
information, such as credit scoring and it could be argued that banks’ lending processes 
for smaller business loans are purely ‘transaction-based’ (Cressy, 2002).  According to 
one UK bank, character based lending is used by US and UK CDFIs and was previously 
utilized by banks until the introduction of credit scoring for relatively small loans 
(£50,000 and under) and the centralization of larger lending decisions (£50,000 and 
above).  The research learned that UK banks do not decline many applications (due to 
unsecured lending for under £50,000 and the availability of the SFLGS, even though its 
effectiveness has been questioned) (Deloitte and Touche, 2002; Rogaly et al. 1999).  In 
contrast to banks, UK and US CDFIs primarily base their decisions on character based 
lending and documentation.  Character based lending is based on old banking practices 
(Barclays, 1987; Dyer, 1977): 
‘If you’re familiar with banking they have what they call the five C’s of 
credit, 5 C’s and I’ll try to say it, one is credit, number two is collateral, 
number three is character which is hard to measure, capacity which means 
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the experience of the business owner and then the cash flow or the 
financial strength of the business and I’ll go over them real quickly but the 
credit’s very easy [as] we can pull [off a] credit [report] to 
determine…whether they have a history of paying,…we look at both the 
business cash flow and the personal cash flow, are there other revenues in 
household, outside the business and what are the revenues of the business 
so we do what I call a business cash flow and a personal cash flow,…we 
just look at the value of the collateral and the value weight of that 
collateral, the character of the person is a little more difficult to measure 
[because]…that’s more qualitative and that’s through the interviews and 
interaction with the loan officer and finally, the capacity of the owner 
which is really the experience, if they’re starting a restaurant they really 
need to have experience in that, we don’t want someone that was a 
construction worker [and] all of a sudden wants to open up a restaurant, 
that wouldn’t rate very well on capacity or experience. So we really 
measure and document the experience of the business owner’ (3a, US, 
13.10.05).   
CDFIs use more time consuming and more expensive, qualitative assessments which are 
used to supplement quantitative evaluations when information asymmetries occur 
(Cressy, 2002).  As such, CDFIs develop a close banking relationship with their clients 
based on trust (BOE, 2000; NEF and Nicholson, 2003): 
‘there are occasional people who will come to us, somehow they’ve heard 
about us or they’ve used us in the past and even though now maybe they 
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can go to a bank sometimes they’ll stay just because of the loyalty thing or 
they just feel more comfortable, they know you, you speak their 
language…But in general…we’re really a starting place for somebody 
who doesn’t have more traditional sources of credit’ (4a, US, 17.10.05). 
Cressy (2002:F7) suggests that relationship lending occurs in the case of less established 
enterprises whose track record is ‘informationally opaque and where the association is 
closer and more personal’ that cannot produce evidence of their business activity.  It is 
even more pertinent that CDFIs establish close relationships with those with a lack of 
track record or information asymmetries during the due diligence process for them to 
access finance from a CDFI.   This suggests that the loan process remains challenging, 
with research showing that SMEs face significant barriers to accessing finance without 
sufficient information, track record or sufficient collateral (Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Cressy, 2002; De Meza, 2002; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  Interestingly, it is believed that 
CDFI applicants consider that they are assessed on: 
‘their skills, their experience, their background, [and if] is there actually a 
market out there for what they’re trying to do’ (9a, UK, 10.02.06). 
Applicants do not consider their ability to repay the loan as part of their assessment.  The 
decision making process for loans is dependent upon the amount required.  This process 
varies according to each CDFI.  But in general, if the loan is for less than $5000 or £5000 
then it can be authorized or declined by one loan officer and signed off by the Chief 
Executive or Manager. If a loan is for a larger amount then a number of loan officers and 
the credit/or lending committee will decide whether it fulfils the required social and 
economic criteria before a decision is made.     
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CDFIs are social financial institutions and their lending process is assessed on both social 
and economic criteria and this can make the lending decision problematic (Bryson and 
Buttle, 2005; NFSNR, 1999).  The key social criteria for enterprises to be authorized a 
loan is for them to provide employment for local people: 
‘Well the two principal ones are that the organization that approaches [the 
CDFI] be it a social enterprise or a for-profit business, [they] have got to 
have been declined by the bank wholly or partly for the finance they are 
seeking, they have obviously got to be based in [our operating] areas and 
most importantly for [the CDFI] to get involved in a project there’s got to 
be some benefit to the local community and that can be either by way of 
job creation or job preservation…or the organization performing a service 
which is demonstrably of benefit to the community…For example it’s 
people providing foster care or people who are providing care for elderly 
people in their home, that type of thing where there’s a defined social 
benefit…the other criteria are that the loan obviously…has got to be 
between £2,000 and £50,000, we will look at propositions where they will 
be located… and if they are employing let’s say half a dozen or so 
employees that all lived in the [operating]...area then so long as everything 
else stacked up then we would actually look at it, obviously the borrower 
has got to complete an application form, supply a properly constructed 
business plan and then one or two other things like bank statements and 
personal asset statement, credit reference search that type of thing, that’s 
essentially it really’ (8b, UK, 10.01.06). 
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This supports Bryson and Buttle’s (2005:279) argument that the CDFI lending process 
represents an ‘alternative discursive’ process.  In this way, CDFIs are reducing financial 
exclusion by authorizing loans to viable businesses that are rejected by the mainstream.  
Nevertheless, the lending decisions rely on old relationship banking practices and the use 
of lending committees to determine the risk/reward ratio on an application by application 
basis.  In this way, ‘too low a risk will exclude too many firms from the…[CDFIs] funds 
while too high a risk will threaten the…[CDFIs] long term future’ (Bryson and Buttle, 
2005:279).   
 
Conditions of the Loan 
The risk of making loans and the issue of default are reflected in the interest rate charged, 
the level of security taken, and the markets served by the US and UK CDFI case studies.  
Interest rates vary vastly between CDFIs and the markets that they serve.  The interest 
rates range from 1% to 24% (Table 5.1, Table 5.2).  The rates charged by CDFIs are so 
varied because CDFIs are unregulated and it depends upon where they access their funds.  
For example, CDFIs that were able to obtain a grant for their lending activity and 
operations perhaps lend at a lower rate than those CDFIs that have had to use loans 
obtained from mainstream banks to support their operations.  Moreover, it depends on the 
knowledge, experience and strategy of the CDFI team and board of directors and the 
CDFIs strategy.  If a CDFI is forward thinking and aims to be sustainable in the long term 
by not relying on public funding, then the interest rate charged reflects this, although 
there are questions around those CDFIs that lend at a significantly higher rate than banks.  
The majority of loans for social enterprises have lower interest rates than for-profit 
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businesses due to lower levels of risk, lower default rates and availability of security 
which was the case for the majority of US and UK CDFIs.  Start-up businesses are also 
likely to experience high rates of interest although again this depends on the CDFI and if 
they lend to the start-up market.  Lending to clients that are on the commercial margins is 
challenging as CDFIs should not compete with mainstream banks.  The US CDFI case 
studies small business lending teams mitigate risk by providing other services to clients 
such as technical assistance and always take collateral in the form of personal guarantee, 
security and/or SBA Guarantee.  In addition, US case study two would even like to 
devise a credit scoring model for CDFIs.   Due to the risk aversion of case study two, 
they have been able to become 91% sustainable (Appendix 5.1, 5.2).  It is important to 
note that US CDFIs are not lenders of last resort and request collateral against their loans, 
making them risk averse and in many respects they act like mini-banks.   
 
It is interesting to note that overall there are few declines in the small business market in 
any of the US CDFIs examined.  This could be a result of the fact that they are not 
lenders of last resort and that they take between 50 to 100% collateral for each loan.  At 
one US CDFI, if an applicant does not have collateral the US CDFI can guarantee the 
loan from the Government’s SBA programme.  It was found that US CDFIs are not 
necessarily embedded in local and national networks as there is a culture of competition 
between US CDFIs and for funding.  This reflects the low number of applications that are 
declined, especially in housing and community facility applications and highlights the 
significance of CDFIs in such markets where the welfare state does not exist.  US CDFIs 
have continued public sector support for their operations and are able to guarantee their 
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lending and take on additional risk compared to UK CDFIs that have lost the support of 
the Phoenix Fund.  According to two US CDFIs, the increased use of credit scoring by 
banks has made it more competitive for US CDFIs to find suitable deals as some banks 
have entered the small firms loans market.    
 
The loan application consists of three processes; referrals, application assessment, and the 
conditions of the loan.  At the first stage of the application process, CDFIs rely on a 
constant flow of potential deals, and referrals from a variety of sources are required.  
However, UK CDFIs are currently experiencing a lack of deal flow.  The twist to the 
referral process and the key to UK CDFI activity, is that the firms applying for a loan 
have been rejected by mainstream financial institutions or in the case of US CDFIs, firms 
would be unlikely to be able to access finance from banks.  In this way, during the second 
stage application process, CDFIs need to assess an application with due diligence so as 
not to experience adverse selection or moral hazard caused by information asymmetries, 
and or with a lack of track record.  CDFIs mitigate these risks by utilizing ‘alternative 
discursive’ lending practices (Bryson and Buttle, 2005).  The final stage of the 
application process, if the loan is approved, is to determine the interest rate of the loan 
and, if applicable, the level of security that the CDFI can obtain to support the loan and to 
reduce the associated risk.  The loan conditions reflect the level of risk identified by the 
CDFIs lending team.  Throughout the loan application process, the CDFI applies its 
social and economic objectives in order to fulfil its purpose of providing access to finance 
to the financially excluded, even if the CDFI objectives are not balanced.  The US and 
UK CDFI application process demonstrates the inherent tensions and risks involved in 
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lending to underserved markets, whilst also balancing issues of organizational 
sustainability.           
 
Post-Loan Process  
The CDFI post-loan process involves monitoring loans, what actions to take if and when 
loans default, the provision of business support services, and performance measurement 
(Figure 5.2).  Monitoring the CDFI clients has three purposes.  First, it identifies any 
problems that may arise with either loan repayment or business support.  Second, it is 
used to evaluate the quality of the CDFI application process.  Third, it is used to target 
additional business support and/or financial advice.  In both US and UK CDFIs, the 
monitoring process is undertaken by the loan officers and in some cases with the 
assistance of back office support systems.  In a minority of cases the monitoring process 
is segmented with a separate collections and/or service department supporting the lending 
team.  This is to make the monitoring process more efficient.  The process for following 
up clients that have defaulted is through the lending team, a ‘client liaison officer’, 
collection or service department which in some cases consists of one person.  Any US 
borrowers that do default tend to have their loan restructured, thus hiding the true 
financial viability of the businesses that are supported by US CDFIs: 
‘the loan consultants need to be able to focus on making sure that the new 
loans and the refinancing [of] loans are the top priority, so they’re always 
there for the clients but many of the requests are administrative requests 
[that] are then handed off to [the] service centre but also the loan 
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consultants keep in contact with all the borrowers on a regular basis’ (4b, 
US, 17.10.05). 
The restructuring of loans and separation of the loan process is more common in the US 
than the UK.  As they have taken security from the client to guarantee the repayment of 
the loan, US CDFIs are more stringent about debt collection when a loan defaults.   
 
One UK case study asks clients to assess the loan application process after 3 months in 
order to grade assistance, advice and the impact that the loan and support has had on their 
business.  This CDFI has achieved a response rate of 45% for the questionnaire and tries 
to resolve any support issues that are raised by the clients.  However, the survey 
undertaken by this UK CDFI was more in the interest of the CDFI improving and 
measuring the effectiveness of its operations.  Similarly, case study 11 sends out a yearly 
questionnaire to their active clients (those clients that are repaying their loan).  However, 
their latest questionnaire had a response rate of just 17% which suggests that the CDFIs 
relationship with their clients is distant.  Three of the UK CDFIs examined had 
undertaken post loan surveys whereas in the US due to the proliferation of business 
support administered alongside the loan, only one of the US CDFIs had completed an in-
depth qualitative impact study of their clients.    
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Figure 5.2: The US and UK CDFI Loan Monitoring Process 
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Reschedule Loan (If Contact is made between Client/CDFI) 
     
   
Default  
 
       
Write off Loan  
Month 6 
 
 
(Source: Own research) 
 
Business Support 
In the US, CDFIs view business support as integral to their missions in helping small 
businesses to become investment ready, grow and succeed.  As such, all US CDFIs 
explored offered either one or a number of the following facilities to their clients: 
financial literacy courses, capacity building, technical assistance such as referrals to 
accountants and marketing.  Business support is offered alongside loans as part of the US 
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CDFIs mission to support enterprise.  However, Storey and Wren (2002) question the 
effectiveness of business support given the business survival rate.  Business support is 
part of the financial literacy programme under the CRA.  It is believed that by educating 
business owners about operating a business and developing skills they perhaps lacked, a 
CDFI is doing as much as possible to ensure that the loan is repaid and monitor their 
client.  Often these support services were free to clients and subsidized by external 
funding sources whether undertaken in-house or referred to external sources: 
‘we got some grant funding to provide technical assistance to a number of 
our business clients.  We figured out that if a number of these people were 
new or emerging companies then they probably had issues of various sorts 
whether accounting, marketing, legal,…you name it they would probably 
have issues that we would try and help out with to ensure that their 
business is more of a success’ (2b, US, 11.10.05). 
Yet increasingly, according to one source, these services offered by US CDFIs that were 
not originally loan funds, were being paid for by clients as they are expensive to deliver 
and the high cost per loan was deemed unviable in the long term.  Technical assistance as 
business support is known in the US is a contentious issue at present: 
‘all of our entities are struggling with it and their struggling with it in 
different ways.  I think in general they’ve all come to the conclusion that it 
would be really good if we offered technical assistance, if the technical 
assistance we offered was so valued by the borrowers that they were 
willing to pay something for it.  They might not have to pay full rate but 
that they should pay something for it…[one CDFI] came to the conclusion 
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that while there was certain kinds of technical assistance they could 
offer...it wasn’t worth it and so they do very little sort of general 
entrepreneurial education anymore…but they have partners who they 
work with…so what they’ve done is try to build a network rather than do 
it themselves’ (7a, US, 07.03.06). 
As such, support services are contracted out by the majority of US CDFIs alongside the 
loan but not necessarily as a condition of the loan.  It is worth noting that two of the US 
CDFIs were primarily enterprise organizations and have since added loan funds to their 
operations.  This suggests that these CDFIs are policy led.   
 
In the UK, business support takes a different role within CDFIs.  All but one UK CDFI 
delivers financial advice or refers their clients to business support agencies or officers 
such as accountants, solicitors and so on depending on their client’s needs.  The one 
exception has business support in-house which for consultancy clients pays one-third of 
the cost whilst one- to-one training is free to the client.  The key issue for UK CDFIs with 
regards to business support is: 
‘That [it] depends on the borrower really, it could do with being 
better…but I think its more [of] a general comment.  It shouldn’t 
necessarily be down to just us to provide it …I think it should be generally 
available from people like Business Link and the Chamber [of 
Commerce]…and I think perhaps in certain cases the businesses …where 
the quality of the people running them aren’t as good, then that’s where 
post-loan support would be of particular benefit.  The well-run businesses, 
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they need little in the way of post-loan support because they know what 
they are doing, they know where to get business from.  It’s the…poorer 
quality businesses and I mean we’ve found in our own pilot that…unless 
you actually do it from the word go, from when you’ve lent the money, 
trying to come back to it 12 months after you’ve lent the money is almost 
an impossible task but despite the fact that you’re offering them a free 
service they become set in their ways and don’t want to listen to other 
people advising them on how they should proceed’ (8b, UK, 10.01.06).    
Business support is viewed as something that should be sought by the business owner, 
preferably prior to accessing a loan and tailored for their individual business needs.  In 
relation to its high cost and the quality of the advice, the business support services 
delivered by the public sector are deemed to be poor and to lack relevance for micro and 
small firms (NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  Thus ‘there is a real reluctance of borrowers to 
actually engage in those services’ (8g) which is both disappointing for UK CDFIs trying 
to aid developing businesses and for those businesses struggling alone when support is 
available from Business Link or enterprise agencies.  NEF and Nicholson (2003:25) 
suggest that UK CDFIs give informal business support although this is: 
‘costly and it is extremely difficult for CDFIs too earn sufficient income 
off their lending operations to cover these costs’.   
The overriding issue throughout the referral, application and monitoring process is trust, 
in that the loan can be and will be repaid (BOE, 2000; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1999; 
Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003).  Trust is especially important 
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between the client and lending team as they are the link between the business and the 
CDFI.   
 
Performance Measurement 
This part of the chapter explores the significance of measuring CDFI performance, the 
outputs and impacts that are evaluated and the issues that the sector faces.  Best practice 
is characterized, in part, by benchmarking (Schoenberger, 1997).  Even so, measuring the 
performance of US and UK CDFIs is challenging for the whole of the CDFI sector, yet it 
is essential for accountability so that CDFIs can benchmark their activities against other 
CDFIs in their markets and for attracting public sector funding and private investment 
into the sector (Collin et al. 2001; Benjamin et al. 2004; NCCA, 2005).  In this way, both 
social and economic criteria are measured in line with the mission statement of CDFIs.   
By having to fulfil the double bottom line illustrates why reaching sustainability is so 
important for many CDFIs yet is extremely challenging (NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  
Sustainability is essential if there is loss or further reduction of public sector support for 
CDFIs.  If CDFIs do not develop partnerships with the CDFI sector, its supporters, and 
the local community, negative perceptions of the CDFI industry could result.  Currently, 
this is countered through the increasing professionalisation of the industry as currently 
CDFIs are perceived by the private sector as an ‘amateur market’ (2e, US, 11.10.05), 
being relatively new financial institutions.   
 
The key CDFI performance measures are through the number of jobs created and/or 
retained, number of loans authorized and also the number of women-owned and ethnic 
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minority-owned businesses that are financed by CDFIs.  US CDFIs also measure: number 
of housing units created, number of loans, total $ loaned, rationale for loans, impact 
(qualitative) and outcomes (quantitative), income, home address of business owner and 
address of business, and immigrant status.  Measurement is dependent on the sector and 
the stage of development that a CDFI has reached.  The OFN has developed the CARS 
programme to measure financial performance and social impact to standardize reporting 
and attract investors to CDFIs (NCCA, 2005).  Mature US CDFIs have a major advantage 
in accessing funding as they have recorded their outcomes which reflect the diversity of 
their activities and are working towards assessing their impacts which they are confident 
will result in improvement to their ability to attract sustainable funding from both private 
investors and public sector sources.  Many UK CDFIs have yet to grasp the importance of 
measuring the outcomes and the impact of their activity. 
 
The US CDFIs surveyed had authorized between 214-7000 loans to small businesses 
since their inception.  The largest small business portfolio was $75 million which reflects 
the high demand for finance or the fact that they are not lenders of last resort.  The bad 
debt rate varied between less than 1% to 15%.  This US case study explains its attitude 
towards loan performance and risk in the following way: 
‘The loan performance is basically … how much money we lost and when 
we created this loan fund we set aside 30%, we said 30% we’re gonna lose 
for sure.  Right now the loss ratio is 9%, so we’re very happy with that.  
Now it’s expected to increase a little bit in the next year or two, this year 
maybe up to 11 or 12%…because it’s inevitable I mean its as the loans get 
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older,…the borrowers aren’t gonna pay you back and I wouldn’t be 
surprised if this year if we had a few more businesses withholding and we 
have a few loans where the borrowers are really good and call in saying 
‘listen right now I can’t pay you so can we restructure the loan?’’ (1a, US, 
07.10.05). 
In some cases, the enterprise loan default figures have been merged with other markets 
(housing, community facilities) or the loans have been restructured.  The default rates are 
not true indicators of small business delinquency rates.  The figures produced by the 
CDFI sector are unclear as the US CDFI annual reports merge default rates experienced 
in different markets.  The US evidence indicates that there is a gap in the market for 
finance for enterprise.  But it is difficult to determine to what extent the gap has been 
filled as US CDFIs are not lenders of last resort.  Nevertheless, as Marshall (1930) stated 
in 1930, it is important to consider that the markets are in a constant state of flux which 
makes the finance gaps time and space specific.  The UK CDFIs examined approved a 
mean average of 700 loans since their inception creating and/or preserving between 220 
and 2310 jobs in the process.  The number of loans and jobs vary not due to the length of 
time that the CDFI has operated but due to the size of loans that they offer and the 
markets that they operate in.  The bad debt rate varies between 8% and 22%, indicating 
that when compared to the average of the US CDFIs of 12.4% the UK is similar to the 
US CDFI case studies with an average default rate of 13.08%.  Yet, the average default 
rate of the UK CDFI case studies is low in comparison to the US rate which is reported to 
be 18% due to the predominant micro finance sector (CDFA, 2005:43).  When the 
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following UK CDFI was asked how they measured their CDFIs performance, they 
replied: 
‘The flippant answer is that I measure it by the big smile on the client’s 
face when they actually go out with a loan when they haven’t been able to 
get one and I would measure it secondly, by wonderful successes you have 
when you see someone who has made a success of the money you’ve 
given them, lent to them rather than somewhere else... Over the years the 
real true answer has been from the point of view of the public sector, it 
ends up being outputs and as a mission I’ve always been very, very strong 
on local jobs for local people.  The real answer to the question has to be in 
a statistic of how many jobs the businesses have created or preserved 
however, I am very conscious like many of the vagaries of that analysis 
that probably there’s a real big issue coming up with the money away 
from the Phoenix to local money from [the RDA] as to just how much 
monitoring you can do.  They are starting to talk, for example 
about…getting measurements from clients about which postcodes the 
employees are in and doing it on a regular quarterly basis.  Well for me 
that’s putting up a big barrier with the clients as to whether they’ll take the 
loan in the first place. After all, you are lending to them at a commercial 
rate. So I think the true measures are the measures each year on your 
balance sheet, they show you’re growing, the fact that quite proudly you 
can point at the balance sheet now and say well there you are, we’ve got 
net reserves of about £1.5 million so we are a being to be reckoned with 
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and that you keep the level of bad debts that you are suffering down to 
below the level you have got cover from the public sector’ (8a, UK, 
13.01.06). 
Perhaps the real indicator of CDFI activity is the number of jobs protected through 
lending to enterprises located in disadvantaged areas.  In this way, there is still a certain 
level of risk involved and the CDFI is attaining its depth of reach. 
 
The increasing significance for public and private subsidized programmes to demonstrate 
their validity demonstrates the need for CDFIs to show accountability, for example, at 
UK case study 9, it is one person’s sole responsibility to look after all evaluations.  
Publicly funded projects (CDFI Fund, DTI, SBS, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
(ODPM)) require quarterly internal and annual external evaluations. Therefore, funders 
require accurate and up-to-date information which can impact upon the efficiency of the 
CDFI as the evaluations are time consuming and therefore costly.  Despite the measuring 
of key outcomes and impacts, there remains an ‘endless tension’ (2e, US, 11.10.05) 
between achieving social and economic objectives particularly in the small business 
financing market: 
‘I think there is tension in…whether they are true statistics, there’s no 
tension in measuring performance in the number of loans delivered and 
value of loans delivered, there will always be a question mark about the 
quality of the jobs, whether they are sustainable, how long are people 
going to be in jobs but that’s the only thing we do...The one big problem 
within the CDFI sector is you will not be able to compare [one 
 190
CDFI]…doing 60 loans value £1 million with [another]…doing 60 loans 
value £100,000 - how do you compare that?...you can’t’ (8a, UK, 
13.01.06). 
In other words, further work is needed on defining performance measurement in the UK 
(Collin et al. 2001; NEF and Nicholson, 3003).  From the evidence highlighted here, the 
key question is: how do you compare or benchmark CDFIs against each other?  The 
simple answer is that it appears to be that they are complex, diverse financial 
organizations that are difficult to define and measure (Figure 5.5).   
 
 
Figure 5.3: Similarities and Differences between US and UK CDFI Operations 
 
 US CDFIs UK CDFIs 
 
Pre-Loan 
Differences 
• Markets served- primarily 
real estate loans which 
balances risk of lending to 
underserved communities 
• Markets served- primarily 
business and personal loans 
 
Pre-Loan 
Similarities 
 
• Missions • Missions 
Loan Application 
Differences 
• Not lender of last resort 
• Take security 
• Lender of last resort 
• Only take security if 
available 
 
Loan Application 
Similarities 
 
• Application assessment • Application assessment 
Post-Loan 
Differences 
• Provide business support  
• Restructure loans if default 
 
• Largely refer to external 
business support or provide 
business support 
 
Post-Loan 
Similarities 
• Benchmarking undertaken 
• Monitor loans 
• Monitor loans 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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The post-loan stage is complex and the tension between the social and economic 
objectives within CDFI activity is perhaps most evident when loans default.  On this 
basis, the loan monitoring process (as well as the application process as a whole) requires 
trust.  Trust and communication between the CDFI lending team and the firm is 
important.  Without trust, the wrong loan decision is made, the loan is at risk of not being 
repaid and the CDFI is seen as an easy way of accessing money.  Communication 
between the firm and CDFI ensures that some issues of repayment may be resolved, for 
example the loan can be restructured or the firm can have a short repayment holiday, 
although this is more common in the US than the UK.   
 
Managing a CDFI is an enormous challenge.  CDFIs are managed in an attempt to 
balance the double bottom line but also to take risks but without overexposure to high 
default rates.  This type of business requires a constant state of balance, yet this balance 
changes on a daily basis.  CDFIs that have a high default rates indicate that the CDFI has 
put itself in jeopardy, whilst conversely, CDFIs that have low default rates suggests that 
they have not taken enough risks.  These examples demonstrate the significance of 
business support in order to get firms to operate effectively.  However, business support 
is available from all of the US CDFI case studies, compared to just two of the UK CDFIs.  
Compared to UK CDFIs, the US CDFI sector has developed benchmarks and made 
CDFIs accountable for their lending activity.  Yet, uneven performance measurement in 
the US by the OFN reflects the challenges in recording CDFI activity, and raises the 
question of how and why should CDFI activity be measured?  Arguably, the main 
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beneficiaries of performance measurement are the investors, rather than the CDFIs 
themselves. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the issues surrounding the nature of US and UK CDFI 
operations.  It is clear that both the UK and US CDFI sectors share the same fundamental 
aims.  Yet the institutional context, lending focus, and scale of the CDFIs differ 
markedly.  US and UK CDFIs experience a number of tensions due to the nature of their 
missions.  US CDFIs face a number of challenges in their operations as they are 
competing with banks due to CDFIs not being lenders of last resort.  As a result, it could 
be interpreted that US CDFIs are operating as mini-banks as they rarely take risks 
without collateral and are increasingly formalizing their operations as they are 
standardizing performance by creating benchmarks for the CDFI industry.  Conversely, 
UK CDFIs are lenders of last resort (NEF and Nicholson, 2003) which means that all 
applications undergo a process of due diligence to ensure that they meet the demands of a 
double bottom line.  US CDFIs subsidize business lending through housing and 
community lending which rarely default as they are secured against ‘real estate’.  In both 
US and UK CDFIs, it is thought that business support services can subsidize loan 
operations.  Through balancing risk between the markets they serve, increasing 
professionalisation of the sector and providing business support services alongside a loan, 
CDFIs are becoming increasingly influenced by orthodox practices.  Moreover, US 
CDFIs operate in ‘emerging markets’ (2h, US, 11.10.05) at the frontiers of disadvantaged 
areas.  Similarly UK CDFIs are targeting their operations in ‘transitional areas’ of 
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deprivation (9c, UK, 10.02.06) which could indicate that US and UK CDFIs are either 
ignoring truly disadvantaged areas to reduce risk or those in deprived areas do not want 
or seek loan finance.  US and UK CDFIs could be deemed hybrid financial organizations 
that are shifting the boundaries of alternative and orthodox financial systems and 
practices to meet the requirements of their missions.  However, the notion of hybridity 
suggests that CDFIs are undergoing processes of constant change as they respond to 
alterations in the markets they serve and in the institutional and policy environments in 
which they operate.  In reality, alternative financial practices are being distorted or 
undermined by the increasingly mainstream financial practices that CDFIs are adopting 
in order to maintain their own viability and sustainability.   
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CHAPTER 6 BALANCING US AND UK CDFI OPERATIONS:  
FINANCIAL VERSUS SOCIAL OBJECTIVES  
 
This chapter explores the embeddedness and the network relationships that surround US 
and UK CDFIs as they try to balance their social and financial objectives.  CDFIs must 
be embedded in the community through networks with public bodies, banks, business 
associates and clients.  CDFI networks act as third party referral mechanisms.  CDFI 
embeddedness is constrained by the flows into the organization or the sources of finance.  
Flows out of the CDFI or the uses of finance are determined by local CDFI contact 
networks which include the contacts of staff members, board of directors, lending 
network, existing and former clients and business support services.  This chapter 
highlights how and why it is important for CDFIs to become embedded within the local 
economy and also to embed themselves in the CDFI sector and funding streams at 
different times and places.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issues concerning US and UK CDFIs at the 
time the research was undertaken.  The notion of time in CDFI activity is important 
owing to time constraints on the sources of funds, as funding streams change and as the 
demands of the market constantly change.  It is, therefore, important to remember that the 
issues explored within this chapter are time and place specific.  The first part of this 
chapter explores the flow of funds into US and UK CDFIs.  The second part of the 
chapter explores the operating environment of CDFIs.  The third part of the chapter 
explores flows out of CDFIs as the funds are lent to the financially excluded.  The final 
part of the chapter explores if and how CDFIs can balance their social and financial 
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objectives through their operations which leads to the issue of how US and UK CDFIs 
measure their performance.  It demonstrates the fundamental tension that exists in 
balancing CDFI social objectives against financial objectives.  This chapter highlights the 
complexity of CDFIs, which are largely not-for-profit social enterprises that must try to 
balance a range of social concerns with a set of financial objectives.   
 
Embeddedness 
CDFIs need to be embedded in networks of relations to secure funding to support their 
lending. US and UK CDFIs may embed themselves in different networks at different 
times to secure funding, to maintain their operations and serve their market.  As US and 
UK CDFIs operate within the underserved communities of deprived areas, it is important 
that they embed themselves within that local environment and also network with other 
national (and perhaps international) organizations.  This is so that they have a mix of 
strong and weak ties to access information and work collectively to achieve a particular 
mission.  It is important to clarify that embeddedness is not limited by geography and can 
have multiple geographies (Ettlinger, 2003).  CDFIs need to embed themselves in three 
types of networks: first, funding networks; second, the underserved markets that they 
focus on; third, the business support networks to access clients and to receive advice.  In 
sum, US and UK CDFIs are situated within diverse and complex networks.  CDFIs are 
designed to be effective in certain communities and efficient in delivering their services.  
On this basis, it could be suggested that US and UK CDFIs are creating new patterns of 
finance through deprived communities in which they operate and embed themselves.   
 
 196
US and UK CDFI networks comprise; investors/supporters, other CDFIs, trade 
associations, Government (local, regional, national), board of directors, staff, 
intermediaries (including banks, accountants, brokers) and clients.  These contacts relate 
to CDFIs in a variety of ways depending on how funding is sourced and utilized.  
Communication between contacts within networks is through formal and informal 
exchanges in a number of different ways and places, although this is dependent upon how 
the relationship was initially established.  For example, work contacts can be made 
through attendance at finance events, and friendship networks can be established outside 
the work environment.  However, these relationships only exist as long as they are 
positive and/or relevant.  For example, an intermediary that refers clients to a CDFI that 
are continually declined loans will be less likely to refer clients to the CDFI in the future.  
US and UK CDFI board members have a unique role to play in reaching out to the 
community.  Through their own networks and skills, they are able to link potential 
funding opportunities and clients with their CDFI.  The CDFIs can use the knowledge 
and experience of their boards to keep their operations focused and also to develop a 
wider perspective.  It is interesting to note that not one interviewee mentioned the word 
‘community’ in terms of its market.  Instead, the term ‘client’ is used.  Some CDFIs 
appear to focus on the economic rather than the social or community success of the CDFI 
and this perhaps explains the balance between efficiency and effectiveness.  Depth of 
reach is defined as those CDFIs that are actively accessing those who are financially 
and/or socially excluded (Nicholson, 2004).  Some CDFIs achieve their depth of reach 
through investing in SMEs that are located in disadvantaged areas or employ excluded 
groups (Nicholson, 2004).  As such, a CDFIs target market is largely dependent upon its 
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contact networks.  In addition, CDFI networks are active and change according to the 
sources and uses of finance.  
 
Flows In: Sources of Finance 
US and UK CDFIs obtain funding from a variety of sources.  CDFI funding is primarily 
obtained from central and/or regional Governments, not-for-profit foundations, religious 
institutions, private/corporate (banks), civic (individual) investors and from their own 
revolving loan fund.  Tables 6.1 and 6.2 highlight the range of funds that CDFIs receive.  
These tables (6.1, 6.2) show the variety of funding from both private and public sources. 
By receiving a range of funding, CDFIs ensure they do not rely on one funding stream.  If 
one source of funding is withdrawn then a CDFI can still function as it has a number of 
other sources to rely upon.  Many CDFIs, however, are dependent upon one or a few key 
sources of funding.  Some CDFIs operations and markets are largely dictated by 
Government policy and funding.  With the loss of the UK Phoenix Fund, for example, 
many CDFIs are undergoing a transitional shift from enterprise lending towards personal 
lending as other public funds are available.  Consequently, some CDFIs are adapting their 
strategies towards the supply of funding rather than the demands of the market.  By 
having a diversified funding portfolio, CDFIs can remain flexible in terms of their 
markets and strategies.  A diverse range of funding means that a CDFI must be embedded 
in different ways in order to access diverse funding streams.  To access public funds 
CDFIs need to be embedded within local, regional, or national political networks; key 
actors involved with UK CDFIs such as board members and Chief Executives need to 
have established links with the Local Authority and other local and regional agencies.  In 
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addition, a variety of funding sources allows CDFIs to realise their mission of balancing 
social and financial objectives through their loan markets and ensuring that they remain 
independent, autonomous organizations.  Those CDFIs that rely on a few key funding 
sources have either followed the funding that has been available or have become more 
commercial in their operations and are able to leverage funding from the mainstream 
banks. 
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Table 6.1: Sources of Finance Used by the US CDFI Case Studies  
 
US CDFI 
Case  
Study 1 
Case 
 Study 2 
Case  
Study 3 
Case  
Study 4 
Case  
Study 5 
Case  
Study 6 
 
 
CDFI Fund 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
State 
Government 
 
X 
 
X 
   
X 
 
 
City 
Initiatives 
     
X 
 
 
Foundations 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
Religious 
Institutions  
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
X 
 
 
Corporate 
Investors 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Civic 
Investors 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
X 
 
X 
 
Deposits 
      
X 
 
Key  
Funding sources are not in rank order 
Abbreviations: 
CDFI Fund- US Federal Government Funding Support for CDFIs 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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Table 6.2: Sources of Finance Used by the UK CDFI Case Studies  
 
UK CDFI 
Case  
Study 7 
Case  
Study 8 
Case  
Study 9 
Case  
Study 10 
Case  
Study 11 
 
 
European 
Funding 
  
X 
   
 
DTI 
   
X 
  
 
ODPM 
   
X 
  
 
Phoenix Fund 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDA 
 
X 
   
X 
 
X 
 
Local Authority 
  
X 
   
X 
 
Foundations 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Banks 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
CITR 
 
X 
  
X 
  
 
Private 
Investors 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
 
Shareholders 
 
X 
    
X 
 
Regeneration 
Funding 
     
X 
 
Lottery 
     
X 
 
Key  
Funding sources are not in rank order 
Abbreviations: 
Phoenix Fund- UK Government Funding Support for CDFIs 
CITR- Community Investment Tax Relief 
DTI- Department of Trade and Industry, UK  
ODPM- Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, UK  
RDA- Regional Development Agency, UK 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the different funding networks that CDFIs are embedded within.  
The most common source of funds accessed by US and UK CDFIs were from 
Government (US CDFI Fund and UK Phoenix Fund).  This is despite the reduction in the 
US CDFI Fund and the demise and loss of the UK Phoenix Fund.  The issue in the UK is 
one of timing as the Phoenix Fund has recently closed and there has been a lack of 
financial vision in the transition period between closure and the establishment of another 
public source of finance.  As such, US and UK CDFIs could have diversified their 
funding source portfolio to account for the decline in funding, and this may have led to a 
change in their operations, markets and strategies.  In the US, all CDFIs have obtained 
funding from corporate investors (banks), as a result of the CRA which forces financial 
institutions to lend to underserved markets.  Many banks support CDFIs rather than 
directly lending to deprived communities themselves.  In the UK, banks largely support 
CDFI activity through CSR and/or through loans to CDFIs that have a track record and 
that can provide a guarantee for their lending, which usually comes from public funding 
sources.  All but one US CDFI received funding from foundations; this support is held in 
high regard due to the difficulty in accessing such funds.  Foundation or not-for-profit 
funding is difficult to attain in the US and UK due to the requirements laid down by these 
organizations. These include a track record, fulfilling financial and social objectives and 
being an example of best practice.  According to a number of US CDFIs, the US has a 
strong philanthropic investment culture hence the majority of US case studies receive 
funding from religious institutions and civic (individual) investors.  One US CDFI noted 
that: 
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‘until recently the bulk of [our funding]… was really coming from 
philanthropy’ (4a, US, 17.10.05).   
The lack of State wide and city initiative support for CDFIs reflects the different and 
uneven nature of State and local Governance in the US.  In the UK, there is a wide 
variety of funding sources which reflects the fragmented nature of public and private 
funding schemes.  The diversity of funding available in the UK for CDFIs suggests that 
the CDFIs are working in different markets and working towards different objectives.  
The CDFIs that have obtained public funding from Europe, Government departments 
(DTI, ODPM) and Local Authorities indicate that they are fulfilling social objectives 
such as tackling unemployment and social welfare issues.  In the UK, the lack of support 
from CITR suggests that the requirements to become part of the scheme are demanding 
and that there are barriers to accessing the source of finance, for example the absence of a 
track record.  The UK CDFI sector is dependent on public institutions for funding support 
which could be a result of UK CDFIs being lenders of last resort and their clients not 
having access to collateral.  It may also be due to the comparative youth of many of the 
institutions.  Consequently, UK CDFIs perhaps take on additional risk to their US 
counterparts that are not lenders of last resort and are able to access collateral to 
guarantee the loan.  The sources of CDFI finance are constrained by the policy 
environment, organizational requirements of funding schemes and limitations on how the 
finance can be used.          
 
CDFI funding is sourced through networks involving conferences, presentations, 
seminars, and strategic marketing to those who have worked in Government funding 
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schemes, financial institutions and community networks.  In smaller US and UK CDFIs, 
one person is usually responsible for obtaining funds.  In larger CDFIs, especially in the 
US CDFI case studies, the manager of each loan department or marketing department is 
responsible for securing funding.  Funding networks are determined by contacts 
generated whilst at previous employers, which are generally financial institutions or 
Government organizations (i.e. public funding schemes, Local Authorities).  The variety 
of US CDFI funds has created networks that are fragmented and dynamic, although the 
CDFI funding processes are not without tension, as explained by one US CDFI:   
‘Here we are private, in the public interest, managers of capital and it’s 
incredible for our credibility not to be influenced, we’d rather not take the 
money [because] we, most of our capital is from individuals and 
institutions…and we have lots of relationships that accrue from those 
relationships to capital so there are people who come to bat for us if we’re 
getting undue pressure and we don’t have to put up, we don’t need to put 
up with it. So it gives us some flexibility to move and to leverage dollars 
and…perform.  The cost of that is we have to be transparent, we have to 
do what we say we do…we have to be able to document it and we have to 
give up something that’s not working and keep thinking about how we 
might do something differently’ (2d, US, 11.10.05). 
This highlights the tensions in accessing sources of funding, the expectations of potential 
and actual investors, and this raises issues of conflict between accessing funds and the 
uses of funds.  US and UK CDFIs are independent social enterprises and should act 
solely in the interests of their organization, mission and clients.  However, investors have 
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demands of their own, especially in terms of how the funds can be utilized, for example 
at one US CDFI an investor stated that their investment could only be used for providing 
loans to community projects even after it had been repaid.  Investors can, therefore, place 
restrictions on funds that are in their interests rather than for the benefit of the markets 
served by the CDFI.  The US CDFI quoted above has a history of successful operation.  
Owing to this CDFIs’ strategy and longevity, it also has diverse funding streams and 
operates in a number of separate markets.  Unlike many other US and UK CDFIs, this 
allows it to work in a variety of markets without pressure to shift markets according to 
current trends in the sourcing of funds or to conform to investors’ wishes. For example, 
investors may only want to fund community projects.  In order to maintain its flexibility, 
however, the CDFI has to demonstrate successful performance to investors.  It can also 
alter the market it lends to as well as the sources of loan finance.   
 
US case study 2 has an investor profile that includes individuals, religious institutions, 
banks, foundations and Government (Table 6.1).  80% of this case study’s investors 
(largely individuals, religious institutions and foundations) provide a marginal amount of 
the fund’s capital (20% of total capital).  The remaining 20% of investors are primarily 
financial institutions and Government.  This breakdown of US CDFIs indicates that the 
most important source of funds came from corporate and Government sources rather than 
individuals and social investors (Table 6.3).  In the US, there are issues with investor 
development as a CDFI investment is neither a charitable contribution nor a market-rate 
investment.  Potential investors could be unfamiliar with the concept of a CDFI and how 
their money would be used.  Funding is largely in the form of a grant but some investors 
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only want their funding to be used for a specific sector or market which impacts on how 
CDFIs manage and record their loan portfolio.  Despite the time and expense involved it 
is important that CDFIs communicate regularly with private and charitable investors and 
provide feedback about their ‘investment’.   For the US CDFI industry it is an enormous 
challenge to define CDFI activity and in doing so ‘create [a] category’ to explain to 
potential investors what CDFIs do.  With unstable Government funding streams, there is 
enormous pressure on US CDFIs to raise funds from other sources and then retain and 
maintain that investment, whilst conveying a clear message of what the CDFI sector is 
and what it does.  Clearly, there is a tension in attracting funding into US and UK CDFIs 
because the public are largely unaware of CDFIs and do not understand their mission.  It 
is difficult to define the social and economic objectives and the diverse activity of CDFIs 
to investors, especially as the sources of funds and markets for loans shift according to 
the economic climate.  In this way, CDFIs are in a constant state of flux. 
 
Table 6.3: Percentage of Loan and Revenue Funding received by US CDFI Case 
Study 2 (in US dollars)    
 
US CDFI Case Study 2 
 
% of Funding in $ 
 
Accumulated CDFI Fund, Corporate Investors 
 
80% 
 
State Government, Foundations, Civic Investors, Religious Institutions 
 
20% 
 
(Source: Own research) 
 
The level of public subsidy available through the US Federal Government’s CDFI Fund 
has declined in recent years, but this has remained relatively stable in comparison to the 
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UK’s equivalent fund, the Phoenix Fund, which ended in March 2006.  All the US and 
UK CDFI case studies were part funded respectively by the CDFI Fund or the Phoenix 
Fund (Table 6.4).  The US CDFI Fund was responsible for leveraging finance for US 
CDFIs to on-lend, and acted as a guarantor against lending to underserved communities.  
Without the support of the CDFI Fund, US CDFIs may not have survived:   
‘we didn’t really qualify [for the CDFI Fund] until 1999 and…we had zero 
equity or company capital or grants in our loan fund, it was all leverage or 
all debt and you know it was a very risky situation for investors and the 
majority of our interest went to cover any losses; there was really no 
money derived for operations from our loan fund.  So right about 1999 we 
got certified by the CDFI Fund and to date we’ve probably gotten about 
$3million from the CDFI Fund so far we have about $6 million in 
revolving loan money and about half of that is equity as a direct result of 
the Government involvement in providing equity to CDFIs across the US.  
We’ve benefited highly from [the CDFI Fund]’ (3a, US, 13.10.05). 
Without the CDFI Fund many US CDFIs may not have been able to diversify their 
lending portfolios nor have been able to grow (Table 6.4).  Growth is dependent on the 
ability of a CDFI to generate a surplus to cover revenue costs.  Thus, without 
Government support, the US CDFI sector would not operate as widely, in terms of the 
markets served or geographical area, as they do at the moment.   
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Table 6.4: Markets Served by US CDFI Case Studies Prior to the Introduction of 
the CDFI Fund in 1994 and Post Award of CDFI Funding 
 
US CDFI 
 
Case Study 
1 
 
Case Study 
2 
 
Case Study 
3 
 
Case Study 
4 
 
Case Study 
5 
 
Case Study 
6 
 
Markets 
Served  
Pre-CDFI 
Funding 
 
 
C, P 
 
E, H, C 
 
H, SME, C, 
M 
 
M 
 
SME, C 
 
M, SME, C 
 
Markets 
Served  
Post-CDFI 
Funding 
 
 
M, C, SME, 
VC, P 
 
E, H, C, VC, 
SME 
 
H, SME, C, 
M 
 
M 
 
SME, C 
 
M, SME, 
VC, C 
 
Key 
Loan Sectors: 
C- Community 
E- Energy  
H-Housing  
HI- Home Improvement  
M- Micro  
P- Personal Consumption 
S- Small Business  
VC- Venture Capital  
 
(Source: Own research) 
 
All the US and UK case studies were funded, in part, by banks donating and/or lending to 
CDFIs (in the US, this was the role of the CRA).  For CDFIs to access capital from banks 
(even if it is at a below market rate), they have to be investment ready and have a proven 
track record.  Investment readiness is when firms seeking finance have viable business 
plans and an awareness of business practices.  CDFIs also face barriers when accessing 
finance from banks as CDFIs are facing the same challenges as other small firms 
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regardless of whether they are for-profit or not-for-profit.  Off the record, the US CDFI 
case studies believed that bank investment under the CRA was merely a box ticking 
exercise to fulfil part of their social and corporate responsibility agenda.  Nevertheless, 
the bank loans that are made to US and UK CDFIs and are repaid, are one indication of 
the financial viability of some CDFIs.  
 
US and UK Operating Environments 
This section explores the different operating styles of US and UK CDFIs.  It is widely 
acknowledged that each firm will operate in a different way (Bryson and Buttle, 2005; 
Storey, 1994).  However, it has been possible to categorize CDFIs into a number of styles 
to reflect the different approaches taken depending on when and why they were 
established.  First, this section explores the US and UK CDFI operating environment and 
second, the different styles of operating are outlined to show how CDFIs balance their 
social and financial objectives to highlight how difficult it is for CDFIs to remain true to 
their missions and become sustainable.   
 
The US and UK CDFI operations are largely determined by the source of funds and 
clients (Figures 6.1, 6.2).  CDFIs also rely on the Government for policy support and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and banks for referrals and business support.  
It is questionable whether CDFIs would be able to function without these organizations.  
Conversely, it is likely that CDFIs would be able to operate without the CDFI trade 
associations, the US OFN and UK CDFA, although the level of support from other 
organizations within the operating environment might be reduced.  Consequently, CDFIs 
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rely on support from a variety of organizations and are, therefore, part of a much larger 
system to reduce financial exclusion.    
 
Figure 6.1: Diagram to Show CDFI Operations: Flows In and Out 
    
 
 
(Source: Own research) 
 
The way in which US and UK CDFIs have developed their operations depends largely on 
when they were founded and who they were founded by and this influences the markets, 
products and strategy of each CDFI.  It is important to note that CDFIs can have a blend 
of influences in their development as they change and grow.  The different ways of 
operating suggest that CDFIs are diverse, complex and continually adapting their 
operations in order to survive.  The next section explores the different types of CDFI 
according to their strategy and operations. 
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Figure 6.2: The Operating Environment of US and UK CDFIs  
Obtaining Clients
NGOs/Banks 
 
 
(Source: Own research) 
 
Policy Driven CDFIs and Project Based CDFIs 
The UK CDFIs that were founded post 1999 and the US CDFIs that were established post 
1994 were established in response to policy initiatives.  These CDFIs either created or 
shifted loan markets to access new sources of public funding.  The US and UK CDFIs 
that were created after the establishment of Government funding support reflects the 
flexibility of CDFI operations and the transition of the market according to funding 
streams rather than client needs.  There is a subset of policy driven CDFIs which operate 
a number of funds on a short term basis.  As such, they are project based CDFIs.  Project 
    OFN/CDFA 
 
 
CDFI Clients 
 
 
Funding 
Sources 
 
Government 
 
 
CDFIs 
Obtaining Funds 
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based CDFIs tend to be linked to enterprise agencies that deliver grant funded policy 
directives, for example business support.     
 
Diverse CDFIs 
Despite CDFIs being not-for-profit, some CDFIs are becoming increasingly commercial 
in their operations.  These CDFIs reduce their exposure to risk in an attempt to make 
CDFI activity viable and sustainable.  These increasingly commercial CDFIs have 
diversified their lending to incorporate venture capital and business services.  These 
CDFIs are risk averse due to low default rates and the markets that they serve, operate in 
emerging markets and have high interest rate levels (Table 5.1, Table 5.2).  The 
increasing diversity of these CDFIs suggests that they aim to be independent of public 
funding and the lending restrictions that tend to be associated with such funds.  In the 
case of US CDFIs, they are in competition with banks for deals.  This suggests that these 
CDFIs have had to adopt similar approaches to mainstream financial institutions for their 
operations to remain viable and they may be a short term survival strategy.  
 
Balanced CDFIs 
A subset of diverse and policy driven CDFIs have adopted a balanced approach to their 
operations.  Some US and UK CDFIs have remained true to their missions through their 
operations and lending activities.  This is achieved through assessing each loan against 
their social and financial objectives (their risk reward ratio) to try to create a balanced 
portfolio.  These CDFIs may have a relatively high default level and it could be argued 
that in this way they are reaching the financially excluded.  Also, by having a balanced 
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portfolio, these CDFIs may attract the attention of foundations and not-for-profit 
investments which are of high value within the CDFI sector as they are hard to obtain.  
As such, these CDFIs are respected by those within and out of the sector and are models 
of best practice. 
 
From this, it could be stated that CDFIs have access to certain funds and use those funds 
differently depending on their strategy, operations and restrictions.  The flows of funding 
in and out of CDFIs reflects the diversity of CDFIs in the US and UK.  Moreover, the 
notion of complexity typifies US and UK CDFI operations which is not dissimilar from 
Storey’s (1994) argument that each enterprise operates in a different way depending on 
the strategy and characteristics of the business.   
 
Flows Out: Uses of Finance 
The first part of the chapter explored how US and UK CDFIs obtained their funding and 
how the source of funding can determine a CDFI’s strategy.  The second part of the 
chapter explores how US and UK CDFIs use their funding, their target markets and how 
the sources of finance can determine a CDFI’s network and therefore, its state of 
embeddedness within the CDFI sector and its locality.   The use of finance incorporates 
in particular, the pre-loan process of interest rates charged to clients and the post-loan 
process of default rates incurred by CDFIs (Figure 6.3).  This will also highlight the 
operational differences between CDFIs and banks. 
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Figure 6.3: Flows In, Flows Out: The Sources and Uses of CDFI Finance 
Time 
 
Flows In: Sources of Finance 
 
 
Flows Out: Uses of Finance 
 
• Public Investment 
 
 
• Loans to Financially Excluded  
• Private Investment (Individual and 
Corporate) 
 
• Interest rate, Default Rate, Performance 
Measurement 
• Bank Loans 
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Figure 6.3 explores the flows into and out of a CDFI and also explores the complexity of 
CDFI operations and the challenges that CDFIs face on a daily basis.  The sources of 
finance reflect the limited access to finance that CDFIs themselves can experience.  
Ideally, CDFIs would have a range of sources so that they are not dependent upon one 
key resource.  This implies that CDFIs have to have a broad network in which to tap into 
for financial and knowledge resources.  The different sources of finance can place 
restrictions on how the funding is spent, and the type of funding can also restrict its use, 
for example, with a bank loan a CDFI might not be able or want to take as great a risk 
compared with funding obtained as a grant.  However, a grant might only be loaned to a 
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specific target market or geographical area.  The funds into a CDFI not only provide the 
capital for CDFIs to lend but also cover the organization’s revenue costs, operations, risk, 
development and measurement activities.   
 
Competition 
Owing to the high levels of competition for funding, deals, knowledge, and influence 
within the sector, few US and UK CDFIs collaborate and share information with other 
CDFIs.  If they do, they may only work with other successful CDFIs that operate in the 
same markets but in different locations.  Because of competition for funding, two US 
CDFIs do not co-ordinate with other CDFIs beyond attending CDFI sector conferences.  
Only a minority of US and UK CDFIs coordinate regionally and this occurs only if they 
are not competing for deals or funding.  As a result, the US and UK CDFI industry is 
highly fragmented and competitive despite attempts to alter this by the UK’s CDFI trade 
association, the CDFA and the US CDFI trade association, the OFN.  According to the 
OFN: 
‘[what] we are really trying to get people to focus on is taking a sort of 
strategic thinking…to figure out how to think more intelligently about 
markets, how to be more focused and disciplined about how they make 
decisions about what they know and understand about the markets and 
how to think of themselves as part of a interconnected network of 
institutions rather than just a bunch of…institutions…I think that the 
notion prevailing for business model for many years in this industry has 
been that of a small vertically integrated businesses that you know each 
exists in their own little world and it’s clear that doesn’t even really exist 
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anymore. People are more interdependent than they like to believe 
sometimes but be that that silo effect is one of the most troublesome, built 
barriers to actually being able to be more productive in what we do and so 
the notion of the network is very much the idea that we are interrelated 
and interconnected and the more we can sort of leverage some of those 
interconnections for good, you know to support our work the more 
effective we’ll be in our mission’ (5d, US, 12.10.05). 
In the future, US and UK CDFIs, may need to co-operate in order to overcome common 
issues that they find challenging, such as awareness of CDFI activity and deal flow.  
Despite the significance of local knowledge to address such issues, it is important that 
CDFIs act together to raise the profile of the sector.  With the unstable nature of funding 
in the US and UK for CDFI activity, it is likely that CDFIs will have to collaborate more 
and act as a cohesive sector to lobby for financial and political support.  Arguably, this is 
the role of the US and UK CDFI trade associations- the CDFA and OFN.  If funding is 
dramatically reduced in the future, then it is likely that CDFIs will have to consolidate 
and share resources, change their market or cease operating.  As such, CDFIs need to 
seek business support to ensure that they remain viable businesses in the same way as 
small firms.  Despite the differences in business operations in respect to funding, social 
enterprises are essentially the same as for-profit businesses as they too occupy a market 
niche and aim to make a profit/surplus in order for them to survive.  The increasing 
professionalisation of CDFIs could see the US and UK CDFI sector become increasingly 
more mainstream and this could shift the focus away from the application of a double 
bottom line to that of a single.   
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Owing to the intense competition between CDFIs for investment, deals and success, US 
and UK CDFIs only collaborate with other CDFIs for strategic advantage, such as the 
sharing of back office systems: 
‘there’s obviously some rivalry within the industry but if someone’s in 
direct competition with you then I would say that…there’s not a lot of co-
operation there’ (6b, US, 06.03.06). 
This also highlights the lack of trust within the US and UK CDFI sector:   
‘I think what has also made things a little bit difficult and probably more 
so in recent months has been the fact that all CDFIs are actually bidding in 
competitive situations for public sector money. In those circumstances the 
element of trust has to be very great if you are actually going to share your 
information with everybody else’ (8a, UK, 13.01.06). 
Off the record information regarding lack of co-operation within the US and UK CDFI 
industry provided the most interesting findings.  The lack of trust within the US and UK 
CDFI sectors is largely a result of the unstable funding environment.  As a result of the 
competitive funding schemes and loan deals, US and UK CDFIs are wary of 
collaborating with each other to minimise risk: 
‘to some degree it [is] competitive with some people but…we try to think 
of it as partnerships and [create] working relationships with different 
people’ (2b, US, 10.02.06). 
It is not surprising that some US and UK CDFIs are competitive, especially with CDFIs 
that are within the same region and/or operate in the same market as themselves.  In this 
way, some US and UK CDFIs are merely replicating mainstream financial practices by 
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being competitive.  Further to this, some US CDFIs also compete with other financial 
institutions for clients and deals: 
‘there’s competitiveness in the market.  Ours is not a pure gap market 
although there is a pretty substantial capital gap you know we certainly see 
other people out [there] offering money usually in a different form than 
ours is but you know its certainly there’ (2e, US, 11.10.05). 
Where there are a number of CDFIs operating within the same market and geographical 
area, there can be competition for clients.  As US CDFIs are not lenders of last resort, the 
level of competition is compounded by banks also vying for loan deals.   
 
Collaboration between CDFIs 
CDFI networks serve as opportunities for funding, operational advice, recruitment and 
client referrals.  CDFI networks incorporate every part of the CDFI operational process 
and span both the public and private spheres.  For example, in the US, CDFIs are often in 
competition with banks for business.  The significance of CDFI networks within the US 
and UK sectors was highlighted in the following way by one of the US CDFIs: 
‘Well I think [networks] are important in every way, they help referral 
deals to you and opportunities to you, they help endorse us to others so 
that the same, you know the same network that if you’re pursuing an 
opportunity and somebody wants to know who you are and so on,…so 
you’re whole reputation…and opportunities ride through the network.  So 
the network is critical, always critical … I mean once you’re involved 
with the company or you’re trying to understand an industry or a market, 
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your network again, that’s what you use to, you know, pull information 
from…other than what you find in the abstract world of the net or 
something, the rest of it is all based in who you know.  You know, tell me 
about this kind of industry, where are its problems, where are its issues, 
I’m looking for a manager for this lot, how can I find somebody to help 
me or we need to consult with XYZ so you use your network every day all 
day’ (2e, US, 11.10.05). 
The above demonstrates how contacts within a network are used as opportunities to 
gather strategic information about businesses, markets, referrals and performance.  An 
organization’s staff and reputation is also significant within networks, which is also 
important for creating new contacts and generating new networks.  Networks act as a 
learning tool so that a CDFI can develop best practice whilst also adapting to changing 
markets so that the balance between economic and social objectives can be sustained.  It 
is important to remember that CDFI networks are time, space, people and price specific.  
For example, there are time limitations to funding, people are transient, operations are 
restricted by serving deprived geographical areas and interest rate levels vary according 
to each CDFI and the market that it serves.  The US and UK CDFI funding environment 
is dynamic and ultimately, it is the funding that controls the operations and markets that 
CDFIs serve.  On this basis, CDFIs can be opportunistic and take advantage of 
information to use as a mechanism to create opportunities. 
 
CDFIs require a consistent flow of referrals to operate effectively.  Bank contacts can act 
as a referral mechanism and pass on clients to CDFIs that have been rejected for a loan.  
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This applies more to the UK as US CDFIs are not lenders of last resort.  If the loan is 
approved by a CDFI and eventually repaid, then the client may become bankable in the 
future and may begin to do business with the mainstream banks that originally referred it 
to a CDFI.  As a result of information sharing, close relationship can reduce time and 
transaction costs.  For example, UK CDFIs can top-up loans from banks when the client 
lacks collateral to secure the full amount required.  A business may require £50,000 but 
the bank will only lend £40,000, but a CDFI could top-up the transaction by lending the 
remaining £10,000 required.  A close relationship between the bank and the CDFI can 
reduce the time taken to sanction a loan.  A mix of tacit and open knowledge between 
CDFIs and firms can benefit loan terms and conditions and the relationship banking that 
CDFIs offer can help overcome information asymmetries.  Close relations can also 
facilitate learning by sharing information and business practices.  It could be stated that 
banks and firms only become involved with CDFIs as and when it suits them.  So, by 
sharing deals and exchanging information, banks and CDFIs could share security, if it is 
available, but usually the bank will come first.  When payments default, CDFIs can 
restructure loans, write them off straight away or attempt to get the loan repaid through 
debt collection services.  The relationship between CDFI and borrower may be strong at 
the beginning but can decay as the business begins to fail.  Relationship banking and co-
operation is, therefore, time limited as the failure of a business to perform often means 
that there is no dialogue between loan officer and borrower.   
 
CDFIs that have close networks are working together with a shared interest to overcome 
the barriers faced by the sector.  The CDFI trade associations, the US OFN and UK 
 220
CDFA, are examples of networks of shared interest.  CDFIs only have close links with 
other CDFIs for strategic advantage.  These ties are used to lobby the trade association, 
state/local and federal/central Government for funding and policy support.  This is true of 
the UK CDFIs that operate in the West Midlands who have formed the Fair Finance 
Consortium to raise the profile of CDFIs and lobby the RDA and Government for 
resources.  Similarly, CDFI practitioners can influence policy by serving on Government 
advisory groups.  CDFIs exchange information to develop strategic alliances in the 
sector.  By sharing knowledge on regulation for example, legal issues have been 
overcome as one UK CDFI has suggested: 
‘there have been occasions where [another UK CDFI has] kind of saved 
our bacon…over changing their consumer credit license because [one 
CDFI] said to me, what do you mean you haven’t changed it?  It affects 
[the whole of the UK]…which we didn’t realise because nobody told us, 
so we had this mad rush to try and change all the loan documents and 
[they] also helped us out because we charge an admin fee that has to be 
added into the percentage rate you quote to the customer in terms of PR 
but our system doesn’t do that.  You would have had to do that manually 
and they had worked out a spreadsheet to calculate that which they sent to 
us for nothing.  So there’s things where we’ve been able to do things for 
each other for nothing which has been good…and…I was able to give 
them a bit of information about how we do stuff up here.  I have got to say 
there’s not been a huge amount of transfer in terms of people going down 
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and people going up but what there has been has actually been not bad, 
pretty good’ (9c, UK, 10.02.06). 
The sharing of information and exchange of knowledge such as at trade association 
conferences can forge new alliances and ways of thinking and operating which stimulates 
best practice and increases the quality of CDFI operations and performance.  Thus, the 
exchange of information and business practice helps establish relationships between 
CDFIs and encourages CDFIs to continue to innovate and develop best practices.   
 
Business innovation, in terms of new or different operations, has led to the exchange of 
information.  By sharing new business practices with other US CDFIs, reciprocal 
relationships have been developed and arguably, US CDFI performance has improved:  
‘In [this city]…we’re kinda the big one - there’s some smaller ones that 
tend to be more either neighbourhood specific or gender specific or in one 
of the cases that dealt with either more specialised, there’s kinda back and 
forth referrals, a couple of cases joint transactions and…a couple of other 
CDFIs in [this state] especially that were looking to obtain SBA lending 
licences since we blazed the trail already…[we] spent some time with 
them and gave them a stack of documents, cos we just said look we’ve set 
the precedent for you now its not like banking competitors, its not the 
same kinda relationship,…so here’s our information,…here’s the legal 
questions, this is what you need this, is what we did to get this licence so 
its kinda that relationship’ (2b, US, 10.02.06). 
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Yet the exchange of information only occurred because the US CDFIs that were helped 
were not in competition with each other and this highlights the nature of relationship 
within the contact networks that have been developed within the US CDFI sector.   In 
addition, case study 2 obtained a banking licence to secure loans using a Government 
Guarantee (SBA Guarantee), which secures between 75-85% of loans to small firms.  In 
doing so, it could be stated that this commercialises US CDFI practices further.  There 
are also indications that UK CDFIs may also guarantee their lending under the SFLGS in 
the future. 
 
Networks are also utilized to obtain clients for US and UK CDFIs.  Clients are often 
introduced to US and UK CDFI through bank loan referrals, accountants, business advice 
agencies, local authorities and agencies, and finance brokers.  Referral contacts can be 
established through associates at previous employers, conferences, and local events.  
Networking is done by all who work at the CDFI but client referrals are largely via 
contacts made by the CDFIs loan officers. Loan officers regularly network at access to 
finance and small business events, and also with contacts at previous employers (i.e. 
banks); loan officers take the opportunity to update their contact on CDFIs activities and 
emphasise the significance of referrals.  In order to get a continuous flow of deals, the 
contacts within networks need to be constantly reminded that the CDFIs exists.    
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Balancing Financial and Social Objectives 
US and UK CDFIs are complex organizations that are defined by their missions and 
operations.  CDFIs must try to balance their social and financial objectives throughout the 
pre-loan, during- loan and post-loan process.  Each CDFI has its own definition of the 
social and financial criteria that it applies and how it resolves the tensions in applying a 
double bottom line, which may ‘never be fully resolved’ (Bryson and Buttle, 2005: 278).  
US and UK CDFIs are constantly challenged by their operations and their missions to 
fulfil both social and financial objectives which are tied to ethical and environmental 
objectives.  For instance, US and UK CDFIs will not fund ‘sin businesses’ such as 
gambling, nor will they support firms that damage the environment.  Social objectives are 
defined as the knock on social welfare benefits associated with creating opportunity and 
generating employment for specific groups (i.e. women, minority ethnic communities, 
ex-offenders).  Similarly, financial objectives are the perceived advantages of gaining 
employment and business growth.  This research highlighted that the social and financial 
objectives of US and UK CDFIs are inextricably linked and so the key objectives were 
jobs created and/or retained, total amount of loans sanctioned and number of loans made.  
US and UK CDFIs also measured gender and ethnicity.  The social and financial 
objectives are further complicated by the third mission of being independent of funding 
support and, therefore, sustainable organizations.  The implications for CDFIs should 
they not aim to be sustainable are that they will cease to exist, making their employees 
redundant, but this contradicts the organization’s mission to create and sustain jobs.  
Therefore, CDFI loan assessment practices ‘constrains the [CDFIs] own profitability by 
restricting opportunities to maximize the return on its capital’ (Bryson and Buttle, 
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2005:279).  Here Bryson and Buttle refer to CDFIs profitability when they are not-for-
profit organizations.  However, they refer to the level of sustainability or surplus 
accumulated by CDFI activity rather than profit.  
 
A CDFIs social and financial objectives challenge a CDFIs routes to sustainability.  
There are two types of sustainability: operational sustainability and financial 
sustainability.  Sustainability is defined as ‘the extent to which a CDFI is covering its 
expenses from its own earned revenue’ (NEF and Nicholson, 2003:41).  Financial 
sustainability is where a CDFI receives enough income from its operations to cover all 
costs and create a surplus.  According to Nicholson (2004:3) there are three ways of 
measuring financial sustainability, these are: 
1. Direct operating costs of lending only. 
2. Operating costs plus bad debts. 
3. Operating costs plus bad debt plus other overheads. 
Operational sustainability is when an organization can cover its operational or 
administrative costs through its earned income but still requires subsidized capital to on-
lend (NEF and Nicholson, 2003).  Sustainability is complex as it alters over time with the 
funding streams and as the client market changes.  In addition each individual’s definition 
of sustainability can be different within a CDFI.  Nevertheless, it is clear that CDFIs need 
to become sustainable as in the long term they may not be able to depend on the support 
of public funds and private philanthropy.  There is no easy or simple way for CDFIs to 
become sustainable.  If CDFIs aim to achieve their financial objectives over their social 
objectives they may not necessarily become sustainable faster then those CDFIs that 
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prioritise their social objectives as there is no way of knowing which loans will default 
and how many.  Here, the issues of balancing these issues are explored though the loan 
process. 
 
According to one US CDFI, CDFIs were effectively research and development operations 
for mainstream financial institutions as this was cheaper than working in such a high risk 
sector of the market themselves: 
‘what we’ve done is created a whole industry with public and 
philanthropic money that does R and D for banks and doesn’t get paid for 
it.  Now that’s a bit of an exaggeration, but it isn’t totally’ (7a, US, 
07.03.06).  
One CDFI highlighted the social and economic conflict in CDFI operations in the 
following ways: 
‘In the US…compared to the developing world is the high cost of doing 
business and I don’t know if we’re ever gonna reach a level of profitability 
because I think if these loans, if there is a way to make it profitable, I think 
that banks would have found that out and they would be doing it.  There’s 
a reason why they’re not doing it simply because there is no money to be 
made in them and the loan size is too small, the amount of time they 
would have to invest in maybe doing the due diligence is too much. So I 
think that’s a big challenge for us…[in]  that we get to balance doing our 
mission and you know running a sustainable, effective business at the 
same time’ (4a, US, 17.10.05). 
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Owing to the high default rates and the time taken to assess loan applications, US and UK 
CDFI operations are expensive.  As a result, CDFIs are presented with huge challenges in 
balancing social and financial missions whilst also aiming to become sustainable.  The 
success of a business and the ability of the business to secure a loan has been linked to 
the strength of local networks and whether those networks are embedded in the local 
economy.  The following example reflects the tension between organizations and 
investors and the significance of embeddedness and balancing social and economic 
objectives: 
‘one CDFI that we did a job for was set up by the municipality…but…it 
had a very bad reputation for being connected to the city,…[they] city 
officials on their board and so on so they were viewed a lot of the time 
with resentment…but often there’s suspicion… in most cities they’ll be 
lots of collaborative committees and things like that and so there’ll be a 
member from every CDFI on it you know they’ll be pretty well 
represented… but it might be that unless there’s collaborations that [they] 
are really successful this kind of resentment builds and negative views of 
the other and you’re only lending in these easy markets, you’re not 
lending in difficult markets and…one of the things I see that if a CDFI 
isn’t doing kind of risky work and really good work, really interesting 
innovative strategies or if they’re just approaching an easy target they’re 
not gonna get foundation [support], they’re not gonna get contributor 
capital and then because they don’t get contributor capital they’re not 
gonna have a very interactive product they’re just gonna be you know high 
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priced and you know so that’s in my mind that’s often how CDFIs 
separate out, are they able to offer a good product or are they offering a lot 
of technical assistance to support the risk that they’re taking on, if they’re 
not doing that they’re not gonna get the contributor capital or the kudos 
for doing what they’re doing and there just gonna become more and more 
mainstream because they just have to go for easier and easier markets you 
know what I mean’ (5a, US, 12.10.06). 
This highlights how some CDFIs can begin as project based CDFIs that do not take on 
risky loans and are simply following the funding to then become increasingly mainstream 
in their approach.  Boards of directors are vital in providing non-financial support in 
devising a CDFIs strategy, structure, and systems (8g).  Younger CDFIs are more likely 
to be established in response to the introduction of Government support and the 
development of a number of different business operational models.   
 
Financial Objectives of US and UK CDFIs 
The financial objectives of US and UK CDFIs, namely the number of jobs created and/or 
preserved is one measure the effectiveness of a CDFI’s activities along with other 
indicators, for example, pre-loan interest rate, post-loan default rate and sustainability 
level.  The loans are assessed on a case by case basis, but largely depend on the number 
of jobs created and/or retained compared to the size of the loan, for example a £10,000 
loan that will retain two employees is more likely to be sanctioned than a £30,000 loan 
where one job will be created.  But the loan application also depends on the market and 
viability of the business.  Interest rates charged by US and UK CDFIs vary widely.  The 
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research highlighted that one US CDFI had a concessionary rate of interest due to its 
social objectives: 
‘Getting grant money [subsidizes our operations and in the future we 
will]…find… another way of subsidizing it because its never gonna be 
profitable and we charge instead of 10% then we charge 15-20% then 
great we are gonna be profitable and its like its not conducive with our 
mission as we are a not-for-profit organization’ (1a, US, 07.10.05). 
This particular US CDFI is evidently a policy driven CDFI due to its over reliance on 
future revenue streams coming from public sources or not-for-profit foundations.  In 
comparison, another CDFI had a higher rate of interest than mainstream banks and the 
other case studies had interest rates comparable to the banks (Table 5.1, Table 5.2).  As 
another US CDFI suggested, ‘It’s not pricing that’s the issue its access’ (7a, US, 
07.03.06) that is important in accessing finance.  However, this raises questions regarding 
how high should interest rates go before it is comparable to moneylenders and whether or 
not a CDFI is taking advantage of its clients in order to become sustainable.  The balance 
between social and financial objectives are contested on a daily basis by US and UK 
CDFIs, their staff and their board of directors as they develop strategies and assess loan 
applications.  In the case of the US and UK CDFIs that are determined by their missions, 
the risk-reward ratio is constantly being challenged, whereby depth of reach is balanced 
against access to finance.   
 
The risk-reward ratio of balancing social and economic objectives is realised in each 
CDFI loan application.  The notion of risk is the chance of the loan defaulting and the 
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reward is the social and financial impact that the loan can make.  Each individual 
application presents a fresh challenge: 
‘we mustn’t set up businesses to fail and you’ve got to take on the riskier 
businesses so there is a gap between what the banks will do and no one 
else will do so you’re filling that gap but on the other hand you know you 
have to insist on standards which means you may not help the most needy 
but you don’t necessarily have to have organizations to fail to give them 
funding if they haven’t got a well thought through business plan, if they 
haven’t looked at the market, looked at the competition, so there are some 
issues there, your mission makes you want to help set up business in a 
disadvantaged area but you’re only creating a bigger problem if you set up 
businesses to fail’ (8f, UK, 20.01.06). 
CDFIs need to reach their target market through embedding themselves in the local 
community whilst recognising the high costs of working in this market.  The assessment 
of loan applications is expensive because it is holistic23 in its approach as it involves the 
assessment of both financial and social aspects of the application.   
 
All the US and UK CDFIs in the sample were yet to become operationally sustainable.  
Some of the US CDFI case studies are said to have attained up to 90% operational 
sustainability.  This suggests that these CDFIs have become increasingly commercial in 
their lending approach.  In addition, sustainability is time specific as a CDFIs level of 
sustainability fluctuates constantly according to deal flow, write off rate, level of 
                                                 
23 A holistic approach is when all aspects are dealt with to create a cohesive solution.  
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guarantee funding, security taken on loans and the current funding situation.  Conversely, 
one UK CDFI stated: 
‘We are a long, long way from that. We’re covering about a quarter of our 
operational sustainability by about 25%. And maybe we don’t want to be 
[sustainable], to reach that level and then that maybe a tip we haven’t 
debated on the board yet, cos this is such too far out of sight but I mean 
what’s the point if you just did like any other bank…our ultimate success 
is when we’ve done ourselves out of business’ (13a, UK, 13.01.06). 
This engages with the issue of sustainability and that some policy driven CDFIs, 
particularly those that rely on grants to operate should, perhaps, not be sustainable in the 
long term as this conflicts with CDFIs ‘mission’ of reaching out to the financially 
excluded who are high risk clients.  Alternatively, CDFIs that have managed their lending 
to the financially excluded by lending to different loan markets and in that way are 
balancing their missions and risk-reward ratio.  From this it can be suggested that, 
regardless of their type, US and UK CDFIs continue to rely on public funds and private 
investment which, in the process, are creating dynamic and complex organizations.   
 
As a result of the risk in lending to deprived communities, US and UK CDFIs are far 
from becoming financially sustainable.  The reliance on grants by some CDFIs, 
demonstrates the unwillingness to take on debt finance and therefore risk.  For other 
CDFIs, it highlights the lack of understanding of their options and/or their lack of track 
record.  There are barriers to obtaining debt finance for CDFI operations as, just like for-
profit businesses they need a proven track record.  Sustainability is the goal for many 
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CDFIs, especially for those that are increasingly commercial in their operations.  
However, any CDFI may have to adapt their operations to reach sustainability: 
‘It’s an issue for any business…I think that more mature institutions that 
have grown have their core businesses…self-sufficient…I think unless 
[they’re] mature CDFIs the issue is that a) they’re more heavily dependent 
and this is true of most UK CDFIs, they’re more dependent on donated 
dollars a and b they don’t understand internal to themselves their financial 
management…and that’s a common problem. If you don’t have 
meaningful and effective cost accounting systems and you’re not able to 
really allocate expenses and revenues in an effective way you don’t 
actually know what’s going on and so…you can look at the gross numbers 
but they hide things and every time we think we understand that and we go 
back and look at the breakout numbers we do internally in self-sufficiency 
there’s always something that surprises me always, every single time 
so…’ (5d, US, 12.10.05). 
It is likely that many CDFIs that do not respond to the changes in public funding will 
close or become transformed as they respond to other sources of public funding.  For 
example, those CDFIs that were established as a response to Government funding for 
CDFIs (largely US and UK third phase CDFIs), tend to shift their markets to follow the 
funding or follow problem solving policies.  In the case of the UK CDFIs that have 
followed policy and/or project based funding have tended to move towards personal 
finance in response to UK the Government’s policy shift.  In their effort to reach 
sustainability, CDFIs with their missions at the core of their operations, have to be 
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flexible in their goals so that they can balance their risk-reward ratio in their lending 
operations.  Again, it is important to stress that US and UK CDFIs need to adopt a 
professional approach to their operations and remain flexible in their goals, just as any 
other business.  In addition, sustainability levels change as to how a CDFI is doing at that 
specific period in time and even more so given the speed of change in the policy 
environment.   
 
Social Objectives of US and UK CDFIs 
The social objectives of US and UK CDFIs vary widely which highlights the complexity 
of the organizations, their relationship to the local economy and the level of 
embeddedness within it (i.e. whether CDFIs are embedded in the local environment).  As 
some CDFIs target specific sectors and markets, each CDFI has different social 
objectives to fulfil in the loan application process.  For example, the number of women or 
social enterprises for whom a loan has been sanctioned.  Nevertheless, the social 
objectives of all the US and UK CDFIs examined in the study are to create jobs and 
wealth, in accordance with the core of CDFIs missions: 
‘clearly the social objectives of [CDFIs] is creating and sustaining jobs 
and therefore having a real impact upon the deprived parts of [the city] so 
that’s really important but the only way that you can do that over the 
medium to long term is to do it on a sustainable basis and particularly in 
the current climate where ongoing [UK] Government funding and other 
funding is far from clear so you’ve got to run a CDFI as a business, you’ve 
got to run it business-like so therefore you’ve got to look at your income 
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line, you’ve got to look at the margins that you’re charging, the fees that 
you’re charging.  I don’t believe that this market is hugely price sensitive, 
I think its access to finance is more important than the price so I think its 
very important that all CDFIs look at what rate they are charging, there are 
one or two that charge soft rates which I think…they’ve missed the point 
altogether so this sort of leads us into will they become sustainable in the 
long term and that’s a real challenge’ (8h, UK, 05.06.06). 
The issues of impact, funding, sustainability, and access to finance raised in this 
quotation encapsulate CDFI lending activity.  The fact that US and UK CDFIs are 
providing finance to underserved markets highlights the significance of CDFI loans.  
Moreover, it signifies that US and UK CDFIs, despite their social mission, may have to 
operate just as any other business would in that they have to consider their financial 
objectives as well as their social.  However, there is a danger that CDFIs are becoming 
and will become increasingly commercial in their operations if they adopt interest rates at 
a significantly higher rate than mainstream financial organizations.   
 
The research showed that all US and UK CDFI portfolios had an imbalance between 
social and financial objectives, which could be a result of the different markets in which 
the US and UK CDFIs operated.  For example, one UK CDFI case study leaned towards 
social objectives due to the time spent on administering financial advice even to those 
that did not take on a loan.  The CDFI that was fulfilling more social than economic 
objectives specialised in ‘consumption’ loans and tended to follow the funding, and this 
CDFI was, therefore, largely project based.  The CDFIs that had a tendency to lean 
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towards commercial viability may become sustainable quicker.  These examples may 
indicate that the CDFIs’ social objectives are largely fulfilled through lending to those 
who cannot access finance from mainstream financial sources.  Although in the case of 
US CDFIs, this is dubious as they are not lenders of last resort and focus on emerging 
markets therefore this could indicate they are not reaching the truly financially excluded.     
US and UK CDFIs may need to be more efficient and innovative organizations if they 
aim to be sustainable and reach their social and financial targets.    
 
This study has shown that it is an enormous challenge to measure social impacts and 
outcomes effectively to demonstrate accountability to CDFI investors.  There is a danger 
that potential clients and investors could be alienated by the use of banking language in 
CDFI annual reports and literature.  There is a need for a clear message to be projected 
concerning the activities of CDFIs as they lack of visibility within the communities that 
they serve.  Another reason for lack of visibility is that there is no market for US and UK 
CDFI activity or the finance gap is marginal.  Although this research recognizes that 
social investment already occurs, it is highly uneven and there is further scope for 
attracting further investment into US and UK CDFIs.   Perhaps the lack of consistency in 
performance measurement and fragmentation within the US and UK CDFI sectors 
exacerbates tensions and competition between CDFIs.  This could impact upon the 
effectiveness of US and UK CDFIs to operate and their ability to attract investment.   
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Performance Measurement 
Performance measurement is a tool to see how well an organization is doing and what if 
anything is going wrong (Law, 1994).  CDFI performance measurement essentially 
assesses the key objectives of the CDFI and how these can be improved.  US and UK 
CDFI performance is often measured in terms of the default rate or the percentage of 
loans sanctioned that have not been repaid.  The default rate is measured as the 
percentage of clients that have failed to repay their loans on time.  It can be measured 
over different time periods (i.e. annually, since inception), in different markets or 
combinations of markets, or a combination of both to demonstrate performance.  US and 
UK CDFIs are unregulated and so are able to adjust the figures according to whichever 
calculation reflects best on their performance.  Such practices call into question the 
appropriateness of performance measures and whether they can be standardized to reflect 
US and UK CDFI practices and activities.  However, the definition of default and 
sustainability changes over time and according to each individual within each CDFI.  
Thus sustainability is a slippery concept as it is linked to a CDFI’s core mission and 
operating style.  The following shows the difference in how UK CDFIs balance their 
portfolio according to their missions and sustainability objectives: 
‘I think if [our default rate] get[s] below 20% then we stand open maybe 
to the criticism that we are being too selective but were in danger of being 
squeezed, I think, in that if were not selective enough we [will not] be 
sustainable so it’s a bit of a tight rope to walk’ (8d, UK, 13.01.06). 
Another UK CDFI argued that: 
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‘[Our sustainability rate is] just a bit over 60%, I think, just now.  And it 
also depends on how you look at the figures and how brutal you are and 
what your default rate is and how you write off and, I mean, we write off 
very brutally at the moment, we write off after three missed payments.  So 
our default rate is really high.  But if we take it what … happens after we 
get recoveries, we would maybe get them back paying again, then that 
takes a lot of the way down.  It’s difficult to compare because everybody 
does it in a slightly different way and also, do you take it over your whole 
loan portfolio or do you take it over a year, do you know what I mean?  
It’s difficult,…because most of us have had no training…all our lending is 
unsecured, which is pretty unusual for a CDFI that does business 
loans…we do take personal guarantees but a lot of people don’t consider 
that as security, because they are only worth what they’re worth when you 
are able to pursue them.  But that would cover 75% of loss which would 
be good for us because we could cover the other 25%.  But if we couldn’t 
get small firms and we couldn’t get other money then we’re bust because 
we can’t cover the level of debt on the percentage rate that we charge.  We 
would have to be charging 25% or something’ (9c, UK, 10.02.06). 
The annual data gathered by the US and UK CDFI trade associations also have limited 
validity as a result of them combining data from older and younger CDFIs, so the figures 
are not truly representative of the US and UK CDFI sectors.  There are moves by the 
UK’s CDFA to try and address the issue of performance measurement by setting 
benchmarks through SMILE, ‘a financial, organizational and impact monitoring tool’ to 
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assess finance, operations and the impact of UK CDFIs (CDFA, 2007).  However, there 
are questions concerning standardization given the complexity and diversity of the UK 
CDFI sectors many different business models and the regulation of the measurements as 
each CDFI is responsible for calculating its own performance.   
 
US and UK CDFIs have demonstrated that the risk reward ratio of lending to financially 
excluded businesses can be uneven.  Lending to financially excluded businesses and 
individuals is high risk and a CDFI may never be sustainable.  Yet arguably, US and UK 
CDFIs have made some businesses bankable after banks had refused them credit.  The 
research suggested that banks could either pull back even further to increase the finance 
gap, or in the UK, take on CDFIs themselves in the future.  However, the latter may be 
unlikely as: 
‘what bits the UK banks don’t do are the scraps and those deals really 
aren’t very strong and I think its been proved…that doing start-up lending 
is extremely risky…we’ve then got the demand, is there sufficient demand 
out there other than what the banks are doing so you know is there much 
left over?’ (8h, UK, 05.06.06). 
In this way, it is not surprising to learn that banks would not be willing to take over UK 
CDFI operations at the present time, unless for example, they were driven to by the UK 
Government as part of CSR: 
‘It all comes down to the size of the market and I suppose the more 
consolidation you had particularly on back office and stuff like that, you 
see CDFIs could end up looking like  banks…30 years ago before they 
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started using credit scoring techniques and things like that and you know 
lots and lots of paper work…to do individual deals so I think they need to 
think about how they can share back office stuff like this, become much 
more streamlined, so no I don’t think banks will take over CDFIs not in 
the short to medium term’  (8h, UK, 05.06.06). 
This statement is significant in that CDFIs are seen as clearing up the excess of the 
economy, when in reality they are giving those living in disadvantaged areas the 
opportunity to make a living for themselves and their community.  UK CDFIs will 
continue to consolidate their operations, which has begun through the sharing of back 
office services.  On this basis, US and UK CDFIs are operating on a local level, relying 
on local knowledge to determine their market, just as banks once did prior to the 
introduction of credit scoring.  Moreover, CDFIs could be seen as replacing banks as 
CDFIs are undertaking smaller loans that banks do not take on and CDFIs are located in 
disadvantaged areas and it is these areas in which the banks have withdrawn their 
services via the rationalisation of the branch networks. 
 
Balancing Complexity and Dynamism 
US and UK CDFIs can be characterized by dynamic complexity.  There are different 
dimensions of complexity, for example funding streams and the restrictions and politics 
associated to them, and these dimensions are dynamic as they change over time and 
space.  CDFIs are complex owing to the embeddedness of their operations, which are 
constrained by the geography and flows into and out of the organization.  Within the 
lending process there is also temporary complexity as lending committees balance the 
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risk and reward of each loan alongside the CDFIs strategy.  As the balance between the 
financial and social objectives has to be maintained and the flows into, within and out of 
each CDFI are ever changing along with the political environment and banking system, 
CDFIs are dynamic and flexible organizations which respond to and instigate change 
depending on their strategy and operating style (Figure 6.4).  It could be argued that some 
US and UK CDFIs are experiencing controlled, sustainable failure.  For example, in the 
UK, CDFIs are at the lending edge of the New Labour Governments agenda of inclusion 
through responsible capitalism.  The logic for this approach is that the grants made to UK 
CDFIs under the Phoenix Fund were cheaper than welfare payments.   
Figure 6.4: Dimensions of Complexity within CDFI Operations 
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Conclusions 
This chapter first explored the flow of funds into US and UK CDFI via banks, not-for-
profit foundations, the public sector and private investors and presented the challenges 
that this caused US and UK CDFIs.  The second part of the chapter explored the US and 
UK CDFI operating environment which established that there are two types of CDFI; 
policy based and diverse.  Each of these types also have subsets; policy based CDFIs can 
include project based and/or balanced CDFIs, whilst diverse CDFIs can also include 
balanced CDFIs.  The third part of the chapter explored the flows out of US and UK 
CDFIs through the loans made, interest rates, default rates, performance measurement, 
social and financial objectives and operational and financial sustainability.  The final part 
of the chapter explored if and how US and UK CDFIs can balance their performance 
through their portfolio and their missions.  To this end, US and UK CDFIs are complex 
organizations that have to constantly adapt to their changing operating environment for 
them to survive. 
  
CDFIs are characterized by dynamic complexity.  CDFIs are helping to bridge the 
finance gap. Yet they are an intermediary development tool, grooming clients to become 
part of the mainstream system through helping them acquire a financial track record, 
delivering financial education, business support and finance to financially excluded firms.  
As a result, CDFIs emerged as an alternative to mainstream finance yet now are 
becoming increasingly conventional institutions operating within a niche market.  
Furthermore, CDFIs have developed in one of three ways.  First, some CDFIs follow 
Government funding sources to determine their markets and operations.  Second, other 
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CDFIs have become increasingly commercial to fulfil their objective of becoming 
financially sustainable and thirdly, there are CDFIs that try to balance their social and 
financial objectives.  In this way, US CDFIs are not as mature as they are widely 
perceived to be by UK CDFIs, thus sustainability remains an issue for all CDFIs, just like 
any other small business.  Therefore, in the future, it is essential that CDFIs in the US and 
UK develop efficient economies of scale and grow through diversification, scale or 
merge.  The costs of operating could be reduced if CDFIs centralized their back offices 
and had satellite offices.  On this basis, CDFI activity could be seen to be closing the US 
and UK finance gap for enterprises.  Yet many enterprises remain excluded from 
accessing debt finance, particularly start-up and micro enterprises operating in 
disadvantaged communities.  In addition, as a result of their networks and role, CDFIs are 
part of the financial system as they are becoming increasingly commercial in order to 
survive.  In this way, some CDFIs operate largely in the same way as mainstream 
institutions, by fulfilling a single bottom line, perhaps more so than they would like to 
realise.   
 
US and UK CDFI networks are shaped by the funding support that they receive and the 
markets that they serve.  On this basis, funding and markets could be the key drivers of 
CDFIs as they inform their organizational strategy and future.   These networks are also 
shaped by spatial proximity and time as these factors influence the strength and weakness 
of ties within each of the US and UK CDFI’s operations.  The reliance on public funds 
and private investment means that CDFIs are dynamic organizations that are largely 
unsustainable in the short to medium term.   
 242
In conclusion, US and UK CDFIs are not operating in a purely alternative fashion as 
CDFIs integrate the blended values of social and financial objectives and incorporate 
mainstream banking practices into their operations.  As such, many US and UK CDFIs 
are diverse organizations that have developed in response to Government policy as a 
vehicle for small firms to access finance.  The next chapter will explore the conflicting 
nature of the CDFI double bottom line through the analysis of CDFI activity in the West 
Midlands, UK. 
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CHAPTER 7 WEST MIDLANDS CDFIS IN CONTEXT AND 
THE CASE OF THE ASTON REINVESTMENT TRUST  
 
This thesis has so far explored the diversity and complexity of US and UK CDFIs, in 
particular, the policy background, tempestuous funding environment and the significance 
of time.  This chapter explores CDFIs in the regional context of the West Midlands, UK, 
through the example of ART.  The chapter is based on eight interviews with 
representatives from ART that were undertaken in 2006.  These interviews included five 
members of the board, two loan officers and the Chief Executive, and produced nearly 
40,000 words of transcript.  Some interviews were incredibly valuable and contained 
important information.  The board members and Chief Executive were able to discuss 
strategy, while interviews with loan officers explored daily implementation of policy.  
The chapter draws heavily on two of these interviews, but triangulation was undertaken 
between these two interviews and the others.  The CASE studentship facilitated unusual 
access to strategic members of the ART team and reflects a period of three years 
engagement with an organization.  The UK’s West Midlands region comprises the 
counties of the West Midlands, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire 
and Herefordshire.   
 
The first part of the chapter outlines the regional context of CDFIs through the 
geographical debates surrounding charity, access to finance and uneven development.  
The second part of the chapter explores the bottom line of CDFI operations, which could 
be seen as the foundations of CDFIs missions and operations.  In light of this, the third 
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part of the chapter explores ART, a West Midland CDFI, in terms of how and why it was 
established, the nature of its operations including the sources and uses of funds, ART’s 
board of directors and clients.  The final part of the chapter highlights the dynamics 
within and between UK CDFIs through the concept of complexity.                
 
West Midlands Context  
The West Midlands has an enterprise deficit in relation to other regions of the UK 
(Deloitte and Touche, 2002: AWM, 2004) as the birth rate and growth of SMEs within 
the West Midlands is below the national average.  The RDA, AWM is addressing issues 
of finance for enterprise by identifying market gaps and implementing strategies to 
overcome them.  The importance of West Midlands CDFIs is highlighted in the following 
statement: 
‘[CDFIs] are important to the West Midlands both as a sector in their own 
right (as part of the broader social economy) and also in playing a key role in 
ensuring that the economic growth and development of the region benefits all 
the population and areas.  They can help to join up the economic, 
environmental and the social through their activities, provide new models for 
service delivery and underpin competitiveness and employment creation.  
They are therefore part of business and sectoral strategies as well as 
regeneration plans’ (NEF et al. 2003:10). 
AWM works closely with CDFIs in the region, and it can be suggested that the West 
Midlands is leading the way in terms of the exchange of information and support between 
CDFIs and RDAs.  In support of this, AWM has attempted to ‘improve the performance 
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of existing financial instruments and resources’ by identifying and bridging the finance 
gaps for SMEs, by coordinating financial resources in the West Midlands (AWM, 
2004:125).  Of all the English RDAs, AWM is leading the Access to Finance agenda by 
addressing the issue through consultation and by implementing strategies to overcome 
barriers to finance such as creating networks to exchange information, and share 
opportunities for investment.  In 2005, AWM, with Barclays bank, supported the creation 
of the New Consortium for the West Midlands (CDF-WM)24, a consortium of CDFIs and 
other loan providers in the West Midlands which could help AWM to achieve its own 
policy objectives.  AWM have developed the ASLP which is designed specifically for 
CDFIs supporting enterprise and other loan providers to access capital and/or revenue for 
their operations and is designed to act as a follow on from the Phoenix Fund.  AWM is 
unique in its approach to CDFI support in terms of funding and networks.  CDFIs and 
other loan providers located within the West Midlands do not cover the entire region, 
although the CDFI geographical coverage, compared to other regions in the UK, is 
widespread (Figure 7.1).  However, the West Midlands CDFIs do not operate in the same 
markets.  This means that access to certain products and services is also uneven.  There 
are eight CDFIs in the West Midlands operating in a variety of markets and serving both 
urban and rural populations.  The West Midlands CDFIs are:  
? 3b 
? ART  
? Black Country Reinvestment Society (BCRS) 
? Coventry and Warwickshire Reinvestment Trust (CWRT) 
? Impetus  
                                                 
24 CDF-WM changed it’s name to Fair Finance Consortium in 2005 to increase awareness of the sector. 
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? North Staffs Risk Capital Fund (NSRCF) 
? Street UK 
? The Halal Fund 
There are also several other loan providers in the region, including: 
? The Arrow Fund25  
? Black Country Enterprise Fund (BCEF) 
The West Midlands is a suitable case study to explore the complex nature of CDFIs.  
 
Figure 7.1: CDFIs within the West Midlands, UK  
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(Source: Adapted from AWM, 2005: No page number) 
 
                                                 
? 25 Is another loan model and member of the Fair Finance Consortium but is a guarantee fund that 
uses a bank as the lender. 
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Uneven Access to Finance 
A finance gap exists in the supply and demand of loan finance (BOE, 2002; Bolton, 
1971; Macmillan, 1931; Radcliffe; 1959; Storey, 1994; Wilson, 1979) and is particularly 
prevalent in disadvantaged areas (Mayo et al. 1998), to the extent that ‘there is a systemic 
development of the geography of financial exclusion in the UK’ (Bryson and Buttle, 
2005:286).  With the availability of funds from the UK Government support under the 
Phoenix Fund, it was assumed that as an alternative vehicle of finance, CDFIs would help 
to resolve the issue of financial exclusion of enterprise from commercial sources of 
finance.  It is ironic then that as with their customers, CDFIs and charities can experience 
financial exclusion, as information asymmetries exist between CDFIs and mainstream 
financial institutions.  This makes it challenging for them to secure finance other than 
grants and charitable donations for their operations (Bryson and Buttle, 2005).   
 
CDFIs, like charities, are part of the third sector, defined by their actions and operate for 
specific groups and/or purposes on a not-for-profit distribution26 (Butler and Wilson, 
1990; Bryson et al. 2002).  The long history of charity is complex due to its diversity 
(Bryson et al. 2002).  However, according to Beveridge (1948) there are just two types of 
philanthropy, first, there is the desire to meet need or combat a particular evil and, 
second, there is a need to alleviate poverty.  Woodroofe (1962:23) suggested that charity 
could be a ‘social regenerator’ and that it could be used to initiate self-help.  These 
comments on charity could also be likened to CDFI activity as CDFIs aim to relieve 
poverty through enterprise.  CDFIs like charities, are also complex in the way that they 
                                                 
26 Any surplus is distributed back into the business rather than shareholders, thus CDFIs are non-profit 
distributing. 
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are defined and through their operational models.  They can be an IPS, Banks, 
Companies Limited by Guarantee and also registered for charitable purposes (Bryson and 
Buttle, 2005).  The historical background, contextual environment, and organizational 
aims inform the charities strategy and structure (Butler and Wilson, 1990).  The 
organizations board of directors and individuals volunteer their services to the third sector 
‘to supplement what is done as social service by the state’ (Beveridge, 1948: 125).  In this 
way, ‘altruism is a fundamental part of human rationality’ and essential to voluntary 
action (Butler and Wilson, 1990:1).  Therefore, the motivation of boards members can be 
a result of philanthropic idealism.   
 
Geography of West Midlands CDFIs 
Uneven development is recognized as the lack of access to finance in disadvantaged 
areas, which in the UK, has been exacerbated by the rationalisation of bank branches that 
began during the 1980s (Harvey, 1973; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994; 1995; 1997; Martin, 
1999).  CDFIs were the ‘new animal’ by which poverty was to be relieved (8a, 13.01.06).  
However, there is an accumulation of charities in areas of wealth, creating a disconnect 
between areas in need and areas of wealth.  For example, the coverage of CDFIs in the 
West Midlands is uneven due to the establishment process, which created spatial gaps in 
the provision of finance for enterprise.  The geography of CDFI activity is uneven 
making access a key issue and the formation of a CDFI is based upon the actions of a set 
of individuals trying to solve a local problem.  Thus, CDFI coverage is not planned but 
evolves as individuals create local CDFIs.   
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Currently there is uneven development of CDFI operations across the West Midlands and 
the UK (Figure 7.1).  Bryson and Taylor (2006:34) state that ‘compared to other UK 
regions, CDFI coverage in the West Midlands is relatively widespread’, yet gaps remain 
in market provision and with geographical areas served.  The RDA recognize this: 
‘[AWM] has provided some initial support to CDFIs under the Advantage 
Small Loan Programme but acknowledges that there are still gaps in the 
provision of this type of finance both in terms of geography and levels of 
finance (under £10k). It also wants to review the prospects for the long term 
provision of this type of finance. This links to issues over the sustainability of 
individual CDFIs and need for ongoing public sector support. It is, therefore, 
intending to commission some research/consultancy to examine these issues 
and provide it with recommendations on the way forward’ (15a, UK, 
29.06.06). 
It is encouraging that AWM continues to assist CDFIs in the region and is trying to 
identify the best way to support them and to ensure that they meet their policy objectives.  
To achieve scale and geographical coverage, ART and other CDFIs would need 
additional resources which include funding, people (staff and boards of directors with the 
right combination of skills and expertise).  However, in increasing the scale of CDFI 
operations, there is a conflict between resources and sustainability.   
 
Not only are there gaps in the geography and levels of finance that CDFIs provide but 
staff with appropriate knowledge and skills is also in short supply.  For example, ART 
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has employed ex-banking staff that possesses the right knowledge and expertise 
associated with enterprise lending and operations.  The geography of CDFIs is: 
‘affected by the availability of the right combination of individuals with 
the relevant skills, knowledges and experiences’ (Bryson and Buttle, 
2005:284). 
Combining both social and financial knowledge and skills in one person is rare (Bryson 
and Buttle, 2005).  The geography and impact of CDFI provision on local economies will 
therefore be highly uneven. 
 
CDFI expansion in the West Midlands is, at present, restricted by other CDFI activity and 
funding restrictions.  It has been suggested that the future of CDFIs depends on finding 
cheaper ways of administering loans, whilst remaining true to their mission.  As one ART 
board member remarked: 
‘ART is limited by it’s geographical boundaries at the moment and in the 
future, particularly if some of the CDFIs that are suffering. [There] may be 
a way forward in having a satellite office in Leicester, or Nottingham or 
wherever.  That would be fantastic really….you can always franchise out a 
successful model and I think ART and DSL [Developing Strathclyde, a 
Glasgow based CDFI] and Bolton [Business Ventures] are successful 
models and if you can then franchise out that concept rather than set up 
something new from scratch which has to go through all the learning and 
audit committees and boards and this and that.  If you can avoid that by 
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setting up a simple franchise where the Governance is provided from the 
centre it would be a lot easier to do’ (8f, UK, 20.01.06).  
There are cases of CDFI duplicating other successful business models, but it is not a 
guaranteed way of providing access to finance as the CDFI has to become locally 
embedded to have local knowledge, understand the market and the needs of their 
borrowers.  The business model could be transferred and should work the issue is 
obtaining clients. 
 
Merging CDFI operations regionally would be cost effective.  Although a West Midlands 
merger would have to be time and space specific, for example, CDFIs would be at risk of 
closing.  With the closure of the Phoenix Fund, and the problems of raising additional 
capital via CITR, some CDFIs are shifting their markets, products and services into other 
sectors such as personal consumption finance: 
‘There are massive problems facing the sector with the removal of [the] 
Phoenix Fund support and…there is going to be no reason for them to 
continue to exist and if they think they are gonna go into personal debt I 
don’t think there is a [finance] gap [in personal finance], I think the credit 
unions are there to do it and I would really like to see credit unions expand 
more and more successfully in this country and there’s some great 
examples around…airline pilots, and taxi drivers…and [the UK is] 
moving towards what Ireland and America have got and it’s on the cusp of 
the credit union movement and it also has a massive social function of 
reaching the unfinanced but I think if the CDFIs move into that then it’s 
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because they are looking for a reason to exist rather than filling a gap’ (8f, 
UK, 20.01.06).  
Thus, following available funding and shifting markets jeopardizes CDFI’s validity and 
reputation as they fail to develop a clear place in the market and are not fulfilling their 
original goals.  The opportunity to merge CDFI operations would be: 
• If and when no further funding is allocated to CDFI operations,  
• To concentrate to finance for enterprise (SMEs and social enterprise), 
•  To create a more cohesive sector, 
• To increase awareness of CDFIs and raise their profile to attract target clients, and 
retain their niche in the finance market,    
• To improve accountability. 
A merger would be time and space specific as firms, regardless of whether they are for-
profit or not-for-profit.  The UK CDFI sector has changed rapidly, especially since this 
research was begun.  UK CDFIs are in a transition period in terms of funding.  There is as 
yet, no final decision regarding the way in which CDFIs will be funded in the future, if at 
all.  Some RDAs have contracted the strongest CDFI in its region or created a consortium 
to carry forward the work.  Currently, it does not appear that UK RDAs are ready to 
provide a long term commitment or solution to their local CDFI.  There are a number of 
different models being trialed in the various RDAs, for example hub and spoke, mostly 
using the last tranch of Phoenix Fund monies.  Thus CDFIs could become programmes or 
project organizations which render the CDFA’s performance and benchmarking agenda 
obsolete.  Arguably this is creating further uneven development of markets and sectors 
served by CDFIs.  The UK CDFI sector is enduring a period of uncertainty.  Without 
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collaboration and co-operation from other financial institutions, business support and 
banks it is unlikely that CDFIs will ‘ever constitute a comprehensive and systematic tool 
for combating [financial] exclusion’ (Bryson and Buttle, 2005: 286).   
 
The double bottom line is central to any definition of a CDFI.  However, this thesis will 
contend that CDFIs are, in fact, working to a triple bottom line.  This triple bottom line 
adds environmental objectives alongside social and financial.  Owing to the nature of 
CDFI operations, there is an overlap of these issues and environmental issues are often 
alluded to but are not yet a mainstream part of their business.  The key to this argument is 
that CDFIs have numerous values in which they articulate in their lending operations.  
This adds another dimension of complexity to CDFI operations, yet it could be argued 
that by categorizing CDFI activity in this way their operations are simplified.  This is 
because CDFI objectives create the foundations for its action. 
 
Triple Bottom Line 
Throughout this thesis, the dynamics of US and UK CDFI activity have been explored 
which has reflected the diversity and complexity of their operations.  At the core of CDFI 
operations is the double bottom line.  However, as the research shows, it is evident that 
CDFIs realize more than just social and financial objectives.  Within the concepts of 
social and financial objectives are a whole host of other, hidden aims which are specific 
to each particular CDFI.  These values may or may not be explicit to those working 
within the CDFI or in the board of directors and may be viewed as a given depending on 
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one’s beliefs and/or view.  As these objectives are at the core of CDFI operations, it could 
be stated that these define and determine the organization.        
 
 Figure 7.2: Diagram to Show US and UK CDFI Triple Bottom Line   
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(Source: Own research) 
 
The triple bottom line represents further complexity that is inherent in CDFI operations 
(Figure 7.2).  Each circle represents the social, financial and environmental objectives of 
CDFIs.  In each objective lies a set of values.  It is these values which influence and 
provide the complexity within CDFI operations, particularly the loan decision process.  
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The financial objectives are to: financial inclusion through employment and access to 
finance, help businesses to grow and/or diversify, regenerate the local area, whilst 
creating a revolving loan fund for the CDFI to continue operating.  The social objectives 
of CDFIs include: actively promoting social inclusion by creating or retaining local jobs, 
new opportunities, through practicing ethically for example, through the non-
displacement of firms and manageable levels of credit.  Ethical objectives could be added 
to the CDFI set of objectives.  Acting ethically is arguably already a key element of each 
set of objectives.  The environmental objectives are typified by lending to a specific 
geographical area, businesses that produce and consume products in the locality, 
businesses that reduce energy emissions, and/or promote environmentally friendly 
practices such as recycling, refurbishing or reusing goods.  These objectives are all 
intricately linked which makes it hard to separate them into discrete issues.  CDFI 
operations, the loan application process and performance measurement remains a 
challenge for each CDFI.  The interrelated nature of social and economic criteria is the 
reason why the boundaries of these concepts are blurred and that CDFIs are diverse and 
complex organizations.      
 
The triple bottom line is balanced at the central intersection.  But balance between the 
objectives of CDFIs cannot always be made.  This is due to restrictions placed on the 
funding.  The board ensures that lending restrictions filter into the lending decisions.  The 
lending restrictions depend on the source of funds, the time, geography and market 
restrictions placed upon it.  For example, ASLP funding does not include loans for retail 
as it is against the original remit as part of the funding came from the European 
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Development Regeneration Funding (EDRF) Objective 2.  Even if funding has ended, the 
restrictions placed on the funds can continue if the CDFI should choose to do so (as the 
money becomes theirs to either guarantee the loans or use for revenue) and re-lend that 
money for that specific purpose within certain areas.  External and internal (self-imposed) 
restrictions are blended into a short and long-term strategy and heavily influence the 
lending process.  Bryson and Buttle (2005) did not consider the restrictions that CDFIs 
face imposed by providers of funds.  The internal and external restrictions are part of the 
ethics of CDFI operations.  The self-imposed geography of lending in key areas is 
especially important in policy funds.  In many cases, after funds have been re-allocated 
for a specific purpose the CDFIs do not retain a separate allocation in their accounts to 
explain future uses which complicates performance measurement.  Those CDFIs that 
have continued to place restrictions on funds can suffer from constrained hypothecation, 
meaning that their CDFI may be experiencing controlled failure, as a way of fulfilling 
their social and ethical missions rather than their financial objectives.   
 
The triple bottom line will be explored further in the ART case study to show how 
intricately linked the social, financial and environmental objectives of CDFIs are.  The 
following section will highlight how and why ART was established, the sources and uses 
of its funds, the board of directors at ART, its organizational strategy and finally ART’s 
active clients. 
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The Aston Reinvestment Trust (ART) 
ART was established in 1997, during the second phase of UK CDFIs, as an independent 
social financial institution to provide finance for enterprise.  The founders of ART were 
‘a unique collection of individuals, all with long-term interests in maintaining 
Birmingham’s local economy and in providing local jobs for local people’ (Bryson and 
Buttle, 2005:285).  The leading individuals that established ART were Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, Pat Conaty (who was then Development Manager of Birmingham Settlement, 
Vice Chair of UK Social Investment Forum (UKSIF), and also later helped to develop 
London Rebuilding Society and Wessex Reinvestment Trust), Danyal Sattar (who was 
secretary of UKSIF and also later worked for the New Economics Foundation (NEF), 
International Association of Investors in the Social Economy (INAISE), Charity Bank 
and Esmee Fairbairn Foundation).  From this it is evident that ART’s architects were 
visionaries.  Undoubtedly, the key influences of ART were the US CDLFs.  It could even 
be suggested that the founders of ART influenced a new paradigm of social finance in the 
UK through the use of a revolving loan fund purely for enterprise in disadvantaged areas.  
ART inspired many others to imitate its model and helped to persuade the Labour 
Government to support UK CDFIs as part of their financial and social inclusion agenda.    
In many ways, ART was ahead of the rest of the CDFI sector as they were the first UK 
organization to use social investment raised from individuals which was to be invested 
locally in enterprise in Birmingham. 
 
The core strategy of ART is ‘to provide loans for viable small businesses and social 
enterprises…when banks are unable to help or have done all they can’ (ART, 2006:1).  
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ART’s loan fund was launched in June 1997 after a six year period of consultation and 
development.  ART operates a revolving loan fund, so as loans are sanctioned and repaid, 
the funds can then be recycled and lent on to other clients.  ART provides finance for 
enterprise (micro-enterprise, SME and social enterprise) in Birmingham and North 
Solihull.  ART initially provided loans to micro enterprise and SMEs from £2,000 to 
£40,000 and then moved on from April 2006 to provide loans in the SME market from 
£10,000 to £50,000, targeting the whole of Birmingham and North Solihull.  ART also 
used to provide finance for individuals to refurbish homes under the ART Homes27 
scheme and finance for energy reduction under ART Energy.  These schemes confused 
the ART brand and the decision was made to focus on the core objective of providing 
finance for enterprise.  ART Homes and ART Energy pilots were subsequently removed 
from ART.  Mercian Housing who took over ART Homes has overtaken the total amount 
that ART has made in loans (as of September 2006) as ART Homes now has a national 
focus rather than local.  
 
As ART was founded prior to the Phoenix Fund, funding for ART’s capital was obtained 
through social investment (with a social return) from corporate, public and private 
investors.  This investment was then used to leverage additional funds from banks, 
charitable foundations and trusts so that ART could build its portfolio and be independent 
of public funds.  ART made careful use of their policy guarantee funds at an early stage 
from the public sector.  ARTs first year business plan was to raise £500,000 in capital and 
lend £200,000.  This meant that £40,000 (20%) had to be raised came from charitable 
donations that were used to underwrite the risk.  In reality, capital of £360,000 was raised 
                                                 
27 ART Homes was a capital release programme for asset rich and revenue poor. 
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from private sources plus £140,000 was raised from public sources.  The public funds 
became guarantee funds and were used to leverage private funding.  ART has tried to 
obtain 20% of risk capital to underwrite the risk but public funds have given up to 70% at 
times.  ART’s revenue capital was initially 90% from the private sector (Barclays bank, 
Natwest bank, Charities Aid Foundation and Birmingham City Council).  In this way, 
ART aimed to move towards sustainability from the outset.  Funds obtained from the UK 
Government’s Phoenix Fund have allowed ART (and other UK CDFIs) to fulfil their role 
within the sector and provide the market with alternative finance by increasing scale and 
reach, and enabled them to take on additional risk in their lending activity which may 
have compromised their aims and increased the levels of bad debt.  By taking additional 
risk, ART has fulfilled its role in lending to those who are not able to obtain their full 
requirements from other sources while remaining true to its mission of supporting local 
jobs for local people.  ART is reaching its target market and successfully achieving its 
social and financial objectives.   
 
ART’s operational model was inspired by the success of US CDFIs and ART, too, has 
been replicated by a number of other UK CDFIs (such as South Coast Moneyline 
formerly Portsmouth Area Regeneration Trust)  often helped by ART’s staff and board 
members.  For example, Bert Nicholson, a former board director at ART and an 
economic development consultant, acted as an independent consultant, rather than as a 
member of the ART board, to help establish BCRS and CWRT, and Steve Walker acted 
as the mentor to the Chief Executive of Street UK.  Some of whom have moved towards 
serving personal sector debt over enterprise.  From this, it may be stated that these UK 
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CDFIs appear to be largely policy driven, project based CDFIs that follow the funding 
and tailor their products and services accordingly perhaps to the disadvantage of their 
missions and/or market.  In the early stages, organizations need to focus on their 
objectives so that they can operate with integrity.  CDFIs are designed to be a flexible 
vehicle to supply finance to deprived areas, yet those CDFIs that are project based can 
jeopardize the CDFI and the sector’s reputation and sustainability especially if they 
frequently switch markets and adapt their operations to the latest funding initiative.    
 
Sources of Funds 
ART has received major funding from the Phoenix Fund and ASLP.  ART has received 
financial support by way of loans, grants and donations from sources such as the Esmee 
Fairbairn Foundation, and Tudor Trust.  Investors include; Jaguar, IMI, Severn Trent 
Water, Wesleyan Assurance Society, Natwest bank, Barclays bank, West Bromwich 
Building Society, Sir Adrian Cadbury, Sir Richard Knowles (former Lord Mayor of 
Birmingham), Sir Digby Jones (former Director-General of the Confederation of British 
Industry) and a number of other individual and corporate shareholders.  Members can 
invest between £250 and £20,000 and receive a social return rather than a financial 
return.   
 
ART is also Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) accredited. 
‘CITR offers 5% per annum off personal or corporate tax liabilities up to a 
maximum of 5 years.  Full CITR offers a return of 5.3% to a standard rate 
tax payer’ (ART, 2007a:1). 
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Shareholder investors are part of the mutual society based on the remit of the IPS 
guidelines.  The variety of funding that ART receives ensures that it does not rely on one 
source or type, for example, public sources.  Owing to the high profile of some of ART’s 
investors, they can benefit from their networks and the power they have to influence 
other key figures in Government and industry.  As Butler and Wilson (1990:16) state: 
‘a voluntary organization that can choose the level of Government 
financial support is far less dependent and far less subject to possible 
constraints on its autonomy than those organizations which rely upon 
substantial Government funding’. 
This alludes to the notion that CDFIs should aim to be independent and sustainable in the 
long term.  It had been hoped that CDFIs would develop along these lines, but the vast 
majority of CDFIs have failed to take this approach and continue to rely heavily on UK 
Government grants.         
 
Operations: Uses of Funds 
ART offers finance from £10,000 and has recently increased its maximum loan size from 
£40,000 to £50,000.  This strategic decision was intended to shift ART away from deals 
below £10,000 which had been high risk and not cost effective, also in response to the 
changing market needs.  Micro enterprise accounts for over 60% of ARTs portfolio, and 
start-ups 50%.  It was originally envisaged that social enterprise loans would help to 
balance the risk of lending to small businesses.  Social enterprise loans have been slow to 
materialize but now account for just under 18%, out of a total portfolio of £5.6 million or 
£1 million worth of loans to the sector.  ART has a bad debt rate of 22.6%, which is 
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similar to the SFLG default rate.  In 2005, ART initiated ART development services, a 
pilot scheme funded by the DTI to administer post-loan support.  ART believes that by 
providing business support, the risk of loan default will be reduced and will increase the 
success of the businesses that it assists.  ART has also developed a CD-ROM which is 
designed to guide entrepreneurs in setting up their own business.  The development and 
modifications to the ART business model demonstrate that CDFIs are innovative and 
flexible financial instruments that can be effective in reaching financially excluded firms 
that are on the commercial margins.   
 
ART Board of Director Dynamics  
The board of directors plays a fundamental role in the management, operations and 
strategy of organizations.  In addition, the way in which the board of directors is 
established is significant, especially how and why certain individuals become board 
members, i.e. through particular networks.  The nature and composition of a CDFI board, 
such as ART’s, can be explored through a number of questions: how and why was the 
CDFI established; how was the board established; who were the original board members; 
who are the current board members; what were/are the original/current board members 
roles inside and outside of the organization; why were these people selected as board 
members.  Board member recruitment at ART relies on established business and 
relationship networks to identify potential candidates.  The mechanism for joining the 
board is through social vetting at a CDFI social event where the potential candidate may 
not even know that they are being vetted.  If the candidate is successful and asked to join 
the board, the new board member has to prove themselves and become an active 
 263
participant in the CDFI.  The sequence of events leading up to and following recruitment 
is exemplified in the following instance of requirement to the ART board: first the person 
concerned had contact with ART through Pat Conaty during the development stages of 
ART.  Second, they invested in ART at its inception and kept in touch.  Third, they were 
invited to join the ART board by Sir Adrian Cadbury (Chair of ART).  Fourth, joining 
ART put the person on a steep learning curve to understand the market gap served by 
ART and operational procedures.  Fifth, they then joined a number of ART’s committees 
reflecting their expertise and experience (8e, UK, 19.01.06).  Clearly, who you know and 
what you know is central to the board member selection process.  It is essential that board 
members have expertise in a variety of areas so they can contribute to one or a number of 
the CDFI’s committees: executive (strategy), remuneration (staff pay), lending (loan 
applications) and audit (decide on policies and how transactions are displayed in 
accounts) committees.  Over time, the board membership changes creating shifting 
coalitions (Taylor, 1999) whereby assets, expertise and approaches are passed onto 
another group.  For example, ART’s first phase of development was a result of the 
founders of ART being able to plant ideas and let them grow but the second stage of 
development required recruiting more people with knowledge and experience of running 
a business.  Therefore, there is a succession issue in the development of any organization 
whether, or not it is a social enterprise, e.g. visionary, operations, legal expertise.  There 
may be an opportunity in the future when the visionaries are called upon to inspire new 
ideas into the organization and this means that in this sense the development process is 
both cyclical and progressive.  
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Charities are embedded in networks of other organizations and agencies (Butler and 
Wilson, 1990).  Similarly, CDFI staff and board members are also embedded in local and 
non-local networks, for example one director reflected that his ‘involvement in the 
community brought [him] to the board’ (8d, UK, 13.01.06).  These networks that are used 
to screen and recruit potential members to the board as one interviewee explained: 
‘So really my knowledge of CDFIs and our link to the CDFA has …led 
me to develop the relationship with ART, and what I think we can bring to 
ART is a wider perspective of other CDFIs and the other issues that are 
facing some. I know Steve [Walker] has got close to them, but we get a 
feel through the links at the CDFA and the other CDFIs that we lend to.  
We are almost doing our own benchmarking of ART and how it performs, 
which is very useful.  May last year, or was it June, having just finished 
another voluntary commitment, and I’d actually written to Steve and said 
look; if any of our investees need some of my time, Id be happy to do it 
and [he] said actually ART had had a few people moving on then …so 
why don’t you join ART?’ (8f, UK, 20.01.06).  
As such, members join CDFI boards as part of their job, beliefs, personal agenda, and/or 
altruism which are key reasons for accessing committed individuals who are willing to 
actively participate in their role as a member of the board of directors.  Also, members 
can develop a local reputation and to meet other business people. 
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ART’s initial board of directors was created by its founders of ART (Sir Adrian Cadbury, 
Pat Conaty, Danyal Sattar).  In 1997, the original board comprised those with key 
expertise:  
Banking and Financial Expertise 
• Ian Clegg (Regional Managing Director, Natwest Bank) 
• Allister Marshall (Finance Manager, Studley High School)  
Business and Operations Expertise 
• Sir Adrian Cadbury (Chair and former Director, Bank of England, Chancellor of 
Aston University) 
• David Brooks (Vice Chair and former Managing Director, Cadbury Schweppes) 
• Clyde Pile (Managing Director, Glass processing and Chair, Birmingham Black 
Business Executive Forum) 
Social Enterprise Expertise 
• Martin Hockly (Manager, ICOF)  
• Louise Kilbride (Housing Consultant)  
• Chris Robertson (Chief Executive, Family Housing Association) 
• Fleur Leach (Investment and Ethical Investment Expertise) 
Management Consultancy Expertise 
• Eoin McCarthy (Management Consultant)  
• Bert Nicholson (Economic Management Consultant) 
These board members were chosen to join the board through the friendship networks (and 
Quakers) surrounding the founders of ART as they provided a rounded skills and 
knowledge base for which ART could draw upon to build its foundations.  Subsequently, 
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Martin Hockly established another Birmingham based CDFI, Street UK, with substantial 
financial backing to set up a national micro credit institution in the UK.  There are many 
more examples of staff or volunteers at ART who have used their skills and expertise to 
strengthen the sector, for example, William Derban who whilst undertaking his PhD on 
CDFIs, volunteered at ART and has since joined Barclays Financial Inclusion Team 
where he has established micro credit facilities in Ghana.  This would suggest that ART 
has acted as a springboard for individuals and the development of other CDFIs.  An 
alternative interpretation of sharing board members with other UK and West Midlands 
organizations is dynamic complexity, whereby people with key skills located in certain 
places are inextricably interlinked. 
 
Since 1997, the board of ART has changed to reflect the needs of the business and to fill 
the gaps that have been left by members as they have resigned.  In 2007, the board 
members were: 
Banking and Financial Expertise 
• Lowry Maclean (Chair and Chair of Wesleyan Assurance Society, past President 
of Birmingham Chamber of Commerce) 
• Ian Clegg (Retired Regional Managing Director of Natwest Bank) 
• Peter Kelly (Head of Financial Inclusion, Barclays Bank) 
• Jeremy Wagg (Credit Policy Director, Futurebuilders) 
• Duncan Murray (Banking Partner, Needham and James Solicitors) 
Social Enterprise Expertise 
• Laurice Ponting (Chief Executive, Mercian Housing Association) 
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Enterprise Expertise 
• Professor John Bryson (Professor of Enterprise and Economic Geography, 
University of Birmingham) 
Public Sector Regional Regeneration Expertise 
• David Ritchie (Retired Head of Government Office for West Midlands) 
Business and Operations Expertise 
• Ray Lowe (Retired Senior Executive, Wesleyan Assurance Society) 
• Honorary President, Sir Adrian Cadbury  
However, this is only one version of the board and there are constant changes.  With this 
information, the key board members of ART can be explored through their backgrounds, 
other relevant information and their influence on ART.  Sir Adrian Cadbury was brought 
up under the Quaker philosophy which has evidently influenced his personal ambition to 
create ART, perhaps as a retirement project.  He attended Eton and went on to read 
economics at Cambridge University where he joined the Olympic rowing team.  He was 
selected as the Chair of UK Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance to 
produce the Cadbury Report in 1992.  Sir Adrian is also a member of the OECD Business 
Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance.  It proved vital to have someone as 
head of the organization with gravitas, business experience and certainly at launch, 
passion.  Steve Walker was on secondment from Barclays when he joined ART as Chief 
Executive.  His contacts at the bank led to the recruitment of two of ART’s staff from 
Barclays.  Without doubt, Sir Adrian Cadbury’s contacts at the Bank of England had 
heard of ART’s activity and he introduced the Chief Executive to the Governor.  
Subsequently, Steve Walker was asked to join a Government Taskforce.  David Brooks 
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was introduced to ART via Sir Adrian Cadbury as he was the Managing Director at 
Cadbury Schweppes and his operational/business experience could then be drawn at 
ART.  Lowry Maclean also attended Eton and Cambridge and was part of the Cambridge 
rowing team and was a contemporary of Sir Adrian’s brother.  Lowry Maclean is 
Chairman of the Wesleyan Assurance Society, and he has a background in the corporate 
world, finance and the West Midlands.  It was through Lowry Maclean that, in 2007, Ray 
Lowe was invited to be on the board of ART.  Ray Lowe has experience of operations so 
was ideal candidate to bolster ART’s operations.  Networks have acted as the key driver, 
and proved vital, in accessing respected and good professional contacts in the board 
member recruitment process and to continue the status of ART as the UK’s leading CDFI 
and the influence of their networks on the future of UK CDFIs.   
 
When the Phoenix Fund was established in 2000, ART, because it was already 
established, was not a major beneficiary.  This was because the Department of Trade and 
Industry28 (DTI) wanted to test different business models.  By the second round, it had 
become recognized that scale was vital to CDFI success and this could only be achieved 
by increasing capital support.  ART had already achieved a degree of scale and only 
required capital (policy guarantee funds) to underwrite the risk in its portfolio and unlike 
many others in the sector did not require revenue support.  By 2005, ART had expanded 
its loan activities and moved more closely to sustainability.  However, along that route it 
was to experience major issues in connection with awareness raising, referrals and 
partnerships, particularly in the area of business support.   
 
                                                 
28 The DTI is now known as the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. 
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Organizational Strategy 
Organizational strategy is viewed as the result of organized relations, between individuals 
and the firm.  O’Neill and Gibson-Graham (1999:20) ‘represent...enterprise as 
disorganized, incoherent and contradictory’ in order to shift the predominant view that 
the firm is fixed into a fluid dynamic entity.  Yet it is important for the organization to be 
consistent and focused on long term objectives.  This is why ART is perhaps different to 
some other UK CDFIs:   
‘right at the outset before a lot of other CDFIs got going, [we were] 
grounded in the principle of trying to move towards sustainability and the 
only way you could move towards sustainability was by lessening your 
requirement over time from the public sector’ (8a, 13.01.06). 
One member of the board suggested that when dealing with the core strategy:  
 ‘[You need to think of an organization as a] temple with three pillars, 
with…ART [as a] foundation and one of those pillars is raising the money, 
and the next one is lending it for the right reasons and the third one is 
trying to get sustainability…reasonably profitably and build the roof and 
you’ve got a sound building’ (8g, UK, 7.02.06). 
This description is useful for conceptual purposes to identify ART’s activity and strategy 
and to consider the larger picture, for example sustainability, whilst also considering the 
day-to-day operations of how this can be achieved and measured (Figure 7.3).   The 
activities and strategy of ART is illustrated in the following diagram: 
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Figure 7.3: Organizational Strategy 
 
 
Sustainability 
Raising Funds 
Missions 
Operational Sustainability 
ART  
 
 
(Source: 8g, UK, 7.02.06) 
 
Organizations’ boards of directors need to set strategy and to recruit committed staff.  
ART’s Chief Executive was mentored by board members Bert Nicholson, Sir Adrian 
Cadbury and David Brooks to get the organization focused on realizing its mission.  It is 
vital that the board of directors is highly committed, motivated and remains focused on 
the wider picture for its long term goals to be realized: 
‘engaging your non-executive directors and trying to give enough of their 
time is a real problem but it will raise the standards’ (8g, UK, 7.02.06). 
In taking account of these issues, systems can be created and implemented, uncertainty 
can be reduced, innovation can occur and risk minimized (Butler and Wilson, 1990), 
including, operational risk, credit risk, liquidity risk (Simpson and Evans, 2005). 
 
Part of ART’s organizational strategy is to encourage professionalism within the CDFI 
sector to ensure the sector has longevity: 
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‘Unless we can get some kind of professional approach into the CDFIs and 
Government and local authorities, it will continue in that British way of 
the gifted amateur, [but a] part time gifted amateur won’t work come the 
first crisis. I mean when the ocean is flat these businesses, even the very 
big ones go along nicely, but when it gets choppy you absolutely have to 
have professionals who understand that business you are in, in difficult 
conditions so I think that’s what [Sir] Adrian [Cadbury] was trying to do 
when he set up ART [which] was to set up a reasonably professionally run 
business, to get a good board [of] executive directors and move that into 
getting non-executive directors who don’t just turn up for board meetings 
but also try to engage with bits of the business, the older ones talk a lot 
like me but the younger ones are the ones who will actually build 
something that matters’  (8g, UK, 7.02.06). 
Owing to ART being an IPS all board members have to be non-executive.  However, 
executives (paid staff) are members of the board but are not directors.  This adds another 
layer of complexity to the operations of ART.  The board also needs to understand the 
complex nature of CDFI activity for CDFIs to work towards future sustainability:   
‘I think they have got to have very clear debates at board level within the 
CDFIs about what their lending strategy and the medium to long term 
strategy is. I think many CDFIs are probably still maturing, there is the 
sort of honeymoon phase and I’m not sure whether they have got the right 
balance of directors on the board. I’m not sure if they have got a really 
long term plan and the issue of demand for their services is another one 
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but there is nothing that I see at the moment that suggests to me that the 
majority of CDFIs will become sustainable in the short to medium term so 
hence I think it is really important they do look at their pricing and their 
risk and look to manage their bad debts because…as…over a number of 
years the CDFI is going to want to raise finance from a number of sources. 
Of course they are getting pump priming support from the Government, 
that support is uncertain as we go forward and other organizations such as 
the private sector such as banks and the foundations have again been 
supporting CDFIs, but how long they will continue to do so is open to 
debate and therefore the CDFI has to build as quickly as possible a good 
track record and the lower the level of defaults that they have the better the 
chance they are going to be able to borrow money against CITR in the 
future.  If there defaults are going to be high then its really going to 
impinge upon their ability to raise finance so, therefore, that could 
impinge the future of the CDFI’ (8h, UK, 05.06.06). 
From this, it is clear that those who work at ART are highly committed individuals, with 
a shared value of helping enterprise access finance and producing a sustainable CDFI.   
 
There is a danger in the implementation of benchmarking by the CDFA as CDFIs need 
skilled people to undertake the task and it is time and cost consuming.  There needs to be 
standardization of methodology, results and guidelines, as for example there are three 
types of operational sustainability (Nicholson and NEF, 2003).  Yet, it is important to 
recognize that: 
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‘you can’t always measure something.  Getting measurement is very, very 
difficult sometimes, but by talking to people and listening and getting 
ideas…[but its about] quality up, costs down, nothing more complicated 
than that. …I think people working together to get a resolution of a 
problem is very important, that you don’t exclude people and you make it 
inclusive’ (8g, UK, 7.02.06). 
Hence, defining the social and financial criteria is a highly complex process at the 
application stage: 
‘The social criteria…started primarily to help identify job creation 
opportunities and it spread out into social areas: is the company supplying 
a service which has the benefit of local community? Then environmental 
issues, does it impact on environmental issues? If it’s a severe one 
obviously it’s not what ART would probably be involved with.  But 
predominantly the social filter would be between 1 and 5 its very much a 
guesstimate … we take a view on the business individual and where they 
score primarily the most focus on that,…if its creates job[s] and doesn’t 
effect the environment, its probably got some social impact by creating 
wealth in the area then that’s what we tend to support’ (8c, UK, 13.01.06). 
In this way, it can be inferred that ART adopts an inclusive approach to decision making 
and practices what it preaches.   Compared to banks, CDFIs experience difficulty in 
measuring and assessing performance.  Each loan fund has a different default rate and the 
different organizations sourcing those funds require accounts and reports at different time 
scales with different information and calculations.  Also, CDFIs work in different 
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markets and operate at different scales which presents a huge challenge to funders and the 
CDFA in trying to produce standard measures.  A metaphor for CDFI operations is a 
game of chess, albeit several games of chess being played at the same time.  Arguably, a 
simple way of reaching the financially excluded would be to administer grants.  
However, this would miss the point about creating businesses, jobs and commercial 
opportunities for the financially excluded and would not incorporate CDFIs missions.   
 
CDFI board members are, in part, motivated by altruism.  In 1948, Beveridge (121) stated 
that: 
‘The philanthropic motive - desire by one’s own personal action to make 
life happier for others - has led to the development in Britain of an 
immense variety of institutions and societies’.    
Without the services donated to CDFIs by their board members, it is unlikely that ART 
would have reached a certain level of maturity.  The networks that the board members are 
embedded provide useful and essential linkages to funders and other sources of expertise.  
For CDFIs to be successful, it is essential for them to become embedded within both the 
public and private spheres of the locality so that they understand the local market.  
Strategic alliances are key to strengthening and creating a cohesive, recognizable sector.  
However, as Schoenberger (1997:47) suggests, ‘strategic alliances must be based on trust 
and open communication…[but they] are by no means problem-free’.  Therefore, the 
fuzzy concept of trust, which often does not exist between enterprises, must be replaced 
by risk minimization.  Minimizing risk is vital within the local network (Lee, 1999), thus 
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it is crucial for CDFIs to become embedded within the locality so that local knowledge 
and trust can be built.   
 
ART’s Clients 
CDFI clients are the raison d’etre of CDFI activity.  In order to access finance from ART, 
the applicant must have been rejected for a loan by a mainstream financial institution and 
be located within a disadvantaged area.  The client must also fit the criteria of the CDFI 
that operates within that geographic area, for example some CDFIs only offer loans to 
women.  Thus, CDFIs operate in a niche market and target specific groups of people.  
CDFIs, such as ART, must ensure that their market is large enough, targeting near 
bankable and viable business propositions, that business support is available and that 
their market is sufficient for them to operate in the long term.  ART has shifted its 
markets from under £10,000 to larger loans.  A constant flow of deals is required to keep 
a CDFI in operation to both secure funds and to use those funds appropriately and in a 
timely manner.  However, there is a lack of awareness of the CDFI brand to attract 
clients: 
‘I suppose ART suffers in the same way that…[other companies] do…is 
awareness of the brand and…I believe there is probably a lot more 
demand out there that ART could do but people don’t know that ART 
exists…I think it’s big problem for ART particularly with the name 
actually ART was a dreadful name, what does ART mean? OK we want to 
get away from Aston so you call yourself ART but it really doesn’t 
describe what you do but ART finance for business does describe a lot 
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better what you do…There isn’t an easy way to reach the small guy who 
may be thinking about setting up his own business.  If there was an easy 
way it would be lovely but there isn’t…So it’s really linking into those 
small businessmen who are thinking of setting up and idea, that’s a 
problem for ART and there is no simple solution’ (8f, UK, 20.01.06).  
This highlights the challenges in attracting clients to ART and the problems in having 
localized CDFIs, as they do not have the resources to market themselves in the same way 
as a commercial business and marketing does not necessarily produce the desired effect, 
for example, ART has advertised in local newspapers and on local radio which resulted in 
only a few deals.  A representative from AWM concurs: 
‘It’s not always the easiest sector to understand and…because it covers 
such a broad spectrum, you sometimes get mixed messages, or it’s 
hard…to get clear messages or policies because they are trying to address 
too many things…I certainly think they could do with discarding probably 
the top end and…at the other end of the spectrum got those involved very 
much on personal and social activity rather than the ones more on 
enterprise and looking to be…independent sustainable businesses.  So I 
think there needs to be…more segmentation…The other thing and I 
realize we are not in a good position to sort of say this, given our name, 
you know we chose to be called Advantage West Midlands rather than the 
West Midlands Regional Development Agency and the point I’m coming 
to is that the problem with the name CDFI’s is that, people outside of 
CDFI’s don’t really know what they are, the name doesn’t really give that 
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much clue.  The best bit is when it’s got ‘finance’ or…‘loan’ in it people 
at least know what loans, most people know what loans are.  It 
distinguishes that they are either being a grant.  Institution sounds a bit 
strange as well and sometimes you get problems with community bit as 
well.  So…one of the things now with…fair finance [consortium] and the 
website that they’ve developed is there’s…issues around markets and the 
[need to] increase [the] of awareness of what CDFI’s are and what they 
do’ (15a, UK, 29.06.06). 
Conversely, an ART member stated that: 
‘[as ART] has been around for a while, so there is some awareness of 
ART amongst the banks so it is known and the fact that they do social 
enterprises as well as small businesses is good but that’s a field still really 
to be exploited. There’s a bit more coming through this year but it’s well 
positioned in the sense that this Government really is committed to the 
development of social enterprises…so ART should be well positioned to 
pick up on the smallest of them’ (8f, UK, 20.01.06).  
When Sir Adrian Cadbury retired and he was replaced by Lowry Maclean, the decision 
was taken that finance for enterprise was the slogan.  Subsequently, in the US, research 
indicated that the words community and development used by CDFI had negative 
associations.  A new campaign has been launched by the US trade association, OFN, 
around the term ‘opportunity finance’.  This is an awareness issue concerning all CDFIs, 
not just ART: 
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‘I think they need to work an awful lot harder about raising awareness and 
I think the CDFA need to be able to help but one of the limiting factors, of 
course, is there isn’t a single brand, you know you have got these different 
CDFIs in the UK, they have all got different names haven’t they? So it 
doesn’t help at all.  This is one of the advantages that the credit unions 
have, they have got one brand and even they have struggled so I’m not 
suggesting that’s the answer but its one part of the answer.  But raising 
awareness in the local community is absolutely essential and, of course, all 
the different cultures in the communities as well so I think they have to 
work a lot harder than that and a lot harder on their relationships with 
solicitors, accountants and particularly the banks and as I say I think the 
way it has to be done is almost giving a business case to those 
organizations why they should support the CDFI rather than I think has 
happened in the past, the CDFI has sought of expected that people will 
support them, they’ve sort of expected that oh because we are socially 
motivated or because we are doing this good for society, people are bound 
to want to work with us, well life doesn’t work like that.  Whatever you’re 
involved with you have to sell yourself and I think CDFIs have got to sell 
themselves a lot better in the local communities’ (8h, 05.06.06). 
There needs to be a clear, simple way of describing UK CDFI activity to potential clients, 
source of referrals, and investors.  As the sector is complex and diverse, it may be 
confusing and daunting for potential clients to approach CDFIs and for people to provide 
referrals to CDFIs.  
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The Clients View of ART 
It was considered that it was also important to gain insight into how clients have 
responded to CDFIs, including ART, so that a rounded, holistic approach could be taken 
to discover the real value of the CDFI approach to providing finance for enterprise.  A 
sample of eight of ARTs clients were selected to survey via telephone to participate in the 
research.  Between 2005 and 2006, ART lent a record total of £1.2 million.  From its 
inception until March 2007, ART had lent ‘£5.5 million to over 310 borrowers’, 
preserving and/or creating over 2800 jobs for local people (ART, 2007b:1).  This was at a 
time (summer 2006) when average borrowings were at the lower level (under £10,000).  
The clients, at the time, were all active in continuing to repay their loans.  The data is not 
in any way representative of ART’s operations.  However, it demonstrates the variety of 
cases that ART deals with.  The data collected from the survey is outlined in Table 7.1.  
Only one client was female, which perhaps demonstrates the low number of women 
seeking and/or accessing loan finance from ART.  The clients were asked to describe 
their ethnic origin so that they were not automatically categorized.  One client did not 
respond to this question, one client described themselves as British, one client was Black, 
one was of Pakistani origin, and four clients described themselves as white.  The ethnicity 
data shows that a high proportion of the clients surveyed were of white origin, although 
this does not reflect the ART loan book.  Six out of eight borrowers were running their 
first business and the half of businesses surveyed were less than three years old.  
Therefore it is not surprising that the majority of reasons for the loan was largely for 
working capital or to purchase equipment.  In two of the cases, the loan was for start-up 
costs.  The referral information highlighted the significance of word of mouth and 
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networks in accessing finance, banks and business support services.  Therefore, it is 
essential that CDFIs network in the locality and the local community.  The loan amounts 
ranged from £5,000 to £20,000, the most common figure being £5,000 to £10,000.  The 
sectors that the clients operated within were retail, social enterprise, consumer services 
(leisure facility) and other, which ranged from education and training to IT services.  It 
appears that the number of jobs created and retained by the loan amount is not linked.  
Therefore, if there are a low number of jobs created and/or retained as a result of the loan, 
the business is or has the potential to provide a vital service for the community and/or 
local economy.  As long as the business is viable and meets the criteria of being 
unbankable and fulfils the double bottom line, the business can access a loan from ART.  
The average perception of the clients experience of ART was 2, a positive score (the 
highest positive rating being 1 and lowest negative rating being 5).  This suggests that 
ART is providing an essential service to the local economy and without sanctioning the 
loans to the enterprises surveyed, they may not exist.             
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Table 7.1: ART Client Survey 
G
ender 
E
thnicity 
First business 
Sector 
T
urnover 
Y
ear business 
started 
R
eferral 
Loan purpose 
A
m
ount of loan 
N
o of jobs Jobs 
created/ 
preserved 
Perception of 
C
D
FI Scale 
(1= positive, 
5= negative) 
M Black  Y Retail £300,000 1999 Friend 
Working 
capital 
5-
10k 4.5 4 
M   Y SE £1m 1998 Bank 
Working 
capital 
cashflow   25 1 
M 
Pakistan
i N Other £50k 2003 Contacts 
Working 
capital 
20k
+ 3 5 
M White Y Retail Unknown 1994 
Business 
Link 
Working 
capital 
10-
15k 0 1 
F White Y Other Unknown 2004 Bank 
Working 
capital 
Equip’t 
5-
10k 1.5 1 
M British N Other £100k 2004 
Business 
Link Start-up 
10-
15k 1 1 
M White  Y SE £1.6m 1996 Friend Equip’t 
5-
10k 
Unkno
wn 1 
M White  Y Retail Unknown 2004 Bank Start up 
15-
20k 5 2 
 
Key 
Equip’t= Equipment 
 
 
(Source: own research) 
 
 
CDFIs need to engage with their clients post-loan to ensure that their businesses are 
receiving appropriate support, monitor the client to ensure that the loan will be repaid and 
perhaps to recognize whether the clients needs an additional loan in the future.  Although, 
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one ART board member commented that ‘ART operates well though there is a need to 
‘interact’ with borrowers more’ (8e, UK, 19.01.06).  This reflects the conflict between 
wanting to help the client and the client not wishing to receive additional support at that 
time and also the cost of providing business support.   
 
ART Risk Profile 
A quantitative analysis of the ART loan data was undertaken to identify the risks in the 
lending process.  The quantitative analysis of the ART risk profile identified that the most 
significant category was the ‘lender’.  This is due to the results illustrating that if one 
person, i.e. the loan officer or ‘recommender’ sanctioned a loan of less than £5,000 then 
there is 66% chance of the loan defaulting.  If two people ‘sanctioned’ the loan (£10,000 
to £20,000) i.e. loan officer and chief executive, then the risk of the loan defaulting is 
61%.  If the loan is £20,000 or above and is sanctioned by a few of the board of directors 
then there is 41% of the loan defaulting.  The key issue here is that the risk of the loan 
defaulting between ‘recommender’ and ‘director’ is 25%.  However, there are caveats to 
this analysis.  The first is that the data are for 1997 to 2005.  Since 2005, ART has 
recognized that the loans sanctioned under £10,000 had a greater risk of defaulting.  As a 
result, ART has increased its loan size and they now offer £10,000 to £50,000.  The 
increase in loan size suggests that ART is exposing itself to greater risk.  Instead, by 
increasing the loan size available, ART has shifted away from start-up and smaller micro-
enterprise loans, which are higher risk, and established itself in the existing enterprise and 
SME market.  Without sufficient guarantee funds to sustain the risk levels of loans under 
£10,000 it became untenable to serve the start-up and smaller micro-enterprise market.  
 283
In this way, ART has developed its operational model as the market has shifted, 
reflecting the notion that businesses evolve over time and it has also been able to fulfil its 
mission by supporting local jobs for local people in existing businesses with a financing 
requirement that not able to be met by others.          
 
Conclusions 
The first part of the chapter explored the geographical debates relating to CDFI activity, 
namely charity, access to finance and uneven development.  This reflected the complexity 
and difficulty in defining CDFI activity.  The second part of the chapter showed how 
CDFIs fulfil a triple bottom line to highlight how difficult it is to balance their operations.  
The third part of the chapter explored a West Midland CDFI case study to demonstrate 
the complexity, dynamics, balancing and triple bottom line of ART.  This was achieved 
by exploring how and why ART was established, the nature of its operations, its board of 
directors and its clients.  This was to highlight the significance of CDFI board members 
in developing organizational strategy which essentially informs how the CDFI is 
managed and embedded in a range of networks, including access to potential borrowers 
and sources of clients.  In sum, the ART case study illustrates the dynamic complexity 
surrounding CDFI operations. 
         
The chapter has explored the dynamics surrounding West Midlands CDFIs in order to 
highlight the drivers of CDFI operations aside from funding and political support.  The 
research has revealed that social relations, altruism, time, space are key to the success of 
CDFI operations.  As CDFIs are social enterprises, they can fulfil philanthropic ambition, 
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yet the research has shown that CDFIs still need to be viable businesses.  Moreover, 
CDFIs need to fulfil their mission of providing access to finance for enterprise which 
means that they should concentrate on their enterprise markets and perhaps increase their 
geographical coverage so that all firms have equal opportunity.   
 
This chapter has explored ART as a case study to highlight the complexity of UK CDFI 
operations within West Midlands CDFIs to show the issues that CDFIs face.  The 
complexity of balancing CDFI operations is pervasive throughout the system.  Balancing 
the social, economic and environmental objectives is inherent throughout the lending 
process and decision making, sources and uses of funding (and their restrictions), the 
staff, board of directors and their networks.  As such, the triple bottom line infiltrates and 
influences each part of the CDFI.  The complexity is, therefore, inherent within each 
individual, the CDFI system, and each loan decision.  In comparison to mainstream banks 
which have a neat standardized system, CDFIs can be characterized as dynamic 
complexity.   
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CHAPTER 8  OVERCOMING FINANCIAL EXCLUSION? US AND UK CDFIS 
 
This thesis has explored the geographies, operations, effectiveness and potential impacts 
of US and UK CDFIs.  The analysis began by exploring the existence of a number of 
financial gaps that prevent firms from obtaining loans to finance the establishment of new 
business ventures or to invest in existing enterprises.  The persistence of the start-up 
finance gap indicates that mainstream financial institutions are disinclined to lend to 
enterprises, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, that do not have the right business track 
record, or lack appropriate collateral.  CDFIs aim to help bridge the funding gap that 
affect these enterprises.  CDFIs are place-based institutions that engage in strategic 
interventions in local economies using local knowledge to counter disadvantage, lessen 
the impact of start-up finance gaps and create business opportunities.  This thesis has 
explored US and UK CDFI lending processes to determine how the triple bottom line is 
balanced and the ways in which CDFIs become embedded within local financial and 
business support networks.  The research included extensive semi-structured interviews 
with key actors in the US and UK CDFI sectors, CDFI borrowers and a detailed case 
study of ART’s loan portfolio to explore how CDFIs operate and balance their social and 
financial objectives.  The key contributions of this thesis are first, its exploration of 
access to finance for enterprises which are financially excluded from mainstream 
financial institutions, second through an analysis of CDFIs as a source of finance for 
enterprise and third, a comparative study of US and UK CDFIs.  This chapter will, first, 
consider; the alternative nature of CDFIs, the different types of CDFIs, the dynamic 
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complexity of CDFI operations, triple bottom line and the uneven access to enterprise 
finance and, second, identifies where future research might focus.  
 
US and UK CDFI Operations 
This thesis began by exploring if US and UK CDFIs could be considered as alternative 
financial vehicles, compared to the mainstream banks, as they help individuals and firms 
that have been financially excluded.  CDFIs serve financially excluded enterprises by 
providing access to credit and, in so doing, overcome financial exclusion in which 
individuals are denied access to various forms of financial products and services.  In 
working to a triple bottom line, CDFIs are independent financial institutions that provide 
capital and support to empower individuals or organizations at the commercial margins to 
develop opportunity and wealth in disadvantaged areas.  These institutions are involved 
in relatively high risk lending and consequently have high default rates.  In simple terms, 
two types of CDFI can be identified (with three different operating styles).  First, those 
that set their own strategies and agendas and, second, those that have been established in 
response to public policy.  CDFIs only provide a partial solution to the finance gap as    
there is an uneven geography of CDFI provision.  Many CDFIs have been established by 
local volunteers rather than being the product of an organized movement or public policy 
intended to ensure equal access to CDFI services throughout the US and UK.  At the 
moment, an unequal geography of CDFI provision implies that CDFI will only contribute 
to overcoming financial exclusion in some parts of the US and UK.   
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Uneven Access to Finance 
The issue of uneven access to finance amongst US and UK CDFIs was explored 
throughout this thesis.  CDFIs have not yet developed at the scale that is required to 
overcome financial exclusion.  Lending to those that are financially viable but excluded 
from mainstream finance is difficult and also is associated with relatively high financial 
risks for the CDFI.  UK CDFIs offer finance at rates that are higher than mainstream 
financial institutions as they are taking on additional risk by acting as lenders of last 
resort, operate in disadvantaged communities and rarely have access to collateral to 
guarantee their loans.  As many CDFIs operate revolving loan funds, they rely on loans 
being repaid on time and in full.  CDFIs will never become sustainable as they require 
grant funding to underwrite the risk of lending to the financially excluded and to cover 
the cost of defaulting loans.  Some CDFIs try to balance their lending by operating in 
different markets, for example, social enterprise loans are low risk which can offset the 
risk of lending to micro-enterprises.  The demand for social enterprise loans is low which 
makes it difficult to balance a CDFIs loan portfolio.  If a CDFIs manages its default rate, 
take lower risks and becomes nearly sustainable then the danger is that it may begin to 
operate in a near to mainstream manner and this would mean that a greater finance gap 
would continue to exist in their area of operation.  It is important to note that like poverty 
finance gaps are a relative concept.  A financial gap will always exist as some business 
proposition will never be viable financial propositions.  
 
US and UK CDFIs may never achieve the scale to have a significant impact on 
financially excluded enterprises. Each CDFI has a different business model, operational 
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structure, funding streams, markets, products, services, and scale which is leaving 
geographical gaps in the types of finance available.  A CDFI may be embedded in the 
locality and responsive to local needs but the demand may not be met as the area has 
multiple needs, for example business and personal finance.  Neither will they achieve 
scale without consistent and relatively constant policy support.  A significant proportion 
of US and UK CDFIs remain dependent upon Government support as many CDFIs have 
not reached sufficient scale and maturity to be independent of external funding.  Some 
US and UK CDFIs supplement their lending through their existing enterprise support 
services.  Some CDFIs have been able to source other funding streams from not-for-profit 
foundations, banks (through market value loans), and private investors.  Attracting 
funding is problematic due to a lack of transparency and benchmarking within the sector. 
This research has established an understanding of the geographies created by CDFIs. 
Coverage is dependent upon groups of individuals coming together to establish a CDFI 
with the right expertise and experience. This process means that CDFIs are locally 
embedded institutions that are designed to address local needs through the articulation of 
different operational models.   
 
Alternative Geographies of Finance? 
US and UK CDFIs are creating alternative geographies of finance due to the application 
of their social missions.  However, their missions have evolved over time so there is a 
constant conflict between mission and sustainability.  Also, some US and UK CDFIs 
have been established by pioneering social entrepreneurs.  Yet, as the social 
entrepreneurs may not have all the skills required to run this type of business, people 
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from banking backgrounds have been recruited thereby beginning a process by which 
CDFI activity is becoming institutionalized and formalized.  US and UK CDFI lending 
activity relies on old fashioned banking practices which ignores credit scoring and 
assesses the viability of each application individually through a review of the character 
and ability of the client to repay the loan.  The quality of the relationships banking that 
exists between a CDFI and its borrowers must be questioned as the quality of the 
relationship may decay during the course of the loan – from strong during the loan 
application process to weak during times when the borrower may default.  Thus, the type 
of CDFI relationship banking is time and space specific.  US CDFIs are not lenders of 
last resort and strategically target ‘emerging markets’ rather than deprived markets 
where, in some cases, they are competing with banks for business but UK CDFIs are 
lenders of last resort.  US CDFIs have taken the place of local banks which have shifted 
their operations towards national and international markets.  As a result, it can be 
suggested that US and UK CDFIs complement neoliberal capitalism and are not 
oppositional to the mainstream banks as they rely on the state and complement 
mainstream financial institutions (Amin et al. 2002) and act as a stepping stone to make 
borrowers bankable in the long term.   
 
The Different Types of CDFIs 
This research identified that three different types of CDFI operate in the US and UK: 
policy driven CDFIs (of which project based CDFIs are a subset), diverse CDFIs and 
balanced CDFIs.  Policy driven CDFIs are those that were established, or shifted their 
operations, in response to policy and access to public funding.  However, Government 
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provided funding does not necessarily match client needs.  Among policy driven CDFIs 
there is a subset of CDFIs identified as project based CDFIs which operate a number of 
funds on a short term basis to deliver grant funded policy initiatives.  Diverse CDFIs have 
diversified their products and markets and in the process, have become increasingly 
commercial.  However, these CDFIs have adopted an entrepreneurial operational strategy 
and have become increasingly risk averse in an attempt to make their activities 
sustainable.  Diverse CDFI activity suggests that they aim to be independent of public 
funds and the limits surrounding the use of public funds.  Balanced CDFIs are a small 
subset of policy driven and project based CDFIs that have more diversified funding 
streams and try to manage to balance their financial and social missions.  As a result, 
these CDFIs may be successfully reaching financially excluded enterprises.  By balancing 
their portfolio, these CDFIs may attract additional funding from foundation and not-for-
profit investment.  By adapting the balanced operating style, CDFIs may become 
respected by those within and out of the sector and be viewed as models of best practice.  
It may be suggested that the diversity of US and UK CDFIs is a result of access to certain 
funding streams (government, not-for-profit, individuals, private sector business) and the 
use of these funds influences their strategies, operations and missions.   
 
Dynamic Complexity of US and UK CDFIs 
US and UK CDFIs can be linked through the concepts of complexity and dynamism.  
CDFIs are highly complex organizations.  CDFI operations are constrained by the 
geography and flow of funds into and out of the organization.  Within the lending process 
temporary complexity exists as the lending committee balances the risks and rewards of 
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each loan alongside the CDFIs strategy.  CDFIs have not yet established generic criteria 
to measure and monitor their activities.  As CDFIs grow and become established 
organizations they will need to measure their impacts and sustainability.  The difficulties 
in producing accountable organizations reflects the fact that CDFIs cannot easily be 
benchmarked against each other – each CDFI in the UK tends to be distinctive and the 
‘sector’ is best described as heterogeneous.  Given this CDFI performance cannot be 
measured and compared and perhaps this implies that the trade associations (OFN and 
CDFA) are redundant organizations.  Innovation within the sector might be undermined 
if all CDFI adopted a common business model and it is important to remember that 
CDFIs have developed to meet the requirements of local needs.  
  
Triple Bottom Line 
The dynamic complexity of CDFIs can also be demonstrated through their triple bottom 
line (Figure 7.2).  The triple bottom line incorporates three related dimensions: social, 
financial and environmental objectives.  Within each objective lies a set of values.  It is 
these values which influence and provide another level of the complexity that exists 
within CDFI operations, particularly within the loan decision process.  First, the financial 
objectives are to create financial inclusion through employment and access to finance.  
Second, the social objectives of CDFIs promote social inclusion by creating or retaining 
local jobs.  Third, the environmental objectives are typified by lending to a specific 
geographical area, and businesses that promote environmentally friendly practices.  These 
objectives are all intricately linked which makes it hard to separate them into discrete 
issues.  CDFI operations, the loan application process and performance measurement 
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remains a challenge for each CDFI.  The interrelated nature of these criteria is the reason 
why the boundaries of these concepts are blurred and that CDFIs are diverse and complex 
organizations.  As the balance between the financial, social, environmental objectives has 
to be sustained and the flows into, within and out of each CDFI constantly change, it 
could be stated that CDFIs are dynamic and flexible organizations which respond to and 
instigate change depending on their strategy and operating style.  In this way, it may be 
argued that some US and UK CDFIs are experiencing controlled, sustainable failure as 
long-term sustainability can never be maintained without a constant injection of external 
capital to cover loans that have defaulted.   
 
There is an assumption by the US and UK Government that a finance gap exists within 
the start-up market.  It is important to remember that CDFIs are an effective means of 
creating and protecting local employment.  The cost of subsidizing a CDFI’s operations is 
perhaps much lower than the costs related to long term welfare payments.  The ART 
borrower’s survey suggests that CDFIs are providing an essential service to the local 
community or economy and that they play an important role in maintaining and creating 
local employment.  
 
Further Research 
This research has explored US and UK CDFIs as one part of the solution to tackle 
financially excluded enterprises located in a particular time and space.  The research has 
focused on access to finance for enterprise using US and UK CDFIs as an example of 
financing marginalized communities to reduce inequality within the financial system and 
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society.  CDFIs are, therefore, only part of the story as they operate revolving loan funds, 
and are a particular type of CDFI.  Further research should explore the wider role CDFIs 
play in local economies by undertaking research into community development banks, 
community development credit unions, community development loan funds, and 
community development venture capital funds including personal and enterprise finance.  
Moreover, as UK CDFIs are currently at a critical juncture in their development there 
remains scope for future research as the CDFI sector matures and develops over the 
coming years.  Another strand of research that urgently needs to be undertaken is detailed 
research into CDFI clients and especially the longer term social, economic and political 
impacts that can be related to CDFI lending activities.  
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 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 3.1: UK CDFIs 
Abi Associates 
ACETS 
Arrow Fund 
Aspire: Micro Loans for Business 
Aston Reinvestment Trust (ART) 
BigInvest 
Black Business in Birmingham 
 
Black Country Reinvestment Society 
Blackpool Moneyline 
Bolton Business Ventures Ltd (BBV) 
Bradford Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Bridges Community Ventures 
Bristol Enterprise Development Fund 
Business in Prisons 
Business Link Berkshire/Wiltshire Fund2Grow  
Capitalise Business Support Ltd (CBS) 
CEED 
Change: Community Finance 
Charity Bank 
Coventry and Warwickshire Reinvestment Trust 
Culture Finance North West 
Cumbria Asset Reinvestment Trust (CART) 
Derby Loans 
Developing Strathclyde 
DIP 
East End Reinvestment Trust - EERT (See Fair Finance) 
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East Lancashire Moneyline (ELM) 
East London Small Business Centre 
Enterprise Loan Fund 
Environment Trust (See Fair Finance) 
Ethnic Business Development Corporation (Ethnic Mutual) 
Fair Finance (part of East End Reinvestment Trust) 
First Enterprise Business Agency 
Five Lamps 
Frederick’s Foundation 
Future Builders 
Gloucestershire Development Loan Fund 
Goole Development Trust 
Granby Toxteth Development Trust 
HBV Enterprise 
Head for Business 
IMPACT-Communities in Partnership for Action / Moneyline Yorkshire 
Impetus MARCHES 
Incredit 
Industrial Common Ownership Finance (ICOF) 
Into Business Scheme 
Key Fund South Yorkshire 
Lincolnshire Development 
Local Investment Fund (LIF) 
London Rebuilding Society (LRS) 
MANSKEP 
Merseyside Special Investment fund (MSIF) 
Moneyline Yorkshire (IPS) Ltd 
Nazir Assciates/West Midlands Inclusive Fund (Halal Fund) 
New Horizons Saving and Loan Scheme (NHSLS) 
Norfolk and Waveney Enterprise Services (NWES) 
North Derbyshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
North East Social Enterprise Partnership 
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North London Chamber and Enterprise Credit Union 
North Staffs Risk Capital Fund 
Northern Oak Credit Union 
Onelondon 
Partnership Investment Fund 
Preston Moneyline 
Project North East (PNE) 
Prya Partnerships 
Salford Moneyline (SML) 
Sandwell Advice and Moneylink (SAM) 
Social Investment Scotland (SIS) 
South Coast Moneyline (aka PART) 
South East Northumberland Enterprise Trust (SENET) 
South West Investment Group (SWIG) 
South Yorkshire Investment Fund 
Street North East 
Street UK 
Suffolk Regeneration Trust (SRT) 
Sussex Enterprise 
The Enterprise Fund 
The Prime Initiative 
The Prince’s Trust 
Train 2000 
Triodos Bank 
Ulster Community Investment Trust 
Urban Partnership Group 
Wessex Reinvestment Trust 
West Yorkshire Enterprise Agency/MYCCI 
Women’s Education in Building 
Women’s Employment Enterprise and Training Unit (WEETU) 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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Appendix 3.2: Email to Potential US and UK CDFI Case Studies 
Re: Overcoming Financial Exclusion: CDFIs and the balancing of financial and social objectives 
 
I am a Doctoral researcher in the Department of Geography at the University of Birmingham, UK 
sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and working with the Aston 
Reinvestment Trust (ART).  My research focuses on CDFIs that provide finance for business enterprises in 
the UK and USA.  This is to discover how CDFIs balance their socio-financial objectives whilst developing 
their business activity.  The research aims to; 
 
1.      understand how CDFIs provide access to finance and how they bridge 
the gap between fulfilling social objectives and economic purposes. 
 
2.      define how CDFIs in the UK and USA identify and measure 
effectiveness of socio-economic criteria that drive the business. 
 
3.      compare CDFIs with other UK and USA CDFIs through benchmarking. 
 
4.     consider the processes in which CDFIs become embedded in local 
financial and business support networks. 
 
5.     this is to essentially, identify best practice to develop and inform 
other UK CDFIs in the future. 
 
I would like to arrange to spend a day at your office to gain an understanding of the organization and how it 
operates, and to undertake a series of interviews with yourself (on your role, also how and why your 
organization has developed in the way it has),  2 loan officers (on the application process), 2 or 3 members 
of the board (on their role and experience) and 4 small business clients (on the application process and how 
a loan from your organization has made their business succeed). 
 
In return for assisting my research, I will send you a summary of my findings towards the end of my 
project. 
 
I am available to visit your organization at your convenience. 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
 
Lindsey Appleyard 
 
Doctoral Researcher 
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
The University of Birmingham, UK 
 
 
(Source: Own Research) 
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Appendix 3.3: Interview Questions for US and UK CDFI Case Studies 
Introductory questions  
• What is your background/role?  
 
How and why was the CDFI established? 
• Who founded the organization? 
• When was the CDFI founded?(Month/Year) 
• What is the role/mission of the CDFI? 
• When did the organization start financing? 
• How has the organization developed?  
• Why has it done so in this way? 
• Which (geographical) areas do you serve? 
• Disagreements/conflict resolution?  
 
How is it run? (Resources- finance, labour, etc) 
• How many staff? What are their roles? 
• No of loans approved?  
• Size of funding?  
• Bad debt rate? 
• Interest rate? 
• Sectors?  
• Size of Loans?  
• Purpose of loan? 
• Any other services? 
• Disagreements/conflict resolution?  
 
How was it financed? 
• What methods do you use to raise capital?  
 
Networks 
• What proportion of your organizations time is spent:  
o delivering services  
o securing funding 
 
• What is your relationship with: other CDFIs; other institutions?  
• Do you co-ordinate with other organizations locally/regionally/nationally/internationally? 
• How do CDFIs become embedded within the system/network/locality? 
 
Referrals/Applications (Declines/Accepted) 
• Lending Criteria 
• Lending process 
• What do your clients think they are assessed on? 
• Referrals? From who? Under what circumstances? How efficient is this for deal flow? 
• Monitoring process? 
• Post-loan support? 
• Details of Client case studies 
• How do they reach their target market? 
• How do they define bad debt/write off rates? 
• Cost per loan? 
• Disagreements/conflict resolution?  
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Performance 
• How do you measure your CDFIs performance?  
• How do you define social and economic criteria? 
• Do you use benchmarking? 
• Define sustainability 
 
Finally 
• What factors facilitate your work? 
• What factors hinder your work? 
• How do you see the market changing in the future? 
• How will your CDFI respond?  
 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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Appendix 3.4: Client Questionnaire 
• Age of business owner 
• Gender 
• Ethnicity 
• Any previous experience in market 
• First or only business 
• No of owners 
• Legal status of business 
• What does business do 
• What is distinctive about its products/services 
• Reason for seeking finance 
• Why ART 
• Other funding 
• Other organizations approached prior to ART 
• Differences in obtaining finance 
• Impact on access to finance 
• Additional impact 
• Location 
• Sector 
• Turnover 
• No of employees 
• Loan Category 
• Year Business Started 
• Referral 
• Time since loan 
• Loan purpose 
• Amount of loan 
• Loan term 
• Application process 
• What was good 
• What could be better 
• Interest rates 
• Post loan support 
• Repayment problems 
• Future loans 
• What contribution does your company make to the local economy? 
• No of jobs created/preserved 
• Jobs created by category 
• Perception of CDFI scale 
• Any comments 
 
(Source: Own research) 
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Appendix 5.1: Case Study 2 
Case Study two was established in 1985 with the purpose of creating wealth and 
opportunity in deprived areas to people and places through socially responsible 
investment (2a).   This CDFI serves a sub-regional geographical area in both urban and 
rural locations.  The total value of loans delivered (at the end of the 2004/5 financial 
year) was in excess of $440 million through 1500 transactions.  In 2004/5, case study two 
had invested $82.5 million in loans to the local community.  The CDFI offers finance to a 
number of sectors including affordable housing, community projects, private equity 
(which is supported in part by the NMTC), small business and sustainable energy (for 
renewable and/or energy efficiency projects) in ‘emerging markets’ (2h).  The variety and 
scale at which this organization operates is indicative of the challenge that CDFIs face 
when defining their activities.  Moreover this case study highlights the difficulty in 
defining CDFI activity as they are so diverse and dynamic and shift according to the 
market and funding requirements.   The small business lending team was established in 
1998 and has since financed over 200 small businesses.  This figure is low within the 
total number of transactions and small business activity accounts for just 14% of the 
cumulative total organizations lending operations.  This low figure can be accounted for 
in the small business default rate which is between 10-15%.  As such, providing finance 
to small business is high risk in comparison to community based lending and the more 
secure, low risk, high figure loans for affordable housing and community projects offsets 
the risk when lending to small business.  The small business operations mitigate risk by 
providing other services to clients such as technical assistance and always take collateral 
in the form of personal guarantee, security and/or SBA Guarantee.  In addition, the small 
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business team would even like to devise a credit scoring model for CDFIs.   Due to the 
risk aversion of this case study, they have been able to become 91% sustainable.  By 
taking a risk averse approach, does this mean that CDFIs are transforming themselves 
into mini-banks?   
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Appendix 5.2: Balance Sheet of Case Study 2 
Financial Position Data 
 
2005 
 
($ in thousands) 
 
Total assets 114,008   
Loans and leases receivable 61,672   
Allowance for loan and lease losses 3,083   
Investments 28,350   
Programme Investments 802   
Investments in limited partnerships 4,853   
Loans payable 58,617   
     
Net assets    
Unrestricted 21,818   
Temporary restricted 14,707   
Permanently restricted 6,944   
  43,469   
     
Total net assets 43,469   
     
Activities Data    
Net interest income 3,368   
Provision for loan and lease losses 390   
Investment advisory fees 1,501   
Grants and contributions 8,828   
Programme services and fees 3,103   
Change in net assets 11145   
     
     
Other Data    
Assets under management 255,380   
Allowance for loan and lease losses 5%   
as a % of total loans and leases    
Net loan loss (recovery) ratio 0.25   
Self-sufficiency ratio 91%   
     
     
Total Financing 82.5 m   
Commercial Real Estate 36.8m 
(34.3m of that is 
NMTC) 
Loan loss provision 390k   
Net charge off 155k   
Policy, Workforce and Neighbourhood Development Programmes 2m   
     
Consolidated assets  114m   
Capital under management 255.4m   
 
(Source: Case Study 2 Annual Report, 2005) 
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